Mapping Women, Peace and Security in the UN Security Council: 2018
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The overall aim of the policy brief is to assess the implementation of the women, peace, and security (WPS) policy framework in the work of the Security Council (SC). The analysis and recommendations build on our well-established policy guidance project, the Monthly Action Points (MAP) on Women, Peace and Security, as well as broader advocacy throughout 2018.

A year before the 20th anniversary of the adoption of United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000), progress on women’s rights has wavered both outside and within the UN. Despite a strong normative framework, repeated commitments by the UN system and Member States, and the wealth of evidence on the importance of ensuring gender equality and women’s participation in peace and security efforts, implementation of the agenda continues to be uneven and selective, and normative progress a challenge.

Our analysis of the Security Council’s performance over 2018 shows that its approach to WPS remains superficial, ad-hoc and inconsistent; subject to the individual efforts of Security Council members rather than being systematically integrated into Council action; and reflects a lack of willingness to tackle the harder and more complex issues under the WPS agenda. Its approach is defined by a lack of accountability for failure to fully implement all provisions of the ten resolutions that constitute the WPS agenda.

Conflicts around the world disproportionately impact the health, safety, and the rights of women, yet women continue to be excluded from decision-making processes that determine their future. Although the Security Council paid increased attention to women’s participation in peace processes in 2018, women still faced challenges at every level, and at every stage, of peace and reconciliation processes and dialogues currently taking place. As has been widely noted, the Yemen peace talks held in Sweden last December included one woman out of the government’s 12 delegates, while the Houthi delegation included none. The resulting Stockholm Agreement, which does not contain any specific provisions on gender or women, fails to adequately address the deeply gendered impact of the conflict on Yemeni women and girls. Although there were attempts to include Yemeni women in other ways, such as the role of various advisory groups at different stages of the process, exclusion from the formal process led to a lack of meaningful participation and limited influence over the outcome. Similarly, peace talks between the United States and the Taliban sidelined not only the Afghan government, but also Afghan women, whose rights are at particular risk. There are many other examples of women’s exclusion from peace processes or where women’s rights have been viewed as dispensable or secondary to getting warring parties to the table.

Given the overwhelming evidence that gender equality is critical for conflict prevention, such exclusion actively undermines peace. This means that there needs to be more focused attention on the gendered challenges and barriers to participation, rather than mere rhetorical acknowledgment of the importance of women’s participation. It also reflects the need for more attention to the full scope of women’s rights. Our analysis shows that while attention to the important issue of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) continues to receive dedicated and annually increasing attention by the Security Council - in 2018, 90% of the references to women’s rights in reports of peace operations were focused on SGBV, accounting for 45% of all references to WPS - women’s rights more broadly have failed to receive an equal amount of attention. Recognition of the interrelated and mutually reinforcing nature of all pillars of the agenda - for instance, that protection of women from gender-based violence is inseparable from their meaningful participation, bodily autonomy and rights, and that ensuring accountability for violations of fundamental human rights is necessary in order to prevent relapse into conflict - remains critical for the advancement of the agenda as a whole.

The pushback against women’s participation is not restricted to exclusion from formal negotiations over peace agreements. The Special Rapporteur on human rights defenders reported worsening violence against women human rights defenders in March 2019, and highlighted how “the rise in misogynistic, sexist and homophobic speech by political leaders in recent years has normalized violence against women human rights defenders.” Meanwhile, new research published by the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) tracking active repression of women engaged in various ways in the public sphere, including in political processes and protests, shows that women have been facing “unprecedented levels” of violence, especially in the past 18 months. These global trends highlight how women routinely face retaliation for engaging in politics, for peacefully protesting, and for advocating for human rights, including their own. As long as ordinary women and LGBTIQ+ persons, human rights defenders (HRDs), women activists, and women politicians are the targets of violence and harassment, they cannot freely participate in public life. The failure of the Security Council to adequately address the issue of women HRDs in outcome documents is one of the clearest gaps in its implementation of the WPS agenda.

Normative progress on WPS has been arrested by growing geopolitical divides within the UN Security Council and
broader attacks on multilateralism, as well as attempts from various quarters to undermine international human rights and humanitarian law. These attempts are taking place against the backdrop of the spread of populism, violent extremism, and growing economic inequality, all of which are deeply gendered phenomena. In the last year, there have been increasing and direct attacks on women’s rights as well as on core principles of international humanitarian and human rights law, including as they apply to sexual and reproductive rights, and sexual orientation, gender identity, and expression, and sex characteristics (SOGIESC). These attempts have been made by a variety of actors around the world as well as within the very UN bodies tasked with protecting human rights and ensuring peace and security, such as the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Commission on the Status of Women.

The Security Council’s continuing omission of the ways in which LGBTIQ+ persons are affected by conflict was starkly represented by the fact that there was only one reference to LGBTIQ+ persons in any Council document in 2018, and it was in a report of the Secretary-General. Similarly, only one reference was made to sexual and reproductive rights, also in the context of a report of the Secretary-General. Overall no outcome document adopted by the Security Council included any reference to these two crucial issues. However, one of the most concerning developments in the past 18 months was the context in which we saw the adoption of the ninth WPS resolution. Resolution 2467 (2019), passed under the German presidency of the Security Council in April 2019, proved to be an indicator of the worrying landscape for women’s rights, which was also reflected in the difficult negotiations preceding the adoption. The threat of the veto by the United States led to the removal of explicit references to sexual and reproductive health in the context of a “survivor-centered approach” to conflict-related sexual violence, excluding one of the critical elements that survivors most need. Two permanent members of the Security Council, China, and Russia, after attempting to expunge human rights language and references to civil society, abstained for the first time on a WPS resolution. Divides within and outside the Council meant that language not only on sexual and reproductive health and rights but on other issues - such as HRDs, the International Criminal Court, and arms embargoes - also suffered. Although modest gains were made in several areas, the political cost of adopting Resolution 2467 (2019) was the shattering of consensus on the WPS agenda a year before the 20th anniversary of the adoption of Resolution 1325 (2000). Although the recently adopted Resolution 2493 (2019) raised concerns that it set a less than ambitious tone for the 19th anniversary of the WPS agenda, it affirmed Security Council consensus and cross-regional support around the existing normative framework.

The developments over the past year reinforce the need for the WPS agenda to be firmly grounded in gender equality and human rights, for both leadership and accountability by the UN system, and for Member States to recognize women’s rights as essential for prevention of conflict and to take bold, principled action to protect and advance the normative framework of the WPS agenda. It is critical to recognize the interrelated, inseparable, and mutually reinforcing nature of all elements of the WPS agenda and the importance of full, not selective, implementation. A lack of accountability for failure to implement WPS both within the UN as well as outside it indicates that there is little to stop women’s rights from being eroded, demoted or traded away in matters of peace and security. There must be greater institutional accountability and responsibility of senior UN officials for WPS to ensure that the UN consistently upholds these standards. Now, more than ever, it is also critical that Member States speak out when the rights of women and girls are under attack.

Defending the fundamental tenets of the agenda, including the full scope of women’s human rights, and pushing for full implementation, while important, must not compromise advancing the agenda. Advances, however, require addressing identified gaps and ensuring a measurable impact on the ground. The most credible benchmark of meaningful advancement is a positive change in the lives of conflict-affected communities.
Overall Trends

When collectively reviewing the Security Council’s implementation of WPS over the last 19 years, it is undeniable that there has been progress. At the normative level, the expansion of language in outcomes adopted by the Council is considerable, and throughout the UN system, there’s been an effort to institutionalize and root the WPS agenda within its peace and security architecture.

As of 2018, the vast majority of peace operations are now mandated to address WPS in a cross-cutting manner. The Council also adopted the most robust language on gender-sensitive conflict prevention to date for the missions in Central Africa and West Africa & the Sahel, and called on gender analysis to be central to the planning, implementation, and transition for the mission in Sudan (Darfur). Sanctions regimes continue to be strengthened by ensuring they are explicitly paying attention to SGBV, and there continues to be an improvement in calling on associated expert groups to have gender expertise and address WPS in their reporting.

There has also been an increasing trend of utilizing additional mechanisms to complement and pressure the Council to improve its attention to WPS. The Security Council Informal Expert Group (IEG) on WPS has been an important new mechanism that highlights the gender dimensions of particular conflict-affected situations and strengthens the flow of information on WPS overall. Another recent development that has served to amplify WPS within the Council are the utilization of “solidarity missions” by senior UN leadership; these solidarity missions are often followed-up on by briefings to the Security Council. Further, the number of civil society speakers briefing during country-specific meetings of the Security Council has exponentially increased since 2016. Security Council members have repeatedly, publicly recognized the contribution of civil society briefers, particularly women leaders, as immensely valuable to their deliberations.

Yet, as will be further discussed throughout this brief, the Security Council is still far from meeting its obligations and the extent to which these developments have had a positive, meaningful impact on conflict-affected communities – the true test for success of the WPS agenda – is uncertain. The ad-hoc nature of the Council’s attention to WPS suggests that progress is often driven by individual Security Council members who have a commitment to the agenda as part of their foreign policy. Our analysis indicates that without this pressure from particularly interested Council members and the institutionalization of WPS within the bureaucracy of the UN system, WPS issues would remain overlooked and unaddressed. As it stands, despite the progress outlined above, WPS is often tokenized and only addressed at the most superficial of levels. As we illustrate below, the work of WPS requires transforming norms and changing the status quo, which will require real accountability.⁵
Ad-hoc and inconsistent implementation

The continued ad-hoc and inconsistent implementation of the women, peace and security agenda over the last two decades by the Security Council reflects a selective approach to WPS and a lack of accountability for the meaningful achievement of the WPS agenda.

Consistent implementation of the WPS agenda means that all components of the agenda are fully and holistically reflected in all aspects of the Security Council’s work: resolutions, presidential statements, discussions in formal meetings, reports of the Secretary-General, and the work of subsidiary organs, including sanctions committees and the Working Group on children and armed conflict. WPS discussed in one context should be reinforced in all other contexts, and also build and progress over time. WPS commitments should then be translated into budgetary commitments, which results in funding staff to carry out programming on the ground that is guided by work plans informed by WPS. The work in the field should be facilitated in partnership with civil society, and in support of the host government’s efforts to implement WPS at the national and local levels. This ideal approach to implementation of the WPS agenda is far from the norm. Our analysis of the Security Council’s portion of the entire cycle of WPS implementation reveals it is inconsistent, as illustrated in several ways:

- **Incongruent provision of information compared to the mandated WPS reporting requirements.** Although nine peace operations are mandated to explicitly report on WPS, we found little evidence of superior information on WPS in the majority of reports from those peace operations relative to those not similarly mandated, and in fact, the reporting on some of those peace operations was sometimes less detailed and analytical when compared to other peace operations. Multiple factors at every step of the report drafting process can negatively impact the inclusion of analytical WPS information in line with the core expectations articulated by the Council. (For more analysis on reports, see page 32)

- **Lack of systematic attention to WPS within a single document, such as a report or resolution, with regards to the focus, location, and quality of the references.** For example, less than 50% of reports on peacekeeping missions and 88% of reports on political missions met the basic threshold for WPS information and analysis, as laid out in previous Security Council resolutions. The majority of information in reports of the Secretary-General and statements delivered during meetings is often focused on violations of women’s rights, with a particular focus on SGBV and lack substantive analysis. Some of the challenges regarding the quality of information seem to be related to administrative aspects of the reporting process, such as the page limit; however, this then points to a contradiction between expectations and practice. Such barriers reflect both a lack of commitment to WPS as well as a poor understanding of why the integration of a gender lens in reporting is foundational to more equitable, inclusive, and sustainable policymaking and implementation on the ground. (See more on reports on page 32)

- **Reliance upon briefers, including senior UN officials and civil society representatives, to raise WPS issues.** Without briefers raising WPS in their statements, there would be far fewer references overall, and those references would be less substantive. We found a clear correlation between briefers raising WPS issues, and subsequent statements with references to WPS within the same meeting. In meetings where WPS was not raised by the briefer, WPS was often overlooked. For example, in the January 2018 meeting on Libya, following Hajer Sharief’s briefing, multiple Council members echoed her messages on WPS. However, subsequent meetings on Libya over the following months saw fewer and fewer WPS references

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* The missions in Afghanistan, CAR, DRC, Lebanon, Mali, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan (Darfur), and West Africa & the Sahel are explicitly mandated to report on WPS.
* In this context, “analytical” references would include additional information on context and detail, that, for example, highlights barriers, challenges, and patterns.
* As a baseline, per the Security Council’s previous decisions, including particularly resolutions 2122 (2013) and 2242 (2015), all reports of the Secretary-General on any country-specific or thematic agenda item should include information and analysis on the impact of armed conflict on women and girls; patterns of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV); the gender dimensions, including the role of women, in all areas of conflict prevention and resolution, peacemaking and peacebuilding; details regarding measures taken to protect civilians, particularly women and girls, against SGBV, as well as related recommendations. WPS (S/RES/1820 (2008), OP 9; S/RES/1888 (2009), OPs 24-32; S/RES/1889 (2009), OPs 5, 19(a); S/RES/2122 (2013), OPs 1-2; S/PRST/2010/8; S/PRST/2014/23)
* The term senior UN officials encompass the Secretary-General and senior managers at UN Headquarters and the field level, including the special representative of the secretary-general (SRSG).
of substance. Although it is positive to see this influence of briefers, attention to WPS is the responsibility of the Security Council members as well, and thus there needs to be the systematic embedding of WPS by each Council member in their statements and their understanding of every agenda item. Further, it is essential to emphasize that although it is mainly briefers who raise WPS, which increases the chances of the issue being reflected in statements, it is still no guarantee that it will be reflected in Security Council action. Briefers, including particularly civil society briefers, often raise issues that have been subject to less consensus within the Security Council, such as HRDs, sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR), and violations targeting lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex, and queer (LGBTIQ)+ people. (See more on civil society briefers on page 41)

- Failure to reflect WPS issues raised in subsidiary bodies in discussions and outcomes adopted by the Security Council. There are a range of subsidiary bodies that report to the Security Council, including sanctions committees, as well as the subsidiary Working Group on children and armed conflict and the Security Council IEG on WPS. The discussion in each of these bodies should include WPS, and that discussion should be reflected in the discussions within the Council as a whole. For example, the Security Council IEG on WPS met to discuss Yemen in March and November 2017; as we noted in 2018, the outcomes of both these meetings emphasized the 30% quota for women in peace processes, gender expertise in humanitarian efforts, condemned attacks on women’s rights activists and HRDs, and called on all actors to uphold their obligations under the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) as it relates to weapons transfers where there is a risk that they would facilitate violations of international humanitarian law (IHL). The sanctions regime on Yemen does not have SGBV as explicit designation criteria, only general criteria for violation of international law, resulting in a complete lack of attention to the issue by the subsidiary body (see more analysis of Sanctions on page 34). Over the course of 2018, the Security Council adopted one presidential statement and one resolution on Yemen; these outcomes included short references to the importance of women’s participation, and the importance of ensuring gender and age-sensitive humanitarian assistance but ignored the recommendations related to attacks on HRDs, and the transfer of arms, issues that have a profound effect on the continuing conflict in Yemen. This reflects, in part, the kind of follow-up we expect in the Security Council; as we see repeatedly, only some of the recommendations from the Security Council IEG on WPS are taken forward.

Our expectation, which is grounded in the Security Council’s own commitments, is that WPS will be discussed across all its regular work, on country-specific and thematic issues. We consider the entire universe of mechanisms and subsidiary bodies in the peace and security architecture as relevant and directly involved in the implementation of the WPS agenda by the Council. Beyond peace operations and sanctions regimes, we consider the efforts of subsidiary bodies such as the Working Group on children and armed conflict (CAAC) and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) on children and armed conflict, as well as the SRSG on sexual violence in conflict (SVC). Further, when WPS is not discussed or included in the information it gets to the Council, the Council would be expected to follow-up as to why this occurred, and hold senior UN leadership accountable.

By virtue of the fact that WPS also encompasses a wide range of peace, security, human rights, and development issues, as well as conversely, that WPS issues are reflected across a wide range of other issue areas, there are connections and linkages that also should be made in other fora in order to continue advancing not only WPS outside of the Council, but also enhancing the holistic perspective of the Council in order to ensure it is making evidence-based decisions. These include mechanisms established by the Human Rights Council, such as the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar (FFM), or cyclical reviews of implementation of human rights treaty obligations, such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).
### Relevant processes, mechanisms and opportunities for WPS implementation

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*Please excuse any unintentional omissions from this table. Our goal is to illustrate the range of opportunities for inclusion of and attention to WPS within and across country situations of particular concern to the Security Council. Please refer to the Methodology section on page 56 for more.*
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Overall Trends
Improvement in the inclusion of information, but weak analysis and recommendations

The Council continues to make decisions based on information that is mostly gender-blind. When there is information on WPS, the information is primarily comprised of descriptions and data, without analysis or linked recommendations, and the information is often concentrated in only a few portions of the report. Over the last several years, both the quantity and quality of information on WPS in reports of the Secretary-General has improved but still does not meet the Council’s standards as expressed in its resolutions or as laid out in strategic guidance developed within the UN system on mainstreaming gender and WPS. Further, the expectation is that, particularly for missions with a mandate to mainstream gender, information on WPS would be throughout the entire report, in addition to a separate section dedicated specifically to WPS. (For more information, please see our Methodology on page 56).

The Council does have the ability to influence the type of information it receives; thus, its failure to utilize this authority to ensure its expectations are met is a contributing factor which leads to insufficient and incomplete information, including the following distinct problems:

- The increase in information on WPS has mostly been an increase in data on WPS and descriptions of activities carried out by peace operations.
- Where data is provided, it isn’t adequately disaggregated by sex, age, and disability.
- In descriptions of WPS activities, there isn’t information on the impact or next steps.
- Most of the information on WPS is provided without context or analysis.
- Information on WPS is not reflected in report recommendations.
- Information on WPS is not mainstreamed and is instead concentrated in only one or two sections of the report.

The increase in information, comprised mostly of data, is a net positive, but insufficient to meet expectations for reporting and provide a realistic picture of the gender dimensions of the situation that can inform evidence-based policymaking. Data alone does not provide insight into, for example, the barriers to women’s participation in peace processes, or what challenges some women face in terms of participating in UN-facilitated activities, or the patterns of sexual and gender-based targeting women.16

Another concern with the data that is provided is that it is not always disaggregated by sex or age. The new call by the Security Council to further disaggregate data by disability is positive, but given the challenge related to disaggregation by sex and age, it is probably that data will continue to be incomplete.17 Importantly, there is a real challenge of collecting data in conflict-affected settings.18 This challenge is repeatedly acknowledged in reports of the Secretary-General. However, there still needs to be renewed emphasis and prioritization of the collection of sex, age, and disability-disaggregated data in order to serve as the foundation for further analysis to inform decision-making.

In addition to data on WPS, the bulk of the remaining information on WPS is often in the context of details related to meetings and other activities carried out by peace operations. This information usually is presented as a statement of fact that the meeting occurred, often with data on the participants, but rarely includes detail related to the outcomes of the meeting or the impact of the overall project. Shifting the focus from activities to impact is an important aspect of ensuring that there is reflection on the actual extent to which activities are making a difference in the lives of communities affected by conflict.

Information presented without analysis results in an incomplete and insufficient understanding of the gender dimensions of a given conflict itself, as well as the peace and security response, its impact on women and girls, and the diverse roles women and girls have in conflict and its aftermath. Less than 10% of WPS references in reports of the Secretary-General could be considered “analytical.” One-third of those references are in country-specific reports on CAAC, and the rest appear in 34 reports of the Secretary-General on ten country situations.19

1 Analytical references occur in the context of reporting on Colombia, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Guinea-Bissau, Haiti,
Although the references are distributed among a high number of reports, there is, on average, only one analytical reference per report of the Secretary-General. Failure to embed intersectional gender-sensitive conflict analysis in reports of the Secretary-General is contrary to guidance provided on reporting and internal good practice guidance, which states, for example, that “quantitative data can complement, but must not replace solid qualitative analysis of violations and their root causes.” Recent internal audits of the work of missions on gender mainstreaming highlighted that all work plans of individual mission components should be grounded in gender-sensitive conflict analysis. This analysis must be gender-sensitive, but also intersectional in order to reflect the gendered experiences of conflict, and the way in which those experiences are impacted and informed by power as well as many other forms of identity and experience, including race, class, nationality, political and religious affiliation, indigeneity, marital status, disability, sexual orientation, and gender identity, and age. These are among the factors that shape the multiple inequalities and injustices that influence women’s lived experiences of conflict and insecurity and are critical for highlighting dimensions that should be taken into account when developing policy responses.

Finally, there are two other important gaps in the inclusion of information in reports. First, although the Council has called on reports of the Secretary-General to include recommendations on WPS, only 65% of reports of the Secretary-General on peace operations contained recommendations that referred to WPS issues. Recommendations in country-specific reports of the Secretary-General are important because they are utilized as the basis for Council action. The failure to include recommendations, even when there might be detailed information on WPS, is not only an indicator of the lack of consistency in the implementation of WPS but also an example of the extent to which WPS is often considered a lower priority when it comes to recommending concrete action. The final gap is related to the extent to which WPS is mainstreamed throughout an entire report of the Secretary-General, in addition to the inclusion of a specific WPS section. Both are required in order to capture all relevant WPS information and activities fully. Very few reports included WPS information in more than one or two sections; usually, information was concentrated in the portion of the report detailing information on human rights and protection of civilians. Substantive references to WPS across multiple sections of a report is an indication of the extent to which a peace operation mainstreams gender; the lack of evidence of mainstreaming is reinforced in recent UN internal assessments which universally noted that for five of the largest peacekeeping operations, gender is inadequately mainstreamed across all components of the mission. In terms of inclusion of WPS in a separate section, only 36% of all reports of the Secretary-General on peace operations included a section on WPS generally, which is an increase when compared to 24% in 2018. Less than 19% of reports of the Secretary-General on peace operations, compared to 15% in 2018, had a specific section on violations of women’s rights, including SGBV.

For more analysis on Reports, see page 32.

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Iraq, Kosovo, Libya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan (Abyei), Sudan (Darfur), and West Africa / Sahel.

9 “Gender identities are shaped by power relations and aspects of people’s identities such as age, marital status, class, caste, race, ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation and (dis)ability. These different identity markers will be more or less relevant in different contexts, and in certain circumstances some may be highly contested. The ideas that these different identities interact with each other and cannot be understood separately is sometimes referred to as ‘intersectionality’. When planning and conducting gender analysis it is important to take this into account throughout. Experiences of conflict can vary significantly for different men, women and [LGBTIQ+ people] according to these different aspects of their identity.” Saferworld, Gender analysis of conflict, 2016. https://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/publications/1076-gender-analysis-of-conflict
Instrumentalization of women’s experiences and marginalization of their concerns

Security Council members frequently instrumentalize women’s experiences, including particularly as related to violations of women’s rights, in their rhetoric to illustrate the seriousness of specific conflict situations and justify certain Council actions, often use of force. However, these same Security Council members regularly fail to meaningfully embed protection of women’s rights and promotion of women’s meaningful participation in peace and security policymaking in those same statements. Almost universally, stories shared in meetings of the Council are focused on extreme examples of violence targeting women. The NGOWG, along with many other civil society colleagues, as well as academics, have long critiqued the “instrumentalization” of women’s rights in justifying military action and furthering foreign policy goals.28

For example, deaths of civilians, particularly women and children in Syria was routinely raised by Security Council members to illustrate the dire humanitarian and human rights situation; however, the references were rarely followed-up with an analysis of the gender dimensions of the situation or on the need for women’s meaningful participation in the peace process.

Similarly, in the context of Council discussions on Myanmar, there were frequent, graphic, examples to violence involving women and girls; however, Council members universally failed to include even the most superficial reference to women’s meaningful participation in any peace and reconciliation process. Finally, the Council’s discussions on Israel / Palestine also provide a stark example of the way in which women’s rights and experiences are instrumentalized. The only reference to women’s participation in any peace and political process was in statements delivered by Sweden. Every other reference to women and girls in remarks given by Council members throughout 2018 focused solely on stories of violence targeting women, with an emphasis on pregnant women and mothers.

The outcomes adopted by the Security Council are generally better at addressing the full scope of WPS; thus, the focus in Council member statements more honestly reflects the extent to which WPS is, or is not, genuinely embedded within individual Council members’ understanding of peace and security. Outcome documents are based on previously agreed language that has often been advocated for and influenced by other stakeholders, UN system entities, and civil society. Statements, however, are solely a reflection of the foreign policy of Member States. This suggests that the core concepts of the WPS agenda are understood only superficially and remain dependent on individuals at various levels within governments and subject to the whims of broader foreign policy goals.

There is also instrumentalization within the broader WPS discourse related to women’s roles and participation in peace and security processes. This narrative argues that women’s participation is necessary in order to make peace processes more effective. This argument ignores the fact that women have a right to equal participation in all areas of decision-making and places the burden on women of advocating for their rights.29 Without women’s participation, the assumption is women’s rights will not be guaranteed. This narrative is also encouraged by the current drive to identify data to justify women’s participation. The paucity of data on women’s participation is an important goal, but this data should not be necessary to ensure women have a seat at the table. The use of data is, in many ways, a strategic response to the lack of success women’s rights advocates have had with rights-based messages; this lack of progress is contextualized in the broader international advocacy environment which is often hostile to, and actively pushing back, on women’s rights.30
Women viewed as a homogeneous group

Women are primarily referred to as a monolithic group throughout the work of the Security Council. With few exceptions, there is not any acknowledgment of unique challenges particular groups of women and girls face in conflict-affected situations, such as young women, adolescent girls, women and girls with disabilities, Indigenous women and girls, displaced women and girls, older women, or LGBTIQ+ people.31 The experiences of particular groups of women and girls comprised less than 2% of all references to women and girls in reports of the Secretary-General. This was further reflected in statements delivered during meetings and in outcome documents adopted by the Council.

It is impossible to understand the impact of conflict on a local community without understanding the way in which power relations and aspects of people’s identities, such as age, marital status, class, caste, race, ethnicity, religion, disability, and sexual orientation and gender identity interact.32 Gender-sensitive conflict analysis, which takes into account these “intersections,” will identify the wide variety of experiences of people in local communities and inform better and more targeted policies and programs. The failure to recognize and adopt an intersectional perspective within peace and security discussions in the Security Council and broader UN system overlooks the multiple, intersecting forms of discrimination and violence experienced by women, girls, and LGBTIQ+ people in conflict-affected situations, which reinforces deeply-rooted inequalities and undermines efforts towards sustainable peace. This omission demonstrates a persistent underlying issue -- that the Security Council has only a superficial understanding of the intersections of identity and how they are impacted both during and after war.

Women and girls with disabilities face specific challenges in conflict settings but largely remain excluded from the decision-making processes concerning their lives. During conflicts, women with disabilities face multiple and intersecting forms of discrimination related to their gender, age, disability, or refugee status, which significantly increases their risk of gender-based violence. As a result, women and girls with disabilities are twice as likely to experience intimate partner violence.33 There were very few references to women and girls with disabilities in any country or region-specific reports or outcome documents. There were no references to women or girls with disabilities in the context of meetings in 2018, however there were broader references to people with disabilities in Central Africa, Colombia, DRC, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Iraq, Israel / Palestine, Lake Chad Basin, Somalia, South Sudan, Syria, and Yemen, in addition to thematic open debates on WPS, youth, peace and security, protection of civilians, children and armed conflict, and peacebuilding.34 Positively, due in large part to advocacy by women’s rights groups, there were references to violence targeting women with disabilities in the annual reports on WPS and conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV).35 Importantly, in June 2019, the Security Council adopted its first-ever resolution on persons with disabilities in conflict; resolution 2475 (2019), called for assistance to civilians to be accessible and inclusive, and to ensure that the specific needs of women with disabilities are met.36 (See more analysis on Women and girls with disabilities on page 47)

It is also essential to understand and acknowledge the different types of challenges Indigenous women and girls face as a result of the intersection between their identity and gender. The 2018 session of the Commission on the Status of Women specifically highlighted that Indigenous women and girls living in rural and remote areas, regardless of age, often face violence and higher rates of poverty; in some contexts, Indigenous women are more than two times more likely to be sexually assaulted or targeted for SGBV.37 At the same time, Indigenous women have a right to equally participate in decision-making processes and often take the lead in local action on conflict prevention and climate change mitigation and adaptation.38 As a result, it is equally important to recognize the deep knowledge and contribution that Indigenous women have in locally-driven peacebuilding, conflict resolution and reconciliation, alongside the particular threats and violence they face.39 In 2018, the vital role of Indigenous women was referenced in several thematic open debates, as well as in reports and meetings on Colombia and West Africa & the Sahel.40 Discussions of Colombia in the Security Council have had a particular focus on the role of Indigenous women, who play an essential role in the peace process at both the national and local level; Charo Mina Rojas, an Afro-Colombian human rights defender, also briefed the Security Council in October 2017.41 In the May 2018 briefing on West Africa & the Sahel, Hindou Oumarou Ibrahim, an Indigenous Mbororo woman, delivered a statement focused on the importance of working with Indigenous communities in the context of the multi-faced challenges facing the region.42 More recently, in 2019, a young Amazigh woman from Libya, Inas Miloud delivered a statement during the open debate on sexual violence in conflict; she highlighted the extent to which Indigenous
women have faced particular violence due to their identity. Despite the rich discussions on the role of Indigenous women in these two specific instances, the overall failure of the Council to discuss this issue is striking.

**LGBTIQ+ people and organizations working on LGBTIQ+ rights** are often at risk for violence, threats, and harassment as a result of the perception that they are going against accepted gender norms. In 2018, only one reference was made to LGBTIQ+ people, appearing in a report on Haiti. This represents a numerical loss when compared to 2017, where there were references in two reports on Colombia and Haiti, and 2016 when two reports on Liberia and Haiti contained references. Consideration of the rights, concerns, and experiences of LGBTIQ+ people have been mostly absent from the Security Council’s discussions on peace and security; references only tend to occur in reports of the Secretary-General on specific country or thematic issues. To date, the Security Council has failed to adopt any outcome document referencing LGBTIQ+ people. In statements delivered by briefers during thematic open debates, there were references to the importance of ensuring peacebuilding is inclusive of LGBTIQ+ people, particularly young people, and protections for LGBTIQ+ people who are victims of sexual violence. Positively, the Netherlands made a reference to LGBTIQ+ people in the context of the country-specific meeting on Colombia in October 2018. The paucity of references indicates this is a particular gap in the Security Council’s discussions. (See more analysis on page 48).

The Security Council overlooked the rights, concerns, and the role of young women in both country-specific and thematic agenda items. Young women, in particular, are not only subsumed within “women” as a whole but are also often invisible in conversations about “youth,” which often assume youth to be young men. Roughly one in four young women and girls are currently living in situations where they are exposed to violence or armed conflict. Yet despite the risks, young women also comprise roughly half of all young people working in peacebuilding and conflict prevention at the local level. Although overwhelmingly, young women are missing from reports of the Secretary-General and outcome documents adopted by the Security Council, young women have been referenced as an important group in meetings more frequently in 2018. Notably, at the open debate on youth, peace, and security in April 2018, Peru invited three civil society speakers to brief the Security Council, and all were young women. Young women were referenced more frequently in meetings of the Security Council when compared to reports of the Secretary-General or outcome documents. References occurred in the context of meetings on Kosovo, Central African region, Yemen, Afghanistan, Israel / Palestine, and a special meeting on WPS in the Sahel, as well as thematic open debates on WPS, youth, peace and security, and regional cooperation. The adoption of Resolution 2419 (2018) on youth, peace, and security provides a strong basis for future Council attention to young women; the resolution calls on senior UN officials to facilitate the inclusion of young women in discussions on peacebuilding and conflict prevention.

**Snapshot: Young women’s participation in Sudan**

The situation in Sudan illustrates the importance of prioritizing the role and protecting the rights of young women and girls in the context of peace and security discussions. Yet in 2018, overall, the challenges and opportunities for young women in Sudan weren’t discussed by the Security Council in any detail. NGOWG member Saferworld found in 2017 that social norms can discourage young women from leading or participating in peace and security initiatives, and particularly in rural areas, family members may feel that young women’s safety is compromised if they engage outside of the home. The ability to participate often required negotiations with family and community members to advocate for their access and inclusion. Further, young women’s participation was often hindered by broader risks to their safety, such as threats from security forces, harmful traditional practices such as female genital mutilation, forced early marriage, as well as other forms of gender-based violence. Enabling the participation of young women cannot, therefore, be achieved without addressing gender inequality and the root causes of violence.
Superficial attention to women’s meaningful participation

Attention by the Security Council to women’s participation and inclusion in peace and security processes has steadily increased over the last several years; however, the discussion remains largely superficial and lacking in detail regarding the roles women have in various processes, barriers to increased participation, which women participated, or the influence women have on the processes they are participating in. Women’s meaningful participation encompasses not just women’s presence in a meeting, but their ability to influence the outcome of the process to ensure that it is reflective of their perspectives.56

References to women’s meaningful participation in peace and security processes occur in resolutions and presidential statements adopted on Afghanistan, Burundi, Cyprus, CAR, DRC, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Mali, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan (Abyei), Sudan (Darfur), West Africa and the Sahel, Western Sahara, and Yemen.57 All peace operations, except for traditional peacekeeping missions, such as Golan Heights, India / Pakistan, Western Sahara, are mandated to support women’s participation in peace and security processes.58

While there have been overall improvements in mandates, there continues to be a struggle to engage substantively with specific core WPS issues within the Security Council and parts of the UN system, notably as it relates to women’s meaningful participation.

There are only a few instances of any analysis in reports of the Secretary-General regarding any substantive factor impacting, positively or negatively, women’s participation; these references were in the context of DRC, Iraq, and Kosovo. In these reports, issues related to threats and intimidation (Iraq), patriarchal norms and stereotypes regarding women’s role in politics (Kosovo), and the general security situation (DRC), were all identified as barriers.59 However, beyond these few examples, information and analysis of women’s participation in reports of the Secretary-General was limited to data or lists, such as the number of women elected or appointed to political office, descriptions of trainings carried out by the mission focused on supporting women’s participation, or listing women along with other groups that should be included in peace and security processes.

There is little, to no, analysis of just how meaningful women’s participation is – that is, to what extent women can influence outcomes and ensure that their concerns and priorities are adequately reflected.60 Moreover, there is rarely any analysis or detail about the reasons impacting the low turnout of women voters or women candidates running for office. It is commonplace for the Security Council to focus on the outcome of women’s participation, effectively blocking it from considering the impact of gender hierarchies in creating barriers to women’s meaningful participation. In general, the Security Council does not consider the gender-specific obstacles to women’s participation in formal or informal peace and security processes.

Notably, the information provided to the Security Council, in addition to lacking in analysis, is often ad-hoc and incomplete. Although women’s meaningful participation is still inadequate at every level and stage of all current peace and reconciliation processes, there were multiple examples of efforts and processes that were not referenced in country-specific reports of the Secretary-General. Some of these efforts were discussed in the Security Council IEG on WPS, and some were referenced in the briefings by senior UN officials. Information should be flowing from both the briefings as well as the reports of the Secretary-General; reports of the Secretary-General remain the official update from the mission, it is critical that there is intersectional gender-sensitive conflict analysis. The importance of ensuring reports of the Secretary-General contain this information becomes even more evident when examining the statements of members of the Security Council; the references, particularly to issues such as WPS, are primarily directly drawn from reports of the Secretary-General, indicating this is one of or the only, source of information for most Security Council members on WPS.
Electoral processes

In 2018, women’s participation as candidates, voters, and observers were referenced in reports of the Secretary-General discussing elections in more than 18 countries. Positively, in country situations addressed by the Council, there was at least one reference to women’s participation in the context of every election in reports of the Secretary-General in 2018. The quality and detail of the references varied; however, the inclusion of some amount of information on women’s participation for nearly all elections held in countries under discussion by the Security Council is positive.

The reports of the Secretary-General on Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, and Libya included the most detailed information on women’s participation in electoral processes, with reports on Afghanistan providing the most comprehensive picture overall. There were recommendations calling for the government to ensure women’s participation in elections in the reports on Central Africa, DRC, Iraq, and Lebanon. Quotas for women’s political participation were referenced in reports of the Secretary-General and statements during meetings the context of CAR, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Libya, Mali, West Africa and the Sahel; there was an overall increase in the calls for quotas by Security Council members, including particularly from elected members. The increase in support for these measures is positive given the demonstrated evidence that in countries that utilize quotas, the representation of women is 8% higher than in countries that do not have quotas.

There have been efforts to draw attention to challenges faced by women running for office through several high-level solidarity missions undertaken by senior UN leadership, sometimes in partnership with the African Union or other regional bodies. For example, in the context of Somalia, in September 2018, the Executive Director of UN Women visited the country and followed up with a briefing to the Security Council in which she highlighted the progress in increasing women’s representation in parliamentary elections from 14% to 25%, but noted that the increase would be even more if it were not for clan elders who often oppose gender equality and push back on women’s participation. In October 2019, Amina Mohammad, UN Deputy Secretary-General, and Bineta Diop, the African Union’s Special Envoy on WPS, also undertook a solidarity mission to Somalia where they met with a range of stakeholders and focused primarily on the upcoming elections in 2020 and 2021 and women’s participation, including through ensuring quotas are met.

Having said that, although, in comparison to reports and discussions on other country situations, Afghanistan was the strongest; when compared to the basic expectations for reporting and briefings, the information and analysis fell short. This is despite a range of efforts to draw attention to the importance of women’s participation, including a field mission to Afghanistan in January 2018, meetings of Security Council IEG on WPS, and a high-level solidarity mission to Afghanistan. The lack of nuance in the discussion on women’s participation in Afghanistan obfuscates real challenges that need to be recognized and addressed - Afghan women's rights are under threat from the Taliban, and women and girls are at risk due to the ongoing insecurity and violence resulting; however, they also face barriers resulting from patriarchal views about women's equality across Afghan society. Research by NGOWG member International Alert in November 2018 highlighted that the push for women's meaningful participation is primarily “top-down” and only accessible for Afghan women who live in urban areas or have existing connections. Further, there remain widespread, existing negative perceptions regarding the importance of gender equality; in the 2018 International Men and Gender Equality Survey (IMAGES), 66% of Afghan men agreed with the idea that “women in Afghanistan have too many rights,” and in particular, expressed strong support for maintaining rigid gender roles. Such negative perceptions of women’s rights naturally influence opinions regarding women’s suitability for public office as well as their role outside the home. There are multiple ways in which women have been prevented from participating fully in elections. In one report of the Secretary-General on Afghanistan, it was noted that women were 30% of the electorate, and had 7,429 polling stations, compared with 11,667 for men. The lack of female-only polling stations compounded the existing challenges for women who wanted to vote, including fears related to physical safety. For example, a comprehensive survey of violence against women in the 2018 elections in Afghanistan found that members of the Taliban circulated letters to households threatening women if they voted for a female candidate.

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1 Elections were discussed in the context of the following countries: Afghanistan, Colombia, Côte d’Ivoire, DRC, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kosovo, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and Somalia.
they participated in the elections.\textsuperscript{70} Another factor is public opinion of women’s rights; a 2018 survey showed that although 87% of Afghans believed women should be allowed to vote in elections, only 57% indicated that women should be able to decide who to vote for on their own.\textsuperscript{71}

### Security Council attention to women’s participation in elections in 2018

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Comprehensive information and analysis on women’s participation in electoral processes would include information and data regarding women’s registration as voters, turnout on election day, women candidates for office, women elected for office, quotas or policies aimed at promoting women’s participation, women’s roles in supporting the process as observers or in other roles, and analysis regarding barriers to women’s participation in all aspects, including importantly, violence targeting women candidates and voters both online and in-person.\textsuperscript{72} Further, throughout all information and analysis, there should be details regarding the ways in which these processes are inclusive of people with disabilities, including women with disabilities. In addition, intersectional gender-sensitive conflict analysis and data, but there should also be recommendations on issues related to women’s meaningful participation in elections in the reports as well.

- **Voter registration data** was disaggregated by sex in reports on Afghanistan, Côte d’Ivoire, DRC, and Libya. Notably, reports on Afghanistan and DRC both included a reference to how the registration compared to previous elections, helping to illustrate progress over time.\textsuperscript{73} The special report on Côte d’Ivoire, submitted as the final review following the closure of the mission in Côte d’Ivoire, noted that parity has almost been reached in voter registration.\textsuperscript{74} Only the report on DRC that the security situation had a negative effect on women registered to vote. In no report was there any gender analysis regarding barriers to women’s registration as voters, such as structural barriers and discrimination, illiteracy, and lack of education, as well as expectations of women’s role in the household, which might prevent her from being able to travel. Further, lack of documentation, such as birth certificates and identity cards, also hinders registration.\textsuperscript{75}

- **Women’s participation as voters and as election support personnel** on election day was referenced generally in reports on Afghanistan, Guinea-Bissau, and Mali.\textsuperscript{76} However, no information was provided in...
any report on specific barriers to women’s participation as voters or support personnel, again illustrating the focus on top-level processes, and the failure to examine barriers and challenges to women’s meaningful participation.

- There were references to the number of women candidates who ran for office and were successfully elected in reports of the Secretary-General Iraq (parliamentary elections), Kosovo, and Lebanon. For Kosovo, notably, the information was in the context of mayoral elections; despite eight women running for mayor, none of the 38 elected mayors are women. Information on the elections in Lebanon detailed historical data, noting that a higher proportion of candidates in 2018 were women, compared to the 2009 elections, resulting in an increase in women elected from 4 to 6. These were the only three countries for which information was provided on both women candidates, as well as women elected.

- Information on how many women ran for office (but not whether they were elected) was in reports on Afghanistan, DRC, Guinea, and Liberia. Information on how many women were successfully elected (but not how many ran overall) was in reports on Colombia, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and Somalia. Except for DRC, Kosovo, and Iraq, there were no details in reports regarding why there were low numbers of women candidates or potential reasons why women were not being elected. In Lebanon, for example, although the increase in the number of women elected is positive, only providing the positive results masks the complex challenges facing women running for office, which range from less attention in the media, lack of financial resources, absence of any political quotas, and also legal barriers related to citizenship and civil registration. Further, belief in gender stereotypes and patriarchal attitudes are inhibiting factors; in a recent survey, 32% of men and 65% of women in Lebanon stated that gender equality isn’t inherent to Lebanese tradition and culture.

Snapshot: Women’s participation in elections in the DRC

The Security Council has paid particular attention to the situation in the DRC over the last several years, with a focus on preparing for the December 2018 elections. Throughout 2017 and 2018, the DRC was discussed more than 16 times by the Security Council; it also received briefings from five women civil society leaders over that same period, all of whom highlighted challenges to women’s participation in the elections. Language related to women’s participation in elections was improved in Resolution 2409 (2018), adopted in March 2018, with a new call to improve women’s participation, including as candidates, which complements existing language adopted by the Security Council noting that women’s participation was a “requisite condition” of the elections. However, one of the most significant gaps in discussions on women’s participation was the lack of attention, in both outcome documents, and discussions on the various barriers to women’s participation as both candidates and voters. Cadre Permanent de Concertation de la Femme Congolaise (CAFCO), an NGOWG member, found that 60% of the cases of political violence were targeting women, with verbal abuse and threats being the most common types of violence and at least 288 women encountered verbal and physical threats, intimidation, discrimination, and corruption during the electoral process. The discussion in the Security Council IEG on WPS sought to bring attention to this issue in its meetings in 2018; however, there was no change in the inclusion of information in reports of the Secretary-General on DRC or in briefings and discussions during meetings. Women’s participation in the elections comprised less than 20% of all references to the elections in DRC in statements delivered by senior UN officials or Security Council members over 2018 and the information on this specific topic in the reports of the Secretary-General was often incomplete or general. In October 2018, the Security Council visited the DRC and met with female candidates as well as civil society organizations (CSOs) along with a wide range of other stakeholders; however, there was no evidence of a substantive discussion on these issues during that time either. Overall, the discussion in the Security Council failed to provide a full picture of the challenges confronting women candidates and voters in the DRC, which include threats to physical safety, intimidation, and administrative barriers, such as the high cost to register as a candidate.

Peace processes

Women’s participation in peace processes has been an area of the WPS agenda that has received a high degree of focus. 2018 was characterized by statements from decision-makers, including Security Council members, emphasizing the importance of women's participation in peace processes and calls from networks of women's CSOs demanding inclusion in peace processes in formal and informal roles, as well as the integration of women’s rights and gender
Overall Trends

Despite rhetorical expressions of support from policymakers, women still face challenges at every level, and at every stage, of peace and reconciliation processes and dialogues currently taking place, including in Afghanistan, Burundi, CAR, Colombia, Cyprus, DRC, Guinea-Bissau, Libya, Mali, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Western Sahara, and Yemen. The rhetorical focus on inclusion without considering the barriers to inclusion supports the observation that Member States and policymakers are generally more focused on participation as an end in itself. Barriers and challenges to women’s equal inclusion and meaningful participation range from the practical to structural and replicate inequality, discrimination, and unequal power dynamics at the societal level.

Even in situations where women do participate equally, women’s participation does not guarantee that women’s rights will be discussed; thus it is essential for facilitators, and all participants to be trained on intersectional gender-sensitive conflict analysis. It is also important to ensure that all knowledge and learning from these processes is shared and transferred to the local level communities.

Security Council attention to women’s participation in peace processes in 2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Government (Track 1)</th>
<th>Parallel (Track 2)</th>
<th>Local (Track 3)</th>
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<td></td>
<td>WPS in process</td>
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<td>Yemen</td>
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**KEY**

- X: Process was discussed by the Security Council
- Green: References to women’s participation
- Red: No references to women’s participation

Women’s participation was not discussed comprehensively, analytically, and consistently in the context of any peace process. Most references to women's meaningful participation were expressions of support for women's participation, usually as points of discussion in meetings or events, but few references analyzed the barriers or even provided examples of women’s meaningful participation. Reporting on CAR and Mali noted that women’s participation in formal national dialogue processes was limited, but there was no further detail or analysis in reports regarding the reasons why this participation was limited. Recommendations on women’s participation in peace and reconciliation processes occurred in reports on Afghanistan, Cyprus, Libya, Mali, and Syria. Notably, in 2018, every report from the mission in Libya included at least one recommendation on women’s participation in political and reconciliation processes. This reflects consistent attention to this issue within the mission.

In 2018, women participated in delegations of conflict parties in UN-supported or facilitated peace processes on Syria, Yemen, Libya, and Western Sahara, the IGAD-facilitated process in South Sudan, the East African Community-facilitated inter-Burundian Dialogue, and the process in Myanmar. Unfortunately, reports of the Secretary-General in 2018 on those country-specific situations failed to include substantive information or

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1 Please see sources cited in the endnotes for recent, comprehensive academic and policy research on women’s participation in peace processes. (See References on page 66).
2 Please note, this is not an exhaustive or comprehensive list and only references a fraction of Track 3 initiatives that took place in 2018.
3 Women also participated in the peace talks between Greece and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
analysis on women’s formal participation in any of these processes. Although women’s participation was extremely low, it is important to include details regarding the participation that did take place and further ensure there was an analysis of the barriers that prevented more women from participating. Some of the sole references to women’s participation in these contexts were in the annual report of the Secretary-General on WPS which was published in late 2019. The singular reference in 2018 to women’s formal participation in a high-level process was in the context of the inter-Burundian dialogue, where a report of the Secretary-General noted that six of the 41 participants were women at the fifth session in October 2018.1 In discussions in Afghanistan, CAR, Mali, and South Sudan, there weren’t any references to the barriers or challenges facing women in engaging formally as part of these high-level efforts. In the 2018 renewed peace process in South Sudan, one woman served as a mediator, women comprised up to 25% of all delegates, and women’s CSOs served as official observers; this was an increase when compared to the 2015 peace process.2 Further, although little progress has been made in advancing the processes in Cyprus or Israel / Palestine, women have been almost wholly absent from these high-level negotiations in the past.3 Research has shown that women face some of the toughest challenges in Track 1 processes; these barriers replicate barriers women face in participation in other decision-making fora, as the individuals that take part on behalf of negotiating parties are drawn primarily from existing leadership, in which women are usually rare or nonexistent.4 For example, over the course of the 2015 negotiations that led to the agreement on Mali, out of 100 delegates who participated over the entire process, only five were women; further, it has been estimated that only 3% of participants in implementing mechanisms are women.5

Women actively participated in a range of parallel processes and dialogues, (sometimes referred to as Track 2 processes)6 throughout 2018, including on Afghanistan, Burundi, CAR, Guinea-Bissau, Libya, Mali, South Sudan, Syria, and Yemen. These processes have increasingly been the space where women’s participation is concentrated due to the informal and often diverse nature of the ways in which people can engage in Track 2 or even Track 3 processes. Several of these efforts were discussed in the Council during meetings and outcome documents, as well as reports of the Secretary-General; the difference between the discussion in the Council on women’s participation in formal, high-level talks versus complementary or parallel processes reflects the ongoing structural barriers to women’s participation in all decision-making roles and the gendered power dynamics that shape these processes.

- Women’s participation as part of the Women’s Facilitation Group and the Women’s Council in Guinea-Bissau was referenced in both reports of the Secretary-General, as well as by several Council members and at least one briefer during meetings.7 The peacebuilding mission in Guinea-Bissau is also mandated to support women’s participation in mediation and peacebuilding processes.

- In the context of Libya, reports of the Secretary-General acknowledged that 30% of the participants in the National Conference process were women.8 Reporting on Libya in 2019 has continued to include information on women’s participation in the Track 2 diplomatic events organized with invitees to the National Conference in Tunisia in April.9 Statements delivered during Security Council meetings on Libya did not refer to women’s participation in the national dialogue as frequently; despite a briefing by civil society representative Hajer Sharief, in which she detailed the various ways in which women must be included in the process, Council members only generically referenced women’s participation as necessary, without any specifics. In fact, only four countries referred explicitly to women’s participation in the National Conference; Sweden and Peru, co-chairs of the Security Council IEG on WPS, made more than half of all statements in this context over the course of the year, the majority of which were following a meeting of the IEG on Libya in April 2018.10

- In Yemen, to advocate for women’s meaningful participation and leadership by women’s groups in the peace process, UN Women supported the establishment of the Yemeni Women’s Pact for Peace and Security (Tawafaq).11 Additionally, the Women’s Technical Advisory Group in Yemen serves as an example of a parallel, complementary mechanism aimed at ensuring women’s participation in the peace process,12

- Similarly, in the context of Syria, the Syrian Women’s Advisory Board and the Civil Society Support Room.13 Additionally, the Gaziantep Women’s Platform, a network of women involved in the Geneva peace process consisting of activists and non-governmental organization representatives active in Syria, was also established “to address issues related to women’s empowerment, women’s rights, and SGBV.”14

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1 Track 1 or high-level and formal processes are official, governmental and focused on decision-making between parties to the conflict. [https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/30542/dossier_Mediation_and_Facilitation.pdf](https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/30542/dossier_Mediation_and_Facilitation.pdf)
2 Track 2 processes are usually informal or “non-official” but influential and linked to decision-makers. These processes can engage civil society, along with government actors and other stakeholders. [https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/30542/dossier_Mediation_and_Facilitation.pdf](https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/30542/dossier_Mediation_and_Facilitation.pdf)
• Other examples of parallel and complementary initiatives including on Afghanistan, where Track 2 dialogues in Moscow and Doha throughout 2019 have seen a small number of women participate. In Mali, UN Women supported the establishment of a “women-led and independent consultative forum to monitor the implementation of the peace agreement.”

• Additionally, although the current peace process has stalled, there are Track 2 initiatives in Cyprus, such as the Gender Advisory Team (GAT), which articulates a feminist vision for peace and aims to provide technical and strategic input into any negotiations process in order to ensure gender equality is mainstreamed.

Local peace, mediation, and humanitarian efforts (sometimes referred to as Track 3 processes) are numerous. These informal, locally-driven processes are often supported by peace operations as part of mandates to support good offices and mediation. In 2018, these efforts were at times acknowledged or referred to in both information flowing to the Council, as well as in statements delivered to the Council, however, these references were often very general, without detail regarding success, impact, or follow-up.

• In Yemen, as Rasha Jarhum articulated in her statement to the Council, The Mothers of Abductees Association serves as a “lifeline to families of forcibly disappeared persons and arbitrarily-detained persons, who are trying to trace their whereabouts,” and negotiates, at the local level for the release of detainees.

• Other examples of local peace, mediation, and humanitarian efforts include local peace and reconciliation initiatives in the CAR facilitated by the peacekeeping mission. In Libya, the political mission supported a process through women engaged in the reconciliation process between the Qaddafi and Awlad Suleiman tribes. In Mali, a nationwide network of women mediators who organize local level dialogues, work with provincial and local authorities, and organize community dialogues was established.

Special measures are often necessary to ensure women’s participation in peace processes; thus, quotas have increasingly been advocated for, including for implementing bodies and special committees, working groups, or parallel monitoring mechanisms. In 2018, quotas were established or adopted in Mali, South Sudan, and Yemen. The Security Council did generally acknowledge the importance of quotas; however, often acknowledgment only occurred after the quota was in place. In Mali, the Agreement Monitoring Committee endorsed the establishment of a working group on the participation of women in the peace process. This was also supported in statements by Security Council members during meetings on Mali throughout 2018. In South Sudan, a quota of 35% (though not yet met) was agreed to for all pre-transitional and transitional structures, as well as at all levels of government. Notably reporting on South Sudan did highlight the emphasis placed by a joint UN-AU delegation that visited South Sudan on women’s participation in the agreement, as well as the implementation of the gender provisions. Further, in meetings, there was repeated emphasis on the importance of meeting this quota by both briefers and Security Council members. UN agencies are also enabling women to be more active in peace and governance processes through capacity building and funding of women-led organizations.

Overall, the bulk of the information on women’s participation in peace and reconciliation processes is in the context of descriptions of UN activities, such as meetings or workshops, as well as in recommendations by the Secretary-General. This indicates that there is a lack of sufficient attention to the serious structural challenges to women’s meaningful participation in these processes, which can be the most crucial entry points and opportunities to shape the future of a country as it emerges from conflict. The relatively strong attention to women’s participation in political, rather than peace, processes, also underlines the extent to which Security Council members prefer to raise issues related to women’s participation after peace agreements have been negotiated and once countries are moving away from violent armed conflict. It is essential that there is intersectional gender-sensitive conflict analysis of the many barriers to participation in all stages of peace and political processes.

**Snapshot: Connecting mediation tracks to ensure the participation of diverse women in Yemen**

In processes where some women have been directly involved in peace negotiations, which is most peace processes, the participation of women alone does not necessarily represent the views of women from that specific context or conflict party. Often, peace negotiations draw from elite circles, which can often be detached from community priorities and perspectives and focus on issues aligned with their political alliances. As a result, the involvement of women in Track 1 efforts is not sufficient in ensuring local linkages to Track 2 and Track 3 efforts.

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[118] Track 3 processes or initiatives are carried out by civil society, including women’s groups, at the local level. [https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/30542/dossier_Mediation_and_Facilitation.pdf](https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/30542/dossier_Mediation_and_Facilitation.pdf)
Overall Trends

This disconnect is particularly profound for women given their limited access to and influence over traditional decision-making at community and national levels.\textsuperscript{120} Whereas men can channel community-level concerns to national level discussions through access to traditional and more formal power structures, for women, the same pathways rarely exist.\textsuperscript{121}

In the context of Yemen, for example, there are a range of political, socio-economic, legislative, and security barriers that prevent women’s full and meaningful participation in peace, political, and peacebuilding processes. Despite this, and due to grassroots civil society efforts, 29.6% of participants in the national dialogue in 2015, and 23.5% of participants in the constitution drafting process were women.\textsuperscript{122} However, more recently, women have been excluded from official dialogues and negotiations, and it continues to be argued that supporting women’s participation is counter to Yemeni “culture.”\textsuperscript{123} In the most recent peace talks held in Yemen, only one out of 24 delegates was a woman.\textsuperscript{124} The gender dimensions that fuel the conflict, including unequal distribution of resources, as well as the use of violence and exclusionary gender norms to silence political opponents, are overlooked in favor of short-term efforts to achieve representation on paper.\textsuperscript{125} This is also despite the fact that at the local level, women play a critical role in addressing various dimensions of the conflict. For example, as Rasha Jarhum noted in her November 2018 briefing to the Security Council, the Association of the Mothers of Abductees Sons were able to release 336 detainees, compared to zero detainees release through the UN-sponsored process.\textsuperscript{126}

**Snapshot: Women’s participation in the peace process in South Sudan**

The Security Council devoted a great deal of attention to the situation in South Sudan in 2018, with a focus on the peace process that led to the signing of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS). The peacekeeping mission in South Sudan has the mandate to support women’s participation, and in 2018 and 2019, the Security Council added new language calling on all parties to ensure women’s participation. Reporting from the mission included several references to the importance of meeting the 35% quota for the participation of women in the implementation of the Agreement, civil society efforts to advocate for an increase in women’s participation in the peace process, and mission activities aimed at supporting women’s participation.\textsuperscript{127} However, there were no recommendations on women’s participation in any report on South Sudan, nor was there any analysis regarding progress in ensuring women’s participation in the implementation of the peace agreement. The Security Council echoed many of the generic messages of support for women’s participation, albeit inconsistently. Notably, more than 50% of the references to women’s participation in South Sudan over the entire course of 2018 occurred at a meeting during which the Executive Director of UN Women, Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka briefed the Security Council on her October 2018 trip to South Sudan. In fact, during that meeting, all Security Council members, except for Russia, referred to women’s participation in the peace process. Following that meeting, there was a three-fold increase in attention to women’s participation in statements delivered by Security Council members. The Security Council also heard from two civil society speakers from South Sudan throughout 2018: Jackline Nasiwa of The Center for Inclusive Governance Peace and Justice in May and Grace John Kenyi Geri, Governance and Peace Manager, Community Empowerment for Progress Organization (CEPO) in September.

Despite the comparatively high-level of attention women’s participation received, discussions about women in South Sudan continued to overwhelmingly focused on SGBV. Further, when women’s participation was discussed, the conversation was relatively general and devoid of analysis. As several NGOWG members, including CARE and Oxfam International, have highlighted: some of the main barriers to women and girls’ participation in peace and political processes are illiteracy, lack of access due to geographic location, or political connections and entrenched discrimination and patriarchal norms.\textsuperscript{128} As was articulated by a civil society representative, “unless beliefs related to masculinity and cultural norms that limit women and girls’ being active members of the society are addressed, women and girls of South Sudan will always remain at the periphery of key decision-making processes.”\textsuperscript{129} The superficial rhetoric on women’s participation in South Sudan also aligns with a common critique levelled by local women’s rights groups: the international community and other local actors who are supporting women’s participation programs and interventions are usually geared towards strengthening the traditional role of women as caregivers and service providers, instead of supporting strategic interventions that seek to transform gender and power relations. Without addressing structural barriers, there can be no progress in ensuring the meaningful inclusion of women.
Constitution-building processes

Women's meaningful participation is also critical in the context of drafting and development of new constitutions. In 2018, constitutional review and drafting processes had been taking place or were planned, in Somalia and Syria. There was a reference to women's participation in the National Constitutional Convention in Somalia, although no specific details regarding their role in the discussions. In the context of Syria, the Special Envoy for Syria has been advocating for a 30% quota for women's participation in the constitutional committee convening at the end of 2018; the participants representing civil society are comprised of nearly 50% women. The success of the constitution-building process will be reliant, in part on the inclusiveness of the Committee and the process and the extent to which it is representative of the diversity of Syrian society. Further, ensuring women’s rights and the rights of minorities are core to any new constitution is essential for safeguarding these rights in the future. Research has demonstrated that women’s rights and gender equality, as well as non-discrimination, must be enshrined in constitutions in order to provide a foundation for the realization of those rights by all people. This requires not only women’s inclusion and meaningful participation but also gender expertise and knowledge of women’s rights in the process of drafting the constitution itself.

Early warning and conflict prevention

The Security Council has repeatedly emphasized that there is a "substantial link between women’s full and meaningful involvement in efforts to prevent, resolve and rebuild from conflict and those efforts’ effectiveness and long-term sustainability." In June 2016, the Security Council adopted a presidential statement on women's role in conflict prevention in Africa that reaffirmed this link and called for increased participation of women in all stages of conflict prevention, the consideration of gender-related issues in discussions on conflict prevention, and to increase funding for WPS programs.

Women's meaningful participation in efforts to prevent conflict, including early warning systems, is overlooked in reports; although, it is important to emphasize that in general, conflict prevention as a whole is an often-overlooked topic in reports of the Secretary-General. The participation of women and girls is critical to conflict prevention efforts and a necessary aspect of broader efforts to achieve gender equality in all conflicts. However, women face a range of barriers to their full participation in conflict prevention, ranging from cultural discrimination and stigmatization to violence and intimidation to structural barriers, including lack of access to education or property. Conflict prevention efforts align with broader global strategies aimed at meeting sustainable development goal (SDG) 16 on peaceful, just, and inclusive societies.

Women have an important role to play in the development of early warning systems. In practical terms, early warning systems are efforts to systematically collect and analyze relevant data and assess risk in order to prevent the outbreak of conflict. In societies that are experiencing rising levels of insecurity, women may be the first to be affected, and so, their participation in early warning efforts can help identify and alert security officials to changing tensions at the local level. There were general references to women's role in peace, security, development, and the prevention of violent extremism in reports on Central Africa (Lake Chad Basin); there was not any analysis regarding success in ensuring women’s participation in these efforts, or barriers to their participation.

Reports included references to efforts to develop mechanisms to reduce violence, build trust between communities, and strengthen early warning systems in the context of several countries, including as part of the African Initiative in CAR, the peace process in Colombia, community violence reduction efforts in Haiti, Mitrovica Women’s trust-building in Kosovo, the reconciliation process between the Qaddadfa and Awlad Suleiman tribes in Libya, and state-level consultations on women’s role in peace, reconciliation and preventing violent extremism in Somalia.

There are many examples of women’s role in mediation and reconciliation, as part of conflict prevention efforts, that are also positive, yet overlooked in Council discussions. For example, in Iraq, the Iraqi Center for Negotiation...
Skills and Conflict Management (IQCM), a network of 360 mediators and negotiators working to de-escalate, manage, and resolve conflicts across the country, is comprised of 30% women. In the Kurdistan region, women negotiators, including Yazidi women, support displaced and persecuted minority groups and help them claim basic entitlements such as identification cards and other vital legal documents. In the case of Yazidi women seeking new documents, this process includes reaching out to the government ministries responsible for issuing state documents as well as internally displaced persons (IDP) authorities. In doing so, women mediators use strong technical mediation skills, including communication, persuasion, and consensus-building.

Civil society has an important role to play in early warning efforts. Unfortunately, details on concrete ways in which women or women’s groups contributed to early warning in reports of the Secretary-General was almost completely absent in 2018. However, we have anecdotal evidence that women’s groups do play an important role. For example, women’s groups in DRC noted that MONUSCO takes into account the warnings from civil society, but it often does not have the capacity to take forward these warnings. Civil society also noted that there is a need to build the capacity of organizations to systematize early warning efforts. In Syria, women-led groups have been warning about the deteriorating situation in Idlib since 2016, alerting the international community that it could become another Eastern Ghouta.

### Addressing the root causes of violence remains overlooked

Over the last 20 years, there have been several studies that have found that gender inequality is an important predictor of conflict and instability; gender inequality increases the likelihood of conflict, and more broadly, countries with weak human rights standards “are more likely to have militarized and violent interstate disputes.” A recent analysis found that 79% of armed conflict in situations for which there is data on gender equality took place in contexts with medium, high or very high levels of gender discrimination. Relatedly, strong feminist movements are also predictors of, and contributors to, efforts that reduce gender inequality, such as advocating for laws that combat SGBV.

Addressing gender equality, as well as inequality more broadly, is therefore essential to preventing conflict, and requires, at its core, protection, and promotion of human rights and efforts to address discriminatory structures and institutions. Inequality, corruption, the proliferation of weapons, violations, and violations of human rights are all root causes of conflict and violence. In order to prevent conflict, underlying political, social and economic inequalities must be addressed with the aim of transforming corrupt, exclusionary, and unjust institutions and systems.

In 2018, the Security Council adopted four outcome documents that committed to strengthening its conflict prevention efforts and particularly emphasized the importance of women’s participation in conflict prevention; the country-specific outcome documents adopted on Afghanistan / Central Asia, Central Africa region, Guinea-Bissau, Somalia, South Sudan and West Africa / Sahel region also referenced women’s role in conflict prevention. However, as was noted by multiple Member States, the Security Council has yet to utilize its conflict prevention capabilities.

The Security Council’s focus on conflict prevention primarily occurs in the context of thematic debates; the issue rarely occurs in a significant way in the context of country and region-specific situations. The exceptions to this are reports and briefings on West Africa and the Sahel and Central Africa. This would indicate that conflict prevention is typically considered when taking a birds-eye view, and also when explicitly mandated, as it is for the regional political missions in West Africa and the Sahel and Central Africa, including with stronger new mandate language adopted in 2018. While women’s role in conflict prevention and resolution is an oft-repeated phrase throughout outcome documents and, as a result, is generically referenced in both debates and reports on country situations as well as thematic issues, addressing the root causes of conflict, such as gender inequality, and adopting a gender-sensitive approach to conflict prevention, is almost entirely absent.

In the context of conflict prevention, the term “root causes” is often used to discuss issues that should be central to peace and security efforts. “Root causes” is commonly used generically, without actual detail as to what those

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“Recognizes that a concerted and determined approach that addresses the root causes of conflicts also requires a systematic and comprehensive approach to women and peace and security issues...”

Presidential Statement 2010/18

“Reiterating the need for a comprehensive approach to conflict prevention and sustainable peace, which comprises operational and structural measures for the prevention of armed conflict and addresses its root causes, including through strengthening the rule of law at international and national levels and promoting sustained economic growth, poverty eradication, social development, sustainable development, national reconciliation, good governance, democracy, gender equality and respect for, and protection of, human rights...”

Resolution 2122 (2013), OP 1
root causes might be or why it is crucial to address them in the long-term, particularly in outcome documents adopted by the Security Council.\textsuperscript{153} The few exceptions are in reports on CAR, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, West Africa and the Sahel. Gender inequality is referenced in reports on Guinea-Bissau and West Africa and the Sahel.\textsuperscript{154}

There are multiple examples of civil society efforts at the local level to address the root causes of conflict and violence from a holistic and inclusive perspective. The Security Council would benefit from hearing more examples in order to understand how complex and integrated approaches to conflict prevention can be effective, particularly in reports from peacekeeping and political missions. In the DRC, Synergie des Associations Feminines du Congo (SAFECO) and Women’s Earth and Climate Action Network (WECAN), two partners of NGOWG member Global Network of Women Peacebuilders (GNWP), implemented a reforestation project in the d’Itombwe forest to try to improve the quality of life in rural areas that have been affected and destroyed by the mining industry. As a result of the project, 110,000 trees were planted by local tribes and Indigenous peoples. SAFECO and WECAN organized trainings and awareness-raising sessions on climate change and its negative impacts, including conflict. In addition to mitigating the adverse effects of climate change, the project contributed to reducing women’s risk of being targeted for SGBV by diminishing the distance they had to travel to collect firewood.\textsuperscript{155}

Similarly, in Nigeria, efforts by West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP) and GNWP in Bauchi and Gombe, two states affected by the farmer-pastoralist conflict and the IDPs fleeing from Boko Haram – both of which are linked to climate change – facilitated conversations between the local authorities to discuss the root causes of conflict with traditional and religious leaders, local women and civil society. Through these conversations, they were able to identify priorities and concrete actions to address the root causes of conflict such as drug abuse, harmful cultural norms, and political violence, which disproportionately affect women and girls and discourage them from participating in politics. The local authorities have committed to developing policies and action plans based on the priorities, and concrete actions identified, and WANEP and GNWP continue to follow-up and accompany the authorities to provide technical support.

**Inequality, exclusion, and discrimination**

The Security Council has recognized gender inequality, discrimination, and exclusion of women and girls as root causes of conflict as factors that can trigger or exacerbate violence.\textsuperscript{156} Recognition of inequality and discrimination as root causes of conflict has increased over the last several years, particularly in statements delivered by briefers and Security Council members, notably in open debates or discussions on thematic agenda items, as well as in the context of CAR, Guinea-Bissau, the Lake Chad Basin, Mali, South Sudan, and West Africa & the Sahel.\textsuperscript{157} This increased focus has been aided by a strengthened focus within the UN system of prevention overall.\textsuperscript{158} However, a gender perspective, including recognition of the importance of addressing discrimination against, and exclusion of women, is often overlooked. Further, although the Security Council did include language on gender inequality and discrimination in Resolution 2149 (2018) on youth, peace, and security, overall, the Council has historically overlooked these issues in its resolutions and presidential statements on country-specific and regional situations.\textsuperscript{159}

The extent to which inequality and discrimination factored into the Council’s discussion on a country situation often also depended on how prominent those issues were in media reports about that the conflict situation. For example, in discussions on Myanmar, there were frequent, substantive references to discrimination and inequality against the Rohingya as a root cause of the conflict, although notably, this attention on the issue by the Security Council has come after years of signs of impending conflict due to the systematic discrimination and exclusion of not only the Rohingya but also women and other ethnic minorities.\textsuperscript{160} These early warning indicators of conflict were highlighted in the recent report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar (FFM).\textsuperscript{161}

Similarly, women’s rights and gender inequality have factored heavily in media reports about Afghanistan, where women’s rights are at risk of being marginalized in efforts to end the conflict with the Taliban.\textsuperscript{162} References to the importance of gender equality appear most frequently in statements by Security Council members during the quarterly debates on Afghanistan, when compared to all other country situations. However, it is notable that these issues are not raised as substantively in reports of the Secretary-General or outcome documents.

The Council’s discussion on Myanmar and Afghanistan contrasts sharply with the discourse on, for example, Colombia, where there were almost no references to inequality and discrimination as causes of ongoing insecurity, despite extensive research by human rights groups highlighting these issues as root causes.\textsuperscript{163}
Proliferation of weapons and militarization

Recognizing the link between weapons, human rights violations, and persistent gender inequality is fundamental to conflict prevention, yet it is a dimension consistently overlooked by the Council in country and region-specific situations.64 The Council overall generically discussed the flow of weapons as a destabilizing factor, particularly in the context of CAR, Central Africa, Colombia, Libya, Mali, and West Africa, but failed to reference the gender dimensions or the particular impact on women and girls.65

There were minimal references to the link between the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) and insecurity, including women’s insecurity. In the context of Sudan, the Secretary-General did note that, in the aftermath of the compulsory weapons collection campaign, “the crime rate in South Darfur decreased by 24%, while the incidence of major crimes such as murder, armed robbery and rape decreased by 35% over the period of the collection campaign.”66 Future reporting should continue to collect data and expand on this important analytical reference in order to strengthen our understanding of the link between SALW and insecurity in the context of Sudan.

The only reference to militarization is in the context of West Africa and the Sahel: “The growing use of military responses to the challenges facing West Africa and the Sahel is disquieting. Military solutions, while necessary, are not sufficient. A holistic approach is required to address violent extremism, with an emphasis on good governance, dialogue, and mediation, sustainable development, including through the provision of basic services, and the inclusion of all segments of society, in particular women and youth, in political and peace processes.”67

Militarization and the pervasive use of weapons can have a profound effect on women’s security. In Colombia, for example, the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), an NGOWG member, reported that the majority of intimate partner violence resulting in femicide was carried out with the use of firearms.68 Relatedly, as a result of increasing police and military operations, the rise of private surveillance, and criminal organizations strengthening in security vacuums, the legal and illegal arms trade has increased, thus also increasing the number of firearms owned by ordinary civilians and therefore insecurity for women and girls.69 In South Sudan, analysis by NGOWG member Saferworld has noted that conflict and instability in areas such as Lakes, Warrap, Jonglei and Eastern Equatoria have persisted among civil population partially due to the spread of SALW in the hands of civilians, particularly young men.70 Guns, typically held in cattle-keeping communities for the purpose of protecting their livelihood, cattle, have been acquired and misused by young men for cattle-raiding, increasing insecurity in local communities.71 Young men are motivated to take part in cattle-raiding in order to be able to afford dowries for marriage. As was stated by a respondent in a recent report: “if you are a young man of 18 or 19 years and don’t have cattle, you can’t marry. You must join the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) or an armed group to raid cattle to get married.”72 A recent analysis by Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) supports this, noting that “South Sudan remains a deeply patriarchal society in which custom and tradition entrench the subservience of women and girls to men,” and contribute towards young men taking up arms in order to fulfill gendered expectations and maintain the status quo.73

In Libya, the proliferation of weapons and ammunition, much of which originates in large stockpiles that were left unsecured in 2011, results in the “highly visible presence” of a wide range of weapons.74 WILPF noted that increasing militarization of society and the resulting widespread use of weapons means that even in communal settings, such as weddings or hospitals, women feel unsafe.75 The widespread presence of arms also has a dampening effect on women’s rights; women often feel like they cannot “do or talk about anything,” and weapons are used to perpetuate SGBV.76 At the open debate on sexual violence in conflict in April 2019, civil society activist Inas Mlioud noted that despite the UN arms embargo, weapons continue to flow into Libya unchecked, and as a result of their widespread availability, “violence often escalates into a deadly outcome.”77

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6 Femicide is generally understood to involve intentional murder of women because they are women, but broader definitions include any killings of women or girls. Some descriptions of femicide note that it is “the most violent manifestation of discrimination against women and their inequality.”
More attention to sexual violence, but gaps in addressing broader violations of women’s rights

The Security Council continues to improve the overall way in which it discusses and addresses SGBV in outcome documents, and the amount of information on SGBV included in reports of the Secretary-General continues to grow. This overall attention to such an important issue is necessary, however, the focus on SGBV often obscures other important women’s rights concerns.

In fact, in 2018, 90% of the references to women’s rights in reports of peace operations were focused on SGBV specifically, accounting for 45% of all references to WPS. In Security Council meetings, the same ratio was repeated; references to SGBV were made more than 2,000 times, while references to women’s rights more broadly were made less than 300 times. Since the adoption of Resolution 1820 (2008), there has been an increase nearly every year in the number of new mandate provisions for peace operations related to monitoring violations of women’s rights with a focus on SGBV. Currently, nine peace operations have the mandate to prevent or respond to SGBV. The Council often negatively frames fundamental human rights, particularly for women and girls, as ‘needs,’ thus ignoring the fact that these rights are not voluntary commitments but legally enforceable norms. This framing occurs in outcome documents adopted across a range of country-specific situations, often in the context of justice, humanitarian assistance, and peacebuilding. The only explicit references to “women’s rights” in 2018 occurred in resolutions adopted on Afghanistan, Haiti, South Sudan, Sudan (Abyei), and Sudan (Darfur). Most of these references listed women along with children as groups whose human rights should be protected; it was only in the resolutions on Afghanistan and Sudan (Darfur) that the phrase “women’s rights” was explicitly utilized.

Although there is an overall increase in information on SGBV, the information is mostly quantitative data on how many women were targeted, listing SGBV as one of many violations against civilians, or activities undertaken by peace operations to prevent or respond to SGBV. Qualitative analysis of the root causes of violence or patterns of violence was overall weak considering the expectations of reporting and information on this issue, although still stronger when compared to the information received on women’s participation. Further, there was rarely any information or analysis on particular groups of women and girls who were targeted for SGBV in country-specific situations, such as Indigenous women and girls, activists, HRDs, politicians, women and girls with disabilities, LGBTIQ+ people, and ethnic or religious minorities. (See above section for more analysis, on page 8)

The most common analytical references made in reports of the Secretary-General in the context of SGBV were related to the role that stigma plays in low rates of reporting, as well as challenges in survivors accessing services. Further, there were multiple instances in which reports acknowledged that data was likely incomplete due to challenges related to gathering information from local communities. Another analytical point made in several reports was the particular risk facing women and girls when undertaking livelihood activities, such as collecting fuel and firewood; this point has been echoed in the work undertaken by many civil society organizations, including NGOWG members. As such, there were multiple references to efforts by UN peace operations to address this specific risk, particularly by missions with a mandate to protect civilians, such as South Sudan.

There was an increase in references to the provision of services for survivors, primarily in the context of activities carried out by UN peace operations in CAR, DRC, Iraq, Kosovo, Libya, Mali, Somalia, South Sudan, and Sudan (Darfur). Examples include strengthening national coordination and capacities for protecting survivors and witnesses in Mali, and the establishment of survivor-centered services at a one-stop center in Juba, South Sudan.

Disappointingly, sexual violence was rarely linked to gender inequality and discrimination in country-specific or regional contexts, although this was touched upon in thematic reports and discussions of the Council, particularly in reports of the Secretary-General on WPS and conflict-related sexual violence. Overall, less than 10% of references in reports of the Secretary-General to violations of women’s rights included information on violations of women’s rights outside of SGBV. The Council’s narrow focus on one type of violation of women’s rights implies that it is engaging primarily with the human rights violation and its immediate causes and consequences, rather than sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) refers to any act that is perpetrated against a person’s will and is based on gender norms and unequal power relationships. It encompasses threats of violence and coercion. It can be physical, emotional, psychological, or sexual in nature, and can take the form of a denial of resources or access to services. It inflicts harm on women, girls, men and boys.”

than systematically engaging with the root causes of long-term structural violence. This also results in a focus on women in conflict primarily in their capacity as victims. As a symptom of broader inequalities, SGBV against women and girls cannot be addressed without getting at the root causes of conflict and prioritizing women’s participation both in identifying trends as well as envisioning solutions.182

The reports that did include references to women’s rights outside of SGBV were focused on the situations in Afghanistan, Central Africa, Colombia, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Iraq, Kosovo, South Sudan, Sudan (Abyei), West Africa & the Sahel. These reports included information on women’s lack of inheritance and property rights, lack of sexual and reproductive rights and health, or efforts to prevent women from participating in political processes, all framed as the denial of human rights.

Further, there were several notable instances in which women’s rights were linked to challenges related to women’s participation. For example, in one report on Colombia, the link is made between women’s economic rights and childcare: “Challenges remain, including the availability of childcare, among other measures to enable the active and meaningful participation of women in productive projects.”183 In the context of Guinea-Bissau, the link is made between harmful traditional practices and participation in economic and political life: “Assessments […] showed that extreme poverty, unequal access to education, multiple and intersecting forms of discrimination affecting women and girls, as well as harmful traditional practices, including early and forced marriage, all limited the rights of women and youth to participate in economic life, which had a detrimental impact on their enjoyment of the right to participate in the public and political spheres.”184

Snapshot: Gender-based violence in Myanmar

The response of the international community to the critical human rights situation in Myanmar has been weak and outpaced by the rapid deterioration of the situation on the ground. Despite the onset of the crisis in August 2016, it was only in March 2018 that the Secretary-General listed the Myanmar military (Tatmadaw) as “credibly suspected of committing or being responsible for patterns of rape or other forms of sexual violence.”185 Political divisions within the Council have stymied discussions on targeted sanctions against suspected individuals and the implementation of an arms embargo.186

As was noted by NGOWG member Global Justice Center, “gender has consistently played a central role in the design and commission of the atrocities committed by the Tatmadaw against ethnic groups in Burma,” and therefore, gender must be at the heart of any response to the crisis.187 However, the Security Council’s discussions on the situation in Myanmar since January 2018 have failed to consider how accountability, humanitarian assistance, and efforts to address the root causes of the conflict must be gender-sensitive and inclusive of women’s participation. The two aspects of the situation that drew stronger statements from Security Council members were ensuring survivors of sexual and gender-based violence have access to services and protecting women and girls from SGBV if they return.

The Myanmar military has long used rape as a weapon of war and oppression in its conflicts with ethnic groups, and the clearance operations in Rakhine state beginning in 2016. It is precisely these acts that led the FFM to conclude that SGBV was a hallmark of the Tatmadaw’s operations against the Rohingya, and “acts of SGBV constituted crimes against humanity, war crimes and underlying acts of genocide accompanied by inferences of genocidal intent.”188 There can be no true justice for the genocide of the Rohingya if perpetrators of SGBV are not held accountable. Although substantial evidence was brought to the attention of the Security Council by CSOs and the FFM that began in September 2018, the Council has not referred the situation to the International Criminal Court (ICC) prosecutor, nor has it established an independent ad-hoc international criminal tribunal as recommended by several institutions. Numerous CSOs have called for stronger public condemnation of the impunity that prevails and for national authorities to enforce credible, accessible, and transparent accountability mechanisms.189 The generals who oversaw the clearance operations have remained in their posts, for example.190 The recent report by the UN Fact-Finding Mission on economic interests in Myanmar also highlighted another dimension of the crisis that is gendered; the Tatmadaw has perpetrated forced labor and sexual violence in mining areas in Kachin state in connection with business activities.191 Further, the report provided detailed information regarding multiple states that have allowed arms and arms-related transfers and assistance to Myanmar, in violation of IHL, international human rights law (IHRL), and the ATT.192 Privately-owned companies located in countries in Western Europe and North America also provided equipment and military training.193 The Council has been silent on this issue.

Although inequality and discrimination against the Rohingya has been identified correctly as a root cause of the conflict by Security Council members, statements universally failed to recognize the gendered nature of the inequality and discrimination. Research undertaken by Oxfam International found that even before displacement,
women in Rakhine had limited access to public space and little meaningful involvement in decision-making. Further, as a result of deep-rooted social and cultural norms, women and girls’ mobility was severely restricted, both through the practice of purdah and the burden of care work. Government facilitated discriminatory measures, including denial of citizenship rights, restrictions on movement, and denial of access to healthcare, including sexual and reproductive rights and health, have been compounded by the specific gendered violence carried out by the military in a decades-long campaign of persecution. Such violence has had a widespread and lasting effect not only on women but on the entire population. Other dimensions of the conflict that are overlooked include land confiscation and displacement, as outlined by NGOWG members Saferworld and Oxfam International. In other research undertaken by Oxfam International, ownership of land was found to be critical in mitigating women’s vulnerability, especially in the context of the return of displaced populations. Adding to the gravity of the failures in responding to the situation in Myanmar, women and girls’ inclusion and full participation in any negotiations or peace processes have been neglected. In meetings on Myanmar in 2018, only Sweden and the United Kingdom made any reference to the importance of women’s participation in decision-making. As was recently analyzed by NGOWG member Women’s Refugee Commission, gender equality and efforts to support women’s participation and leadership must be central to humanitarian programming in Myanmar and can have transformative effects in the long-term. (For more analysis on LGBTIQ+ rights in Myanmar, see page below).
There were 28 country-specific or regional situations discussed by the Security Council in 2018. Overall, the Security Council has broadly continued to include WPS references in country and region-specific resolutions and reports, relatively consistently. Compared to 2017 and 2016, the Security Council improved its inclusion of WPS in a few key areas and maintained existing good language elsewhere. There was not any sign of particularly regressive WPS language in any country or region-specific resolution or presidential statement.

The Security Council IEG on WPS complements the discussion and action through focusing attention on a few specific country-specific situations in meetings with senior UN officials and Council members. A newer development in 2019 has been pre-IEG meetings with civil society representatives in order to better facilitate information sharing from women leaders, HRDs and activists directly to the Council members.

- **Afghanistan**: There have been four meetings held on Afghanistan in 2016, 2017, and 2019. There was a pre-meeting consultation with civil society prior to the July 2019 meeting.
- **CAR**: There have been four meetings held on CAR in 2016 and 2017.
- **DRC**: There have been three meetings held on DRC in 2018 and 2019.
- **Iraq**: There have been four meetings held on Iraq in 2016, 2017 and 2018.
- **Lake Chad Basin region**: There were two meetings held on the region in 2017 and 2018.
- **Libya**: There have been three meetings held on Libya in 2018 and 2019. There was a pre-meeting consultation with civil society in August 2019.
- **Mali**: There have been four meetings held on Mali in 2016, 2017, and 2018.
- **Myanmar**: There has been one meeting held on Myanmar in 2019. There was a pre-meeting consultation with civil society prior to the meeting.
- **South Sudan**: There have been two meetings held on South Sudan in 2019. There were pre-meeting consultations with civil society prior to both meetings.
- **Yemen**: There have been three meetings held on Yemen in 2017 and 2019.

### Calendar of Meetings of the Security Council Informal Expert Group on WPS between 2016 - 2019

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Jan</th>
<th>Feb</th>
<th>March</th>
<th>April</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>June</th>
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<th>Aug</th>
<th>Sept</th>
<th>Oct</th>
<th>Nov</th>
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<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>South Sudan*</td>
<td>Yemen**</td>
<td>DRC**</td>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>Libya**</td>
<td>South Sudan**</td>
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<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>Lake Chad Basin*</td>
<td>DRC*</td>
<td>Iraq**</td>
<td>Libya*</td>
<td>Mali / Sahel</td>
<td>DRC**</td>
<td>CAR**</td>
<td>Libya**</td>
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<td>2017</td>
<td>Lake Chad Basin*</td>
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<td>CAR**</td>
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<td>Iraq*</td>
<td>CAR*</td>
<td>Afghanistan*</td>
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<td>Iraq**</td>
<td>Afghanistan**</td>
<td>CAR**</td>
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* First IEG meeting on country / region  ** Follow-up meeting on country / region  Pre-IEG consultations with civil society
Peace Operations

Currently, there are 26 active peace operations overseen by the Department of Peace Operations (DPO) and 11 special political missions managed by the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA). The Security Council renewed the mandates of 11 peacekeeping operations and 6 special political missions over the course of the year. The peacekeeping mission in Liberia (UNMIL), completed its mandate on 30 March 2018.

In 2018, 10 out of 15 peacekeeping missions had gender units, with only three senior gender advisors. Further, only eight of these units were reporting directly to the offices of the Heads of the Mission, as called for in the 2015 peacekeeping operations review. For special political missions, most field missions had gender advisers, but only four of these were senior level. Analysis undertaken by the UN on gender mainstreaming across five peacekeeping operations in 2018 found some common challenges related to the ability of gender experts to carry out their work. According to the reports, the key failures related to mainstreaming WPS across the mission mandate was the failure of senior leadership to prioritize WPS in their work and hold staff accountable for integrating gender into their work. Training on expectations related to WPS and also capacity within the mission are also key challenges.

There is a clear correlative relationship between mandates, gender expertise, and information and analysis on WPS. Our analysis reveals that having a mandate to address WPS correlates with the almost universal inclusion of some information on WPS in reporting. As a result, it is clear that there is an ongoing need for the Security Council to explicitly include provisions in future mandates that call for WPS to be mainstreamed, in addition to component-specific provisions on women’s meaningful participation and women’s and girls’ protection including in DDR; SSR; rule of law; and protection and monitoring of human rights. The presence of gender advisers and women protection advisers results in more detailed information on the gender dynamics of situations as well as information on WPS activities carried out by the mission, indicating that their presence has an operational impact, as well as information gathering and analytical impact.

Our analysis further reveals a correlative relationship between the presence of gender advisers and an improvement in information on women’s participation in reports of the Secretary-General. This relationship is most visible in reports on special political missions, which often have stronger mandates to support women’s participation in elections and constitutional reform processes. The influence of women’s protection advisers is seen in the inclusion of information on SGBV: in fact, the rate of increase in references to SGBV and other protection issues aligns with the deployment of women’s protection advisers beginning in 2012. Missions with women’s protection advisers had stronger and more detailed information on SGBV activities undertaken by the missions. This relationship is one of the main reasons why the NGOWG continues to advocate for robust gender expertise, considering the recent budget cuts.

It is important to note that the responsibility for implementing WPS provisions in mandates does not lay solely with gender advisers, women’s protection advisers, gender focal points, or any other gender experts; their presence should facilitate the implementation of those provisions and support training and capacity building. Mission leadership must support all gender experts as the ultimate responsibility for the mainstreaming of WPS must lie with the mission leadership as prescribed by Resolution 2242 (2015).
Mandates

Of all missions active in October 2019, 17 of 26 peace operations had women, peace and security-related tasks explicitly articulated as part of their mandates: 9 peacekeeping missions and 8 special political missions. As of October 2019, 13 peace operations mainstream gender as a cross-cutting issue across their work. The only missions that do not mainstream gender are those in Afghanistan, Cyprus, Golan Heights, India / Pakistan, the Middle East, Kosovo, and Western Sahara.

Over the last several years, most multidimensional peacekeeping missions were given relatively robust mandates with regard to WPS issues. The missions without any WPS mandate provisions are those where complex political dynamics prevent the inclusion of new WPS language. Advocacy and expertise from UN Women, the gender teams within DPO and DPPA, and civil society have been instrumental in pushing for ongoing advancements in the mandates of peace operations in partnership with a small group of elected and some permanent members of the Security Council. Further, the influence of the Security Council IEG on WPS has also served as an additional mechanism through which experts can advocate for strengthened mandates. In the context of mandates, the expertise provided by the UN system and civil society has been critical in ensuring mandates on WPS continue to evolve. We can broadly group mandate provisions on WPS into the following categories:

- Engagement with civil society, including women’s groups, as part of mandate implementation.
- Support for women’s participation and inclusion in peace and security processes.
- Protection and promotion of human rights, including women’s rights.
- Support for gender-sensitive peace and security processes.
- Protection of civilians, including specifically women, and prevention and response to SGBV.
- Enhanced reporting on various dimensions of WPS.

There are some notable new inclusions in mandates of peace operations in 2018:

- Added language calling on four more peace operations to mainstream gender as a cross-cutting issue in the Central African region, Iraq, Lebanon, and Libya.
- The mission in Sudan (Darfur) was explicitly asked to ensure gender analysis and technical expertise in mission planning and transitions, a first for any peace operation mandate.
- First and strongest language to date on mainstreaming gender in the context of conflict prevention, in the mandates for the regional missions in Central Africa and West Africa & the Sahel.
- A new provision calling on the mission in Central Africa to support ensuring the peace process in CAR had a gender perspective; the result of the process was the February 2019 Bangui Agreement.
- The first language calling on a peace operation to support the participation of women in counter-terrorism and countering violent extremism initiatives.

New language calling on the mission in Sudan (Darfur) to monitor and report on SGBV. This reflects the outcomes of the strategic review of the mission, which was facilitated in early 2018.

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1 For the full detail of all provisions in each mission mandate, see Annex: UN peace operations: summary of WPS-related mandate provisions on page 58
## Overall Trends

### WPS Provisions in mandates of peace operations active in 2019

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Missions¹</th>
<th>WPS Mainstreamed</th>
<th>Civil Society</th>
<th>Participation / Inclusion</th>
<th>Gender-sensitive Processes</th>
<th>Human Rights</th>
<th>Protection / SGBV</th>
<th>Report on WPS</th>
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#### Special political mission

- ▼ Part of mission’s mandate as per adopted Security Council resolution
- ■ Part of mission’s mandate as per internal work plan, senior leadership compact, or budget proposal

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¹ For the full detail of all provisions in each mission mandate, please see our annex on page 58.
² Only missions which have a WPS mandate and are active as of November 2019 are listed in this table.
³ The mission does not have gender explicitly laid out in its mandate, but as part of its work carries out WPS activities in a range of areas.
⁴ Although the mission mandate as laid out by the Security Council doesn’t include any WPS provisions, the mission’s mandate to verify gender provisions of the Peace Agreement related to Reintegration (chapter 3.2) and Security Guarantees (chapter 3.4) results in a range of WPS activities. Further, the mission has developed a Gender Directive, which further supports implementation in a few key WPS areas.
⁵ The mission has communicated its intent to mainstream WPS as part of its work through its recent budget proposals; this is not specifically laid out in any resolution of the Security Council.
⁶ The peacekeeping mission in Haiti (MINUJUSTH) is in the process of drawing down, thus only the newly established political mission is included in this table.
⁷ There is no specific wording on UNSOM mandate on gender mainstreaming but this is done as part of the SRSG’s Compact.
Reports

The number of reports that included references to WPS continued to be high; however, the quality of the information and analysis did not meet the expectations the Council has laid out in terms of reporting on WPS.7 The peacekeeping missions in CAR, DRC, Mali, South Sudan, and Sudan (Darfur), and political missions in Afghanistan, Somalia and West Africa and the Sahel are additionally requested to provide “enhanced” reporting on WPS, which can be assumed to provide information and analysis that exceed basic expectations of how WPS should be reflected in every section of the report.

Reports excelled at providing information on activities or steps taken to implement WPS; 100% of reports with WPS references, contained references to relevant WPS activities, although notably, without any detail on the impact or outcomes of those activities. Reports often stated that missions specifically contributed to positive improvements in the context of WPS, however, no subsequent information was included on the specific ways in which actions taken by the mission improved the situation of women, making it difficult to assess the veracity of such statements.

Reports of the Secretary-General also contained a great deal of information on the impact of armed conflict on women, especially data or information regarding specific incidents of violence or lists of violations perpetrated against women. Information on the impact of conflict on women was accompanied by analysis less than 15% of the time; this analysis was often contained within a single sentence that provided additional context for the issue under discussion. Although the inclusion of these short analytical notes in reports is positive, they do not provide adequate information regarding the causes of the violence, or what barriers exist to obtaining remedies. For example, in reports on CAR, there were references to the challenges related to collecting information on incidents of sexual violence and difficulties associated with ensuring rapid trials for perpetrators but no specific details on what these barriers are. In another example, reports on the DRC note that survivors encounter limitations in accessing holistic services and that there were low numbers of women running in national and provincial legislative elections; however, there was no additional analysis on what the specific barriers to accessing services were or explanation of why the numbers of female candidates were low.216 It is important to note that in the case of DRC and CAR, these countries were discussed by the Security Council IEG on WPS, and in the background documents provided to the Security Council members, further analysis of all of those issues was provided.217 Given that the IEG on WPS is meant to be a platform to strengthen the flow of WPS information and analysis to the Council as a whole, the continuing lack of this sort of analytical information in the reports of the Secretary-General is disappointing.

Analytical information, although rare, was included in reports on Guinea-Bissau and Kosovo. For example, in a report on Guinea-Bissau, it was noted that access to justice was still a significant challenge for women, primarily due to lack of transportation and financial means for women to physically

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7 As a baseline, per the Security Council’s previous decisions, including particularly resolutions 2122 (2013) and 2242 (2015), all reports of the Secretary-General on any country-specific or thematic agenda item should include information and analysis on the impact of armed conflict on women and girls; patterns of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV); the gender dimensions, including the role of women, in all areas of conflict prevention and resolution, peacemaking and peacebuilding; details regarding measures taken to protect civilians, particularly women and girls, against SGBV, as well as related recommendations. WPS (S/RES/1820 (2008), OP 9; S/RES/1888 (2009), OPs 24-5; S/RES/1889 (2009), OPs 5, 19(a); S/RES/2122 (2013), OPs 1-2; S/PRST/2010/8; S/PRST/2014/21)
get to the court. In a report on Kosovo, the report discussed the way in which intimate partner violence had become an issue of public concern following the murder of a woman and her daughter; noting that there was a need to strengthen the institutional response to intimate partner violence, the report included analysis from UN Women, which stated that “the true scope of the problem continues to be masked by underreporting owing to perceptions of domestic violence as a private matter, coupled with social stigma, fear of retaliation, lack of trust in competent authorities and economic dependence on the perpetrator.” These sorts of analytical details provide a more comprehensive picture of the real challenges and barriers facing women and thus provide a clear direction for policy responses.

Other expectations laid out by the Council in terms of reporting that were unmet include:

- There was rarely analysis accompanying information on the role of women in conflict prevention, peacemaking, and peacebuilding. The information that was in reports of the Secretary-General was comprised of statistical information on women’s participation in various political and peace processes.

- There is also meant to be information in reports on trends, patterns, and early warning indicators on the use of sexual violence. This information was usually generic and without detail; further, sexual violence was rarely, if ever, highlighted as an indicator of potential conflict or violence. Notably, in several statements throughout 2018, some Security Council members did acknowledge that human rights violations, including SGBV, should have been an indication that they should act before the crisis worsens; these statements were particularly made in the context of Myanmar.

- Similarly, the challenges faced by women and girls in post-conflict situations, such as barriers to accessing healthcare and livelihoods, was discussed inconsistently in reports. Although periodic reports of peace operations did not include this information and analysis, strategic reviews often included gender analysis.
Sanctions

In 2018, the Council extended the mandate of the associated experts groups of nine sanctions regimes. The sanctions targeting Eritrea were lifted, and a new panel of experts on Somalia was established to monitor the remaining sanctions on Somalia.

Accountability for SGBV was a particular focus of the Council’s discussions in 2018; as a result, there was an additional emphasis on ways to utilize sanctions as an accountability tool. On 22 October 2018, an Arria Formula meeting was co-hosted by Côte d’Ivoire, France, the Netherlands, and Peru entitled “Moving from a Culture of Impunity to a Culture of Deterrence: The Use of Sanctions in Addressing Sexual Violence in Conflict.” The discussion resulted in several recommendations, including on ensuring SGBV is systematically mainstreamed across sanctions regimes and ensuring there are resources, including gender expertise, for meeting obligations to monitor and report on SGBV.

The Council has committed to ensuring that sanctions regimes have explicit criteria for SGBV; that there are briefings and coordination between the SRSG on SVC, UN peace operations, the Working Group on CAAC, and sanctions committees and their associated expert groups; and that associated panels of experts have gender expertise, report on SGBV, and mainstream gender as a cross-cutting issue. The inclusion of SGBV as explicit criteria has been integrated either as stand-alone criteria or as part of broader violation of international humanitarian and human rights law into most sanctions regimes, with the exception of DPRK, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, and Lebanon; none of these regimes have any human rights-related criteria for listing. The new calls for gender expertise are a positive development; however, in practice, gender expertise must be distributed within the panel or team of experts. For example, the individual who already has responsibility for humanitarian issues, and also children’s rights, should not additionally have responsibility for gender or sexual violence. Further, there should be gender training for all members of the entire team, given the importance of mainstreaming gender across all work of the experts group. Only a few sanctions regimes are requested to report on WPS; however, thus far we have not seen a discernible increase in the quality of information. The information tends to be descriptive rather than analytical, and often only within a separate section focused on SGBV. Formal briefings by the SRSG on SVC to sanctions committees have historically been ad-hoc; in 2017 there was only one briefing to the South Sudan sanctions committee, and in 2018, one briefing to the Sudan sanctions committee; positively, there have already been at least four briefings to the committees on DRC, CAR, Mali, and South Sudan by the SRSG on SVC in 2019. However, it is important to note that informal engagement between the office of the SRSG on SVC and sanctions committees and their expert groups has deepened significantly in recent years, serving as another important pathway for information sharing and cooperation.

*Expresses its intention, when adopting or renewing targeted sanctions in situations of armed conflict, to consider designating, […] those actors, including those in terrorist groups, engaged in violations of IHL and violations and abuses of human rights, including SGBV […] and commits to ensuring that the relevant expert groups for sanctions committees have the necessary gender expertise…*

Resolution 2242 (2015), OP 6

*Encourages the Secretary General to ensure that expert groups and monitoring teams and panels for sanctions committees […] include information on incidents, patterns, trends and perpetrators of sexual violence in conflict and post-conflict situations in their reports and recommendations to committees, where mandated…*

Resolution 2467 (2019), OP 11

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The sanctions regime for CAR has one of the stronger mandates in terms of WPS and includes provisions for SGBV as designation criteria, as well as requirements for the panel of experts has gender expertise, participate in briefings and to maintain gender as a cross-cutting issue in reporting, the latter of which was added in the 2018 renewal of the sanctions mandate in response to recommendations made by both civil society and the Security Council IEG on WPS at its November 2017 meeting on CAR. Despite the strengthened call for gender in reporting, the 2018 report continues to only report on incidents of rape and sexual assault without analysis of the gender dimensions of the situation, applying a gender perspective across all work of the sanctions committee or putting forward recommendations. The SRSG on SVC was not invited to brief the sanctions committee in 2018 but did provide a briefing in July 2019. As of the end of 2018, four individuals and one entity were listed for violations that include SGBV, as laid out in the narrative summary justifying their listing.

The DRC sanctions regime is mandated to include SGBV as designation criteria, and it is requested that the SRSG for SVC continue to share relevant information with the Committee. The SRSG on SVC was not invited to brief the Committee in 2018 but did brief in 2019. There were no changes to the mandate in 2018, which is unfortunate given the gaps in the regime’s inclusion of key WPS provisions, namely mainstreaming gender as a cross-cutting issue, including in reporting. Reporting by the panel of experts included data on multiple incidents of SGBV in the annex of the report. In September 2018, the Security Council IEG on WPS members raised the need for accountability of perpetrators of SGBV and expressed confidence that the inclusion of SGBV as listing criteria would increase pressure on the government to address SGBV more broadly. As of the end of 2018, there were ten individuals and three entities listed for violations that include SGBV.

The Libya sanctions regime included two new elements in 2018: designation criteria for SGBV and a request for the panel of experts to include expertise on sexual violence. Each addition responds to the recommendations discussed in the 2018 Security Council IEG on WPS meeting on Libya. Widespread sexual violence and other human rights violations committed by migrant smugglers and human traffickers have been well documented, compelling the High Commissioner for Human Rights to describe the situation as “an outrage to the conscience of humanity.” Until recently, reports by the panel of experts have largely excluded any gender perspective, but in the final 2018 report, it details the common practice of exploitation of women, girls, men, and boys by human traffickers and recommends that Member States share information regarding these violations with the panel and to implement relevant conventions to combat trafficking and its associated crimes. Nine of the individuals listed under the Libya sanctions regime were designated for trafficking in persons, which is directly relevant to the implementation of Security Council Resolution 2331 (2016), in which the nexus of sexual violence in conflict, trafficking, and violent extremism is articulated. With the new SGBV designation criteria, it is expected that future listings of individuals will include SGBV when relevant. It is important to note that there was opposition to the inclusion of SGBV in the listings criteria for Libya, yet this was overcome, and the result was the adoption of the resolution with 13 in favor and two abstentions (Russia and China).

The Mali sanctions committee is mandated to receive briefings by the SRSG on SVC and includes sexual violence as designation criteria. Reporting in 2018 documents and analyzes SGBV and its impact on survivors, noting the lack

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44 The specific terminology utilized to refer to acts of SGBV varies between regimes. For South Sudan and DRC, “rape or other sexual violence” is used; for Somalia and CAR, “sexual and gender-based violence” is the formulation.
of access to services, including psychosocial. The SRSG on SVC was not invited to brief the Committee in 2018 but was invited in early 2019 to share information. The connection between the trafficking of women and girls and sexual violence was addressed in a recent report of the panel of experts, which reflects broader discussions within the Council on issues such as trafficking within the region.

The Somalia sanctions regime was modified to include SGBV as designation criteria in 2018. The report of the panel of experts submitted in 2018 does not refer to WPS; further, the SRSG on SVC did not brief the sanctions committee in 2018. If implemented, the new mandate will make a difference in the discussions within both the sanctions committee and the associated panel of experts on issues related to WPS.

The South Sudan sanctions regime has rape and sexual violence in the list of designation criteria, and in 2018, the Council called on the panel of experts to include gender expertise and to mainstream gender as a cross-cutting issue across its investigations and reporting. In May and July 2018, two commanders of the SPLA were listed for planning and directing acts of SGBV. Out of the six individuals listed in previous years, five were listed for enabling "widespread rape." The reports of the panel of experts have provided more names and further evidence of sexual violence for future listings. The SRSG on SVC was invited to brief the Committee in 2017, 2018, and 2019. In October 2018, following her briefing to the sanctions committee, the SRSG on SVC submitted further names of alleged perpetrators to the sanctions committee’s chair in a joint confidential letter with the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.

The sanctions regime for Sudan has listing criteria for individuals or groups who “commit violations of international humanitarian or human rights law or other atrocities,” which is interpreted further in Resolution 2138 (2014) to include SGBV. Resolution 2340 (2017) requests the panel of experts to share information regarding individuals and entities who meet the listing criteria and to report on “threats to stability in Darfur and the region” and violations of IHRL or other atrocities, which is interpreted further in Resolution 2138 (2014) to include human rights and other atrocities, which could encompass SGBV. Reporting by the panel of experts included an annex in its first report of 2018 focused on conflict-related sexual violence, which provided details regarding patterns of violence; this was some of the strongest reporting seen in 2018 by any panel of experts on SGBV. In 2018, references were only made to a briefing received from the SRSG on SVC. No one has been listed explicitly for acts of SGBV; however one individual has been listed for violations of IHRL or other atrocities, which could encompass SGBV. Importantly, there is increasing pressure within the Council to include SGBV as separate designation criteria, unfortunately, consensus has yet to be reached as of 2019 despite the inclusion of information on SGBV in reports to the Council and multiple briefings and informal interactions with the SRSG on SVC over 2018 and early 2019.

The sanctions regime for Yemen contains no provisions mandating it to address WPS in any way and no designation criteria related to SGBV. This absence is reflected in the reports for 2018 in which women were only referenced as victims of airstrikes and other attacks, contained solely within the annex of the reports submitted by the Panel of Experts. Further, the meetings of the Council in which sanctions are discussed were completely devoid of any reference to women or SGBV, indicating a clear blind spot on the part of the Council regarding the importance of holding perpetrators of SGBV accountable in Yemen. The outcome from the Security Council IEG on WPS meetings on Yemen in March and November of 2017 reiterated that SGBV should be included as designation criteria for violations based on IHRL and that additional gender expertise is required within the panel of experts; however these recommendations have not been implemented. Incidents of SGBV have reportedly increased by over 63% since before the conflict, according to the International Rescue Committee, and a recent report from the Group of Governmental Experts on Yemen noted that they “believe all parties to the conflict committed GBV.”

The sanctions adopted to target ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida do not include specific designation criteria for SGBV; however, as per Resolution 2388 (2017), the Council called on the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team to “include in their discussions” issues related to sexual violence in armed conflict, along with information on trafficking in persons. In 2018, information on sexual violence did not significantly improve in the context of reporting. This was partially explained in the narrative of the report as a result of the lack of information from Member States on the issue. Positively, there was a noticeable increase in information and analysis on issues related to women in the context of ISIL (Da’esh), including challenges related to dealing with women returnees, and also the increasing number of women who are becoming suicide bombers. This sort of analysis is positive and reflects the quality of information expected as a baseline in reports.
Crisis Situations

Over the past five years, the Security Council has shown a marked improvement in its attention to WPS in crisis situations.

In 2018, the Security Council adopted or discussed reports of the Secretary-General on 14 country or region-specific situations. The Security Council’s response to country or region-specific crisis situations often includes the adoption of an outcome document to address either the emergence or recurrence of violence in a country or region that either does not have a UN-mandated peace operation, such as Syria or Ukraine, or falls outside the regular cycle of decision-making on a peace operation, such as elections in DRC or the transition of the mission in Sudan (Darfur).

In both 2017 and 2018, respectively, all but two outcome documents adopted on crisis situations referenced WPS. The result is that more than 86% of all outcome documents included a reference to WPS in the past two years compared to only 46% in 2016. There is no pattern in terms of the subject of the outcome documents that do not have WPS, Sudan (Darfur), Ukraine, and the DPRK.

Typically, the Council discusses various WPS issues in the context of DRC and Sudan (Darfur); thus failure to include WPS in, even short presidential statements (PRSTs), is another example of the lack of consistency. Having said that, the inclusion of WPS in crisis response is indicative of a positive trend and shows that the WPS agenda is generally seen as relevant, on a superficial level, in most country and region-specific deliberations.

The Security Council discussed the following crisis situations: Afghanistan, Burundi, CAR, DRC, Guinea-Bissau, Israel / Palestine, Liberia, Libya, Somalia, Sudan (Darfur), Ukraine, West Africa & the Sahel, and Yemen.

We consider any presidential statement adopted by the Security Council on a country-specific situation to be part of the Council’s “crisis response,” even if that country has a peace operation. Any resolution adopted by the Security Council on a country-specific situation which is not establishing, modifying, or renewing a mandate is also considered “crisis response.”
Snapshot: Women’s meaningful participation in Syria

The Council met to discuss the situation in Syria over 30 times throughout 2018, with a particular focus on the chemical weapons attacks, the political process, and the humanitarian crisis, including in Eastern Ghouta and Idlib. The Council adopted two resolutions in 2018: Resolution 2401 (2018), which demanded a 30-day ceasefire, and Resolution 2449 (2018), which renewed the authorization for cross-border and cross-line humanitarian assistance. Further, 13 reports were submitted by the Secretary-General; 12 were the monthly reports on the situation, and one on cross-border humanitarian assistance.

The Council’s discussions on Syria provide a clear example of how WPS issues are fragmented and inconsistently discussed by the Council. The deaths of civilians, particularly women and children in Syria was routinely raised by Security Council members to illustrate the dire humanitarian and human rights but rarely followed-up with an analysis of the gender dimensions of the situation or on the need for women’s meaningful participation in the peace process. The diverse experiences of women and girls in Syria are often artificially divided up, depending on the subject of the specific briefing or meeting. This is not unusual for the Security Council; there is a tendency to see WPS issues as siloed and distinct, but it does illustrate the lack of understanding regarding the interconnected nature of the impact of the conflict on women and girls, the violations of women’s rights, and barriers to women’s meaningful participation in peace and security processes. For example, references to women’s political participation were nearly absent in briefings on the humanitarian situation in Syria, even when the Special Envoy for Syria also briefed. In briefings on the political process, references to women’s participation increased. The content of Security Council members’ statements did not differ greatly between the two types of meetings; in all meetings, regardless of subject, most Security Council members referred to the political process and the constitutional committee. However, it was WPS issues overall, but particularly women’s participation, that was often overlooked or siloed when the Council was having a “humanitarian” briefing. In fact, in the over 2,000 references made to the Syrian peace process and political process over the course of 2018 by Member States in statements to the Security Council, women’s meaningful participation was referenced in less than 0.5% of those instances. Similarly, only 2 out of 13 reports of the Secretary-General referred to women’s meaningful participation in the peace process.

The gender dimensions of the humanitarian situation and the role of women and women’s groups in humanitarian action are also strikingly overlooked. Importantly, OCHA routinely failed to include any substantive references to women’s participation in humanitarian efforts or the gender dimensions of the humanitarian situation in their briefings to the Council. Finally, the importance of ensuring ceasefire agreements and peace agreements are gender-sensitive was also absent from the discussions. This again highlights the crisis mentality of the Council, which often overlooks gender and women’s rights at the most critical moments.

Snapshot: Women’s meaningful participation in Palestine

Gender-based discrimination, deeply entrenched customary norms and harmful stereotypes have limited Palestinian women’s equal access to resources and to decision-making positions. Despite this, discussions of the Israel / Palestine conflict at the Security Council are almost completely gender-blind. Throughout 13 meetings and debates on the situation in Israel and Palestine, there were only 32 substantive references to WPS in all of 2018. Israeli and Palestinian women have a long and powerful history of leading efforts for peace despite strong resistance. They have created spaces of unity and shared visions for a peaceful and equitable future. This history has started to gain some recognition by a few Security Council members who are pushing for women’s full participation in the peace processes; up until 2018, there had been very little acknowledgment of women’s participation in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. As was noted by the first Palestinian civil society representative to brief the Security Council in October 2018, Randa Siniora stated that “although women have been at the forefront of the Palestinian liberation movement and the Palestinian Authority worked with grassroots women leaders to create a 1325 National Action Plan, few have been represented in peace talks.” Women are under-represented both as official negotiators and as technical advisers, despite clear evidence that they have often been critical to working across political divides, building grassroots support for peace, and providing essential expertise on human rights or issues like health and access to resources. Little space has been made to integrate Palestinian women’s concerns into key political processes, including for achieving Palestinian statehood or for national reconciliation. Representation of women in key decision-making positions, including in Palestinian Authority institutions, is barely 5%. Only 4 out of the 30 members of the internal reconciliation team are women. The election of women to local councils barely passed the 20% threshold and did not enable their meaningful participation. Not a single woman participated in the talks leading up to the signature of the reconciliation agreement between Fatah and Hamas’ political leadership in October 2017. As a result, no women are represented in the technical committees that were established afterward.
to flesh out the details of the reconciliation arrangements that will directly impact their lives. All the above show that Palestinian women have not been consulted in shaping political or humanitarian responses in their country and therefore, their needs have been overlooked.

Members of the SC continue to list their disdain for the violence directed at Palestinians on a daily basis, often adding "women and girls" as victims to indicate its especially heinous, but little is done in terms of addressing accountability for the Israeli government. They go as far as to list specific events with premeditated deaths as "ethnic cleansing." Despite the repeated references to violence perpetrated against Palestinian women, there were only superficial remarks about CSOs and peace processes. References to women’s active participation in peace processes are lacking in frequency and substance.
Civil Society and Human Rights Defenders

Civil society, women’s rights groups, and women HRDs play a critical role in advancing the WPS agenda. In outcome documents adopted on more than 30 different thematic and country-specific agenda items over the last 19 years, the Security Council has reinforced, acknowledged, and highlighted the role of civil society 500 times, calling for Member States and the UN to work with civil society in conflict prevention efforts, peacebuilding, provision of humanitarian assistance and peace processes.269

The Security Council has repeatedly recognized the role of civil society, particularly women’s groups, as crucial interlocutors in conflict situations, contributors to early warning and conflict prevention efforts, and necessary to ensure the sustainability of peace processes and peacebuilding efforts. There are also a range of examples demonstrating that at times, CSOs can be more effective than international actors in settling local disputes and providing humanitarian and development assistance.

In 2018, there were references to civil society in outcome documents adopted on Afghanistan, Colombia, Cyprus, DRC, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Somalia, South Sudan, Somalia, Sudan (Darfur).270 References to civil society, including women’s groups, generally fell into several categories: recognition of the importance of civil society in peace and political processes, condemnation of harassment and intimidation of CSOs and HRDs, and calls for support and inclusion of civil society in various processes.

The peace operations in Afghanistan, CAR, Iraq, Mali, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan (Darfur), West Africa and the Sahel are mandated to collaborate with civil society.271 The mandate for the mission in South Sudan is the most comprehensive, calling on the mission to engage with CSOs, including women’s groups and HRDs, in the context of protection of civilians efforts.272 The missions in CAR, Mali, Somalia, and Sudan (Darfur) are specifically asked to collaborate with women’s groups or women civil society.

Resolutions on Afghanistan, CAR, Cyprus, DRC, Guinea-Bissau, Somalia, and Sudan (Abyei) called on the government or other stakeholders to engage with civil society in the context of peace and security processes.273 The Council called on stakeholders to specifically ensure the inclusion of women’s civil society groups in the context of Afghanistan, Somalia, and Sudan (Abyei).

The Council condemned attacks, harassment, and censorship of civil society in the DRC and South Sudan. In the case of DRC, the Council called on the government to ensure freedom of opinion, expression, assembly, and movement for civil society.274 The mission in Sudan (Darfur) is mandated to monitor violence targeting civil society.275

Reporting on international donor conferences and other international processes overwhelmingly failed to mention any instance of participation or engagement by women’s groups. One of the most glaring examples of the omission of civil society, including women’s groups, is in reports regarding international donor conferences, international engagement groups, and other ongoing initiatives involving international stakeholders. For example, although there was a reference to women’s meaningful participation in a report on Afghanistan, there was no reference to whether or not women-led organizations attended or were invited.

“Taking note of the critical contributions of civil society, including women’s organizations to conflict prevention, resolution and peacebuilding and in this regard the importance of sustained consultation and dialogue between women and national and international decision makers...”

Resolution 2122 (2013), PP 13
Civil society engagement with the Security Council

The number and frequency of women’s civil society invited to brief the Security Council have steadily increased since 2015 when Resolution 2242 (2015) was adopted. In addition to the WPS open debates, which have long featured civil society, it has been customary for representatives of civil society to brief the Council on other thematic agenda items such as CAAC and SALW. However, before 2016, a majority of briefers at non-WPS thematic discussions were representatives of civil society.

Resolution 2242 (2015) expanded the scope of civil society engagement with the Security Council by expressing the intention to invite civil society, including women’s organizations, to brief the Council during country or regional-specific discussions; since then, a majority of the civil society briefers at the Council, including in thematic discussions, live and/or work in conflict-affected contexts. In May 2016, under Egypt’s presidency of the Security Council, Hindou Ibrahim, Coordinator at the Association for Indigenous Women and Peoples of Chad, briefed the Council during a meeting on regional challenges in the Sahel, becoming the first representative of women’s civil society invited under Resolution 2242 (2015). The second and only other civil society briefers during country or region-specific discussions in 2016 was Victoria Wollie, National Coordinator in Liberia for the West Africa Network for Peacebuilding, who briefed the Council on the situation in Liberia. From 2016 through September 2019, there have been more than 37 women civil society briefers at country and region-specific meetings.

**Civil society briefers in the Security Council in 2018**

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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>30</strong></td>
<td><strong>24</strong></td>
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</table>

Overall, 2018 saw a significant increase in frequency and number of civil society representatives invited to participate compared to 2017, when ten women briefers delivered statements at seven country-specific meetings and three thematic discussions, sharing their experiences from nine different conflict-affected countries. This trend has continued through 2019. As of September this year, 28 women’s civil society representatives have briefed the Security Council: 16 on country-specific or regional discussions, and 12 during thematic ones.

“Expresses its intention to invite civil society, including women’s organizations, to brief the Council in country-specific considerations and relevant thematic areas...”

Resolution 2242 (2015), OP 5(c)

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**Pursuant to Resolution 2242 OP. 5(c), we interpret “civil society, including women’s organizations” to refer to a range of actors based on certain criteria, which are detailed in the methodology section. These criteria are applied in all subsequent counts of briefers reflected in this section.**

**Women civil society briefers from the following countries spoke in the Security Council in 2018: Libya, Afghanistan, DRC, Nigeria, Mali, Myanmar, Haiti, CAR, South Sudan, Iraq, Colombia, Chad, Palestine and Lebanon.**

**Women civil society briefers from the following countries spoke in the Security Council in 2017: Nigeria, Somalia, DRC, South Sudan, Iraq, Yemen, Nigeria, Colombia and Afghanistan.**
Additional new developments in 2018 include:

- The first **young women** to brief the Council during a thematic open debate on **youth, peace, and security** (Sophia Pierre-Antoine, Haiti; Ekomo-Soignet, CAR).²⁸¹
- The first **Rohingya woman** to brief the Council spoke on behalf of the NGOWG at the April 2018 open debate on sexual violence in conflict (Razia Sultana, Myanmar).²⁸²
- The first **Palestinian woman** to brief the Council, spoke on behalf of the NGOWG during the October 2018 open debate on WPS (Randa Siniora, Palestine).²⁸³
- The first **women** to brief the Council during country-specific meetings on Libya and Iraq (Hajer Sharief, Libya; Suzan Aref Maroof, Iraq).²⁸⁴

Whether to allow a civil society representative to brief is largely at the discretion of the rotating presidents of the Security Council. Calling for a procedural vote or even the threat of one, by any member of the Security Council, can be used to block civil society representatives from briefing, even if formally invited to participate. For civil society activists, formally briefing the Security Council can pose a range of risks to their safety and security, depending on the political dynamics at the Security Council surrounding the country they come from, the issues they work on or explicitly choose to discuss, and, in part, the level of publicity surrounding their briefing. In several instances, briefers have faced reprisals following their briefings for these reasons.

In addition, in-person briefings are subject to a variety of challenges, including difficulty obtaining a U.S. visa, travel bans, and other logistical constraints resulting in more civil society briefing via video teleconference (VTC). In 2018, more women spoke during country or regional-specific discussions via VTC (7) than in-person (5); no men spoke via VTC on behalf of civil society. In-person briefings are preferred to VTC since they provide an important opportunity for additional engagement with key decision-makers outside the formal briefing through bilateral meetings or events in New York.

The sharp increase in invitations to women’s civil society to brief the Security Council signals growing recognition of the importance of having their perspectives inform Council discussions on thematic and country-specific issues. This is also reflected in the higher number of statements made by Member States expressing support for civil society briefers over the course of the year, particularly in the context of discussions on Council working methods.²⁸⁵ In similar meetings in 2016 and 2017, there were far fewer references than 2018, notably limited to statements made by Belgium, Indonesia, Italy, Mexico, and Uruguay.²⁸⁶

Although the increasing number of civil society briefers is positive, a more meaningful indicator of their impact would be the extent to which the Security Council and individual members take forward their concerns and recommendations in subsequent statements, actions, or policies. As yet, how the Council, the UN system, and Members States act on or integrate the information provided by civil society briefers cannot yet be clearly or consistently identified.
### Women Civil Society Briefers in the Security Council in 2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Speaker Name</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Agenda Item</th>
<th>Method</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17 Jan.</td>
<td>Hajar Sharief (Libya)</td>
<td>Together We Built It</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>VTC</td>
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<tr>
<td>8 March</td>
<td>Mariam Safi (Afghanistan)</td>
<td>Organization for Policy Research and Development Studies</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>19 March</td>
<td>Jeanine Bandu Bahati (DRC)</td>
<td>Encadrement des Femmes Indigènes et des Ménages Vulnérables</td>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>In-Person</td>
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<tr>
<td>22 March</td>
<td>Chitra Nagarajan (Nigeria)</td>
<td>Adelphi</td>
<td>Lake Chad Basin</td>
<td>VTC</td>
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<tr>
<td>28 March</td>
<td>Fatimata Touré (Mali)</td>
<td>Groupe de recherche, d’étude et de formation femme-action</td>
<td>Peacekeeping</td>
<td>In-Person</td>
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<tr>
<td>16 April</td>
<td>Razia Sultan (Myanmar)</td>
<td>Rohingya Women Welfare &amp; Kaladan Press</td>
<td>WPS (CRSV)</td>
<td>In-Person</td>
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<tr>
<td>23 April</td>
<td>Sophia Pierre-Antoine (Haiti)</td>
<td>Advisory Council of the World YWCA</td>
<td>YPS</td>
<td>In-Person</td>
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<tr>
<td>23 April</td>
<td>Kessy Ekomo-Sognet (CAR)</td>
<td>Organization URU</td>
<td>Peacekeeping</td>
<td>In-Person</td>
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<tr>
<td>8 May</td>
<td>Jackline Nasiwa (South Sudan)</td>
<td>Center for Inclusive Governance Peace and Justice</td>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>VTC</td>
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<tr>
<td>22 May</td>
<td>Hanaa Edwar (Iraq)</td>
<td>Iraqi Al-Amal Association</td>
<td>POC</td>
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<tr>
<td>09 July</td>
<td>Yenny Londoño (Colombia)</td>
<td>Group of Young Consultants on Childhood, Adolescence and Armed Conflict</td>
<td>CACAC</td>
<td>In-Person</td>
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<tr>
<td>11 July</td>
<td>Hindou Oumarou Ibrahim (Chad)</td>
<td>International Indigenous Peoples Forum on Climate Change to the UNFCCC</td>
<td>Climate &amp; Security</td>
<td>In-Person</td>
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<tr>
<td>26 July</td>
<td>Justine Misaka Bihamba (DRC)</td>
<td>Synergy of Women for Victims of Sexual Violence</td>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>In-Person</td>
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<tr>
<td>8 Aug.</td>
<td>Suzan Aref Maroof (Iraq)</td>
<td>Iraq Task Force on SCR 1325 &amp; Women Empowerment Organization in Iraq</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>In-Person</td>
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<tr>
<td>23 Aug.</td>
<td>Joana Cook (UK)</td>
<td>Intl. Center for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence</td>
<td>ISIL (Da’esh)</td>
<td>In-Person</td>
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<tr>
<td>27 Aug.</td>
<td>Solange Lwashiga Furaha (DRC)</td>
<td>Rien Sans Les Femmes</td>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>VTC</td>
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<tr>
<td>29 Aug.</td>
<td>Mossarat Qadeem (Pakistan)</td>
<td>PAIMAN Alumni Trust</td>
<td>Mediation</td>
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<tr>
<td>12 Sept.</td>
<td>Sarah Blakemore (UK)</td>
<td>Keeping Children Safe</td>
<td>Peacekeeping</td>
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<tr>
<td>18 Sept.</td>
<td>Grace John Keny Geri (South Sudan)</td>
<td>Community Empowerment for Progress Organization</td>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>VTC</td>
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<tr>
<td>25 Oct.</td>
<td>Randa Siniora (Palestine)</td>
<td>Women's Center for Legal Aid and Counseling</td>
<td>WPS</td>
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<tr>
<td>8 Nov.</td>
<td>Tuesday Reitano (Lebanon)</td>
<td>Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime</td>
<td>Peacekeeping</td>
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<tr>
<td>13 Nov.</td>
<td>Josephine Mbela (DRC)</td>
<td>Congolese Association for Access to Justice</td>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>VTC</td>
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<tr>
<td>16 Nov.</td>
<td>Rasha Jarhum (Yemen)</td>
<td>Peace Track Initiative &amp; Women's Solidarity Network</td>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>VTC</td>
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<tr>
<td>17 Nov.</td>
<td>Ghizaal Haress (Afghanistan)</td>
<td>Independent Commission for Overseeing the Implementation of the Constitution</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>In-Person</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*VTC: Video teleconference*
Consultations with women’s civil society by peace operations

Most peace operations consult with women’s civil society in some way on an ad-hoc basis. However, the extent to which these processes are formalized outside of annual open days on WPS varies widely. In reports of the Secretary-General, references to consultations with women’s organizations were primarily limited to discussion of how participants are engaged in conversations or follow-up on recommendations and information shared. However, there is not enough information or detail provided in reports regarding the quality, duration, or details of the engagement, so we do not know if it is meaningful. Although these references are positive, there is rarely follow-up information on how information from CSO consultation is utilized or reflected in the work of the mission in recognition of their unique positions as experts, service providers, policymakers, and members of their communities in their respective countries.

It is clear that missions with a mandate to engage with women’s groups and CSOs reported on such engagement more frequently and in more detail than those missions lacking a specific mandate for engagement. This trend indicates a correlation between the inclusion of specific mandate provisions and mission activities. There are numerous extremely positive examples of ways in which the UN system has facilitated women’s participation and engaged with local groups. Unfortunately, there are widely disparate experiences for women’s civil society groups in terms of their interaction with local mission staff. Generally, due to the geographic location of UN missions, CSOs in urban areas have better access, as do those organizations whose representatives speak English or another major language. Local UN field staff can either hinder or facilitate women’s participation. Examples of ways in which mission staff can hinder women’s participation include failing to adopt a consultative approach when developing programming; focusing on larger organizations; tokenizing women by gathering a large group of “diverse” women providing feedback from women’s groups; lack of transparency; and creating tensions between local women’s groups, which can prevent collaboration and synergies.287

Shrinking civil society space

The ever-shrinking space for civil society globally affects the implementation of WPS, as this process largely relies on their efforts to drive local implementation.

The failure of the Security Council to adequately address this issue substantively in outcome documents is one of the clearest gaps in its implementation of the WPS agenda. The increasing use of counter-terrorism legislation and efforts to combat violent extremism over the last two decades has reached a critical point - increasing use of this practice is swiftly shrinking and closing civic space all over the world. In her 2019 annual report, the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, concluded that ”...broad invocations of the need to counter-terrorism, to prevent and counter violent extremism and to protect national security have been abused by a number of states to close civic space.”288 Her report found “that the targeting of civil society is not a random or incidental aspect of counter-terrorism law and practice [but] the hard-wiring of misuse into counter-terrorism measures taken by states around the globe.”289

Evidence of these findings can be found in country contexts like South Sudan and Myanmar, where the operations of civil society are restricted according to the misuse of such laws or the misinterpretation of existing laws safeguarding freedom of speech, expression, and assembly. In Myanmar, for example, the laws are misused and misinterpreted to curtail basic human rights. Laws such as the Peaceful Assembly and Peaceful Procession Act, Section 505(b) of the Penal Code, which prohibits the incitement of crimes against the state; and the 2013 Telecommunications Law were used to quell dissent. The latter has been frequently used to repress HRDs, journalists, and activists by imposing penalties of up to three years for a variety of broadly defined acts, including defamation. The number of such cases has increased significantly since the National League for Democracy (NLD) administration came to power, from 21 cases in early 2016 to 106 cases in late 2017.290 The total number of such cases as of 30

*Requests the Secretary-General’s Special Envoys and Special Representatives to United Nations missions, from early on in their deployment, to regularly consult with women’s organizations and women leaders, including socially and/or economically excluded groups of women...*

Resolution 2122 (2013), OP 2(c)
May 2019 is 185, with a 100% conviction rate. Almost all cases (93%) were raised on the grounds of defamation. In South Sudan, freedom of speech, expression, and association are treated as security threats by the government, which affects all CSOs, including the few that are women-led. CSOs are constrained by regulations such as those enforced by the National Security Services in Juba, which requires all meetings and workshops organized by CSOs and NGOs to be approved. Without such approval, the security apparatus will shut down meetings/training and penalize the organizers; this was seen in meetings held as part of the national dialogue process in late 2017 and early 2018, where security forces prevented meetings from taking place.

**Threats to human rights defenders, including women human rights defenders**

Despite the crucial role of human rights defenders in the realization of human rights, the strengthening of the rule of law, and fostering security and well-being in countries around the world, our analysis of the last four years reveals that the Security Council has been glaringly inconsistent in its attention to HRDs. In 2018, the Council included language referencing threats to HRDs in three resolutions on Afghanistan, DRC, and South Sudan and one PRST on Burundi. The peacekeeping operations in DRC and South Sudan are the only missions mandated to ensure the protection of HRDs in the context of protection of civilians (POC) activities. The maintenance of this language is a positive, particularly given the growing violence against HRDs, journalists, and external experts in conflict-affected situations, increasing the need for urgent attention to civilian protection by the peacekeeping mission. The language in the PRST on Burundi was new in 2018 and reflected attention to threats to civil society and some references to HRDs in reporting over the last several years. There were sporadic references to HRDs in debates and briefings, notably concentrated in the discussions on Colombia and Nicaragua, with additional references by some briefers in meetings on Burundi, DRC, West Africa, and the Sahel and Yemen. Importantly, many of those references were made by the heads of mission or the civil society briefers. It is important to note that the statements made by speakers on the situation of HRDs in different countries aligned with the information Security Council members received in reports, and then included in outcome documents. HRDs were referenced in reports on nine countries: Burundi, Central Africa, Colombia, DRC, Guinea-Bissau, Israel / Palestine, South Sudan, West Africa and the Sahel, and Western Sahara. This was the first time HRDs were referenced in the context of Guinea-Bissau, Israel / Palestine, and Western Sahara. Although the Security Council explicitly called for the mission in Afghanistan to report on threats against HRDs, however, reports on Afghanistan in 2018 did not include any information on HRDs. Further, in 2017, reports on Libya and Somalia included references to HRDs, but in 2018 failed to do so. References overall focused broadly on the attacks and killings of HRDs, as well as progress in implementing protection measures.

There were no references to women HRDs in any outcome documents adopted by the Security Council in 2018. Women HRDs were specifically referenced in reports on Colombia, Guinea-Bissau, and South Sudan; the references in all cases with the exception of Colombia, were about the number of women HRDs whom attended UN-facilitated events for HRDs, and not a substantive reference to risks or challenges. Women HRDs were only referenced in statements delivered during the thematic open debate on WPS in October 2018, and by Rasha Jarhum, who briefed the Council on the situation in Yemen in November 2018.

LGBTIQ+ HRDs in countries such as Myanmar are at particular risk from the prevalent misuse of national laws (as detailed above), which are compounded by discrimination against their gender and identity. Women HRDs are at extreme risk of SGBV in Myanmar, which is perpetrated by the government, security services, community, and family. Abuse, harassment, and attacks in the digital spheres are increasingly used against all HRDs, especially those who promote and defend the rights of LGBTIQ+ people. Additionally, so-called “protection” mechanisms are often used to control women HRDs rather than address the risks they face.

“Stresses the importance of promoting and protecting the human rights of women and girls in the context of the implementation of resolution 1325 (2000) and other relevant Security Council resolutions. The Security Council acknowledges that human rights of women and girls are at particular risk during armed conflict and post-conflict situations and notes that civil society members working on women’s human rights issues may be targeted in a number of these situations. The Council urges concerned Member States to pay special attention to addressing these risks.”

*Presidental Statement 2012/23*
Snapshot: Women and Indigenous human rights defenders under threat in Colombia

In Colombia, the situation for HRDs, including women HRDs, is extremely dire; Council meetings and reports on the country have consistently recognized this. All four reports on Colombia in 2018 discussed HRDs, with two reports specifically referencing threats against women HRDs. Reporting on Colombia repeatedly referenced its “Comprehensive Security Programme for women HRDs,” noting the potential the program had for addressing the particular risks faced by women HRDs; there were no updates in 2018 on the status of the program, but the first report of 2019 provides a detailed update regarding implementation challenges. Further, in meetings of the Council, there was a focus on attacks and killings of community leaders and HRDs; in 2018, the SRSG for Colombia, Mr. Jean Arnault, and in January 2019, the new SRSG, Mr. Carlos Ruiz Massieu, included frequent, substantive references to this alarming trend. Unusually for the Security Council, references to HRDs were made by nearly every member of the Security Council in almost every meeting in 2018, with the exception of China, Russia, and Equatorial Guinea, although Russia referred to killings of “community members” in their July 2018 statement on Colombia, and Equatorial Guinea referred to the killings of “community and social leaders” in April and July 2018. Ethiopia initially referred to community leaders and then specifically referred to “HRDs” in their final statement on Colombia in October 2018. Overall, China was the only member of the Security Council that failed to refer to the killings of leaders and HRDs in any way in 2018.

The recognition of the situation for HRDs is an important first step in addressing the situation, however, there is a need for more detailed and nuanced gender-, age-, disability- and diversity analysis, especially regarding the gendered nature of the violence, and also the particular threat that Afro-Colombian HRDs face. The transition period in the years since the Peace Accord was signed has been marked by extreme targeted violence against women HRDs and HRDs. Threats and attacks on HRDs in Colombia disproportionately impact Afro-descendant and Indigenous leaders, women leaders, and leaders promoting the Peace Accord. Since 2016, approximately 23% and 9% of assassinated HRDs and social leaders, respectively, were Indigenous and Afro-Colombian, respectively, while 13.96% of total victims identified as women. A recent analysis of the situation noted that “violence against HRDs continues unabated, disproportionately impacting Afro-descendant, Indigenous, and rural leaders, as well as women leaders promoting Peace Accord.” The National Protection Unit (UNP) that is responsible for protecting HRDs and other leaders under threat is overwhelmed and lacks resources, and as a result, has not been able to implement protection measures adequately, particularly in rural areas. Madre, an NGOWG member, recently noted that Afro-descendant leaders’ calls to address the root causes of the violence, including illegal mining and large-scale industry’s demands for territory, continue to be ignored. Protection alone cannot, therefore, address the problem, without examining the root causes of the violence.
There has been a lot of progress at the normative level in advancing the WPS agenda. Yet, gaps remain in the Council’s approach to WPS regarding specific thematic issues, as well as a lack of attention to intersectional and diverse voices and concerns, which prevents nuanced, holistic, and inclusive implementation of the WPS agenda.

## Women and girls with disabilities

Today, between 15 and 20 percent of the global population – an estimated 1.15 billion people – have a disability, and an estimated 16% of all refugees, which includes 6.5 million women and girls, have a disability. Disability often intersects with other marginalized identities resulting in numerous layers of discrimination within communities for persons with disabilities and their families. The Security Council has historically omitted persons with disabilities from their work, and in the rare instances they were considered, it was only in the context of their distinct needs as a vulnerable group and not as individuals actively participating in peacebuilding. This is especially apparent in the context of women and girls with disabilities.

In 2018, there were only a limited number of references to persons with disabilities in the context of Central Africa, Colombia, DRC, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Iraq, Israel / Palestine, Lake Chad Basin, Somalia, South Sudan, Syria, and Yemen. Further, thematic discussions on WPS, YPS, POC, CAAC, and peacebuilding all contained references to persons with disabilities. Resolutions adopted on DRC, South Sudan, Syria, Conflict and hunger, and CAAC referred to persons with disabilities; the mandates for the missions in DRC and Somalia include provisions on supporting persons with disabilities. The mission in DRC is mandated to ensure protection for persons with disabilities in the context of existing civilian protection efforts, and as of 2019, the mission in Somalia is requested to support the participation of persons with disabilities in conflict prevention and resolution, peacebuilding and elections.

In some cases, persons with disabilities were mentioned in report paragraphs related to WPS issues; however, they were mentioned superficially rather than being directly linked to the issues under discussion or providing deeper analysis and understanding of the experience of persons with disabilities in conflict situations. There is no intersectional discussion or analysis by the Council or within reports of the Secretary-General on the challenges, opportunities, agency, or abilities of women and girls with disabilities in the context of peace and security. This leaves a major gap in the Council’s work and its ability to respond to and comprehensively address conflict-affected countries. When considered cumulatively, there is no indication of a clear understanding of how to report on or discuss the rights of persons with disabilities in the context of peace and security. Persons with disabilities are consistently referred to in a tokenistic manner; for example, they are often included in lists of groups of people who require special attention by using the phrase, “including persons with disabilities.” In reports, references made to persons with disabilities vary greatly, but largely focus on linking them with “vulnerable groups.” Exceptions to this include short analyses of the specific challenges persons with disabilities face in terms of access to specialized healthcare in the context of Colombia, and inclusion of youth with disabilities in civil society organizing.

There has been, however, some progress on raising the issue of persons with disabilities at the Security Council. In December 2018, Poland hosted the first-ever Arria Formula meeting on persons with disabilities in partnership with Côte d’Ivoire, Germany, Kuwait, and Peru. The objective of the meeting was to recognize the disproportionate impact of armed conflict on persons with disabilities and to ensure a more inclusive and participatory approach. Yet, there was little attention to the gendered dimension of disability at the meeting. In April 2019, the Security Council was briefed by Nujeen Mustafa, a young woman with cerebral palsy who fled as a refugee from Syria, on the disproportionate impact of conflict on persons with disabilities, including women, in that context. In June 2019, the Council adopted Resolution 2475 (2019) with a focus on persons with disabilities in conflict. The references to women and girls are relatively few, but the resolution should expand the conversation on the gender dimensions of disability. The new Global Guidelines on Inclusion of Persons with Disabilities in Humanitarian Action is scheduled to be launched in October 2019; these guidelines are the product of work undertaken by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee, which includes the Women’s Refugee Commission, NGOWG member.
Sexual orientation and gender identity

The Security Council has historically remained largely silent on LGBTIQ+ issues - this is apparent in the complete absence of references to these issues in resolutions and presidential statements published in 2018, including in reporting of situations in which LGBTIQ+ persons face specific discrimination and violence. The Security Council did not refer to LGBTIQ+ people in any outcome document, and only one report on Haiti contained a reference, representing a decrease in references when compared to 2017 and 2016. References to LGBTIQ+ people were made in briefings by Sophia Pierre-Antoine, in the YPS open debate, and by Ms. Mlambo-Ngcuka in the WPS open debate; and in statements delivered by Costa Rica, in the open debate focused on sexual violence; the Netherlands, in a meeting on Colombia.

The report on Haiti, which contained the only reference to LGBTIQ+ people in 2018, provided details of efforts by the mission to collaborate with local NGOs to combat homophobia, prevent discrimination and promote human rights for the LGBTIQ+ community. Importantly, the peacekeeping mission in Haiti that is transitioning to a political mission in October 2019, has an indicator in its results-based budget framework that calls for the adoption of measures to protect vulnerable groups against discrimination, including LGBTIQ+ persons; this was a first in terms of inclusion of activities with LGBTIQ+ persons in the budget for a peacekeeping mission. The new special political mission in Haiti does not appear to have the same indicator. Previous references to LGBTIQ+ people have occurred in reports of the Secretary-General on Lebanon, Sierra Leone, Kosovo, Haiti, and Syria. Importantly, in the report on conflict-related sexual violence in 2015, the Secretary-General noted that individuals are targeted based on their “(actual or perceived) sexual orientation has come to light as a form of social control employed by certain armed groups in the Syrian Arab Republic, Iraq and elsewhere.”

The Security Council’s continued and abject failure to consider how LGBTIQ+ persons are affected by conflict constitutes an egregious oversight. The enforcement of heteronormativity, patriarchal norms, and rigid gender binaries, often to reinforce national, ethnic or religious identity and “family values” perceived to be at risk, threaten the rights, identity, and bodily autonomy of gender non-conforming people. The experience of LGBTIQ+ people must be understood on a continuum - inequality, discrimination, and violence during peacetime is exacerbated during conflict and exposes them to compounded risks across different settings and stages of conflict.

In Myanmar, there has been no attention by the Council to LGBTIQ+ people in the context of the clearance operations carried out by the military. The recent report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar (FFM) noted: “transgender people of Rohingya ethnicity are victimized twice: as Rohingya and as transgender people. The result is a tolerance of SGBV that has included rape and other forms of sexual violence.” In 2018, none of the humanitarian response plans for the ten largest humanitarian crises in the world included any reference to LGBTIQ+ people. This can result in overlooking discrimination in access to sexual and reproductive health services, as well as marginalization and exclusion from other forms of assistance, such as shelter or livelihood support.

Climate change and exploitation of natural resources as drivers of conflict

Issues related to climate change and natural resources are increasingly recognized as critical peace and security issues that have an adverse impact on violence and conflict; however, the gender dimensions and women’s role in addressing climate change or natural resource-related conflict has been recognized more slowly. Although climate change affects everyone, the impacts are not gender-neutral. Research indicates that crisis, including those resulting from climate change and conflict, perpetuate gender inequality, can lead to higher rates of intimate partner violence, compromise access to sexual and reproductive health services, and result in additional reliance upon caregivers, who tend to be women. Women are particularly vulnerable to the degradation of resources caused by climate instability and extreme weather events because of their reliance on common property resources. The contributions that women can make to mitigating climate change, disaster risk reduction and building communal resilience are also often overlooked, and female leadership is frequently disregarded. Those responsible for the most emissions from energy and land use are not the same communities that experience the worst effects of climate change. Those communities tend to be the most vulnerable, especially women, youth, and the poor (who are also primarily women).

In 2018, there were references to the important role of climate change and natural resources in the context of outcome documents adopted on CAR, Central African region, Mali, Somalia, Sudan (Darfur), and West Africa & the Sahel; none of these references mentioned women or the gender dimensions of the situation. The references in the
context of all but Sudan (Darfur) and West Africa & the Sahel are new in 2018. Reports on the situation in CAR, DRC, Mali, and South Sudan referenced climate change and/or natural resources, but all were gender-blind. The exploitation of and clashes over natural resources has consequences on women and girls living in those communities. SGBV against women and girls during the migration of certain groups during the dry season (or other seasonal weather patterns) was also reported on in the context of South Sudan. However, although there was a general analysis of how climate change is causing more extreme weather conditions, such as desertification, that displace communities and create many different forms of vulnerability, there was no particular analysis regarding its impact on women’s and girls’ access to resources. Climate-induced migration contributes to inter-communal conflicts over land and resources and exacerbates insecurity for women and girls by increasing the risk of human trafficking and other forms of SGBV.

Although the above analysis is generally positive, the Council’s overall neglect of climate change as a driver of conflict that is indisputably connected to WPS issues remains problematic. For example, in Nigeria, livelihood activities based on natural resources have been disrupted due to climate change and caused high unemployment, which in turn has caused restiveness and radicalization among youth, which is apparent in the current crisis. The Council’s recognition of these links has to date been inadequate despite some level of awareness.

Similarly, in the DRC, the Council has failed to recognize that climate change (including desertification) is aggravating the conflict between farmers and herders – this is the case, for example, in Ruzizi (Uvira territory) and Fizi (Mwenga territory). As noted above, such conflicts compromise the security of women and girls living in these conflict zones.

Further, as has been widely acknowledged, exploitation of natural resources by extractive industries operating in DRC has contributed significantly to the crisis.

**Humanitarian action**

Gender-sensitive humanitarian action and response are necessary throughout all stages of crisis and conflict, yet the Security Council routinely failed to acknowledge anything more substantive than frequent references to women and children being the majority of displaced persons. Despite references to humanitarian action across most issues on the Council’s agenda, there was little acknowledgment of the importance of ensuring humanitarian efforts are gender-sensitive and no reference to women’s role in humanitarian assistance. More than 67% of all refugees worldwide in 2018 came from just five countries: Syria, Afghanistan, South Sudan, Myanmar, and Somalia. In 2018, a majority of UN Member States endorsed the UN Global Compact on Refugees, which highlights the need for women’s participation and empowerment and includes gender, age, disability and diversity considerations throughout.

In 2018, there were WPS-linked references to humanitarian action in 11 country or region-specific situations: Afghanistan, CAR, Colombia, DRC, Haiti, Iraq, Libya, South Sudan, Sudan (Darfur), West Africa & the Sahel, and Yemen. Six outcome documents included a reference to humanitarian assistance and WPS in the context of DRC, Yemen, as well as thematic outcomes on conflict and hunger and protection of civilians. There were 13 reports with some references linked to WPS, albeit in a general and very limited manner. Many of these WPS-linked references are the inclusion of sex- and age-disaggregated data on the numbers of civilians who received support or who were victims of violations. Such reporting must be complemented with comprehensive analysis and deeper reporting on the situation for women and girls beyond their status as victims. One statistical reference included a brief analysis of the potential consequences for girls returning to Haiti from the Dominican Republic and other neighboring countries, such as trafficking and exploitation. Such details are critical for assessing humanitarian situations from a gender perspective.

The largest gap in the Council’s attention to WPS in this context is the lack of inclusion of references to ensuring humanitarian assistance is planned and delivered in a gender-sensitive manner. Humanitarian settings can often exacerbate existing inequalities; disrupt access to services, particularly for girls; and expose them to new risks, such as forced marriage. However, less than 1% of humanitarian aid is spent protecting women and girls from violence in conflict; this is why centering women’s rights in humanitarian action is essential, and also why it is important to ensure women’s groups, including women’s rights organizations and feminist groups at the local level, are
supported at the frontlines to be able to continue their life-saving work.343

In Syria, for example, evidence from a recent study showed that failing to adopt a gender perspective in humanitarian assistance, specifically cash transfer programs, can have unintended, negative consequences for women.344 Pre-existing inequalities and power dynamics influenced women’s ability to benefit from such programs, and women’s increased access to income within the household often prompted a backlash.345 In the context of the situation in Myanmar and the humanitarian response in Bangladesh, failure to adopt a gender-responsive approach resulted in site planning and water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) infrastructure based on gender-blind assumptions regarding the user.346 NGOWG member Oxfam International led a project working with women and adolescent girls and female architects to integrate a different perspective into the design and siting of WASH facilities.347 The resulting recommendations were not new and aligned with recommendations found in “countless documents on gender and protection mainstreaming,” yet they are often ignored in the setup of new sites.348

There was one reference to women’s roles and participation in humanitarian interventions and responses to SGBV.349 This should be emphasized in the Council’s work with consistent calls to ensure the meaningful participation of and engagement with women and women CSOs in the provision and facilitation of humanitarian aid as an integral part of developing a gender-sensitive humanitarian response.350 It is important for the Council to not only consider the importance of women’s participation in humanitarian action but the barriers to their participation. For example, civil society in Nigeria noted that while some efforts are made to include women in humanitarian action, one cannot do so without addressing the patriarchal power relations that subjugate and subordinate women and girls.351

Similarly, in Iraq, women are generally not well incorporated into humanitarian efforts. Civil society activists noted that one of the reasons for this is that Iraq remains a very male-dominated space, and women-led NGOs are not heard or respected regularly or consistently.352 Even in the midst of crisis, structures and systems of inequality are replicated, undermining women’s meaningful participation.

There were a few references that called for full funding of the UN and other international organizations in order for them to be able to provide humanitarian services required by the populations they serve, including survivors of sexual violence.353 These are important references that echo advocates’ calls for funding on the ground to support WPS-linked initiatives and gender-sensitive provision of aid. However, the focus on funding international organizations is an example of how the Council consistently overlooks the role of grassroots organizations and local NGOs that are also on the ground as partners or independently providing humanitarian services.354

There are a few isolated references that can be linked to WPS, such as one that mentioned gender equality as an outcome for the humanitarian response plan in Haiti, one that refers to strategic partnerships to develop a safe reporting program for sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) committed by UN personnel, and the inclusion of economic empowerment via employment opportunities for women as part of a humanitarian response plan.355 These are context-specific and important points to highlight in reports. Such information should be included consistently across all relevant contexts within the theme of humanitarian action.

Sexual and reproductive health and rights

Sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) encompasses the “full spectrum of women’s needs and rights during their reproductive life span, from adolescent through motherhood and beyond,” which can be considered four distinct and intersecting components: sexual health, reproductive health, sexual rights, and reproductive rights.356 As recognized in the outcome of the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD), realizing the right to reproductive health is a critical element of reproductive rights.357 Member States have international legal obligations to respect, protect, and fulfill sexual and reproductive rights, which are codified by multiple, complementary bodies of international law, including IHL, IHRL, international criminal law, and refugee law.358 Further, the Security Council itself has articulated its support for reproductive rights in Resolution 1889 (2009), and sexual and reproductive health more broadly in resolutions 1889 (2009), 2106 (2013), and 2122 (2013).359 In conflict and crisis, women and girls are at heightened risk of SGBV and trafficking, unintended pregnancy, maternal morbidity and mortality, unsafe abortions, and child, early and forced marriage.360 Unfortunately, addressing sexual and reproductive health is not treated with the same urgency as other aspects of humanitarian response, resulting in dire consequences, particularly for survivors of SGBV and displaced women and girls. Ensuring access to and provision of sexual and reproductive health services is “central to an effective humanitarian response,” and a component of meeting fundamental human rights and humanitarian law obligations.361
In 2018, only one reference was made specifically to sexual and reproductive health and rights, in a report on Colombia, noting that “the provision of and access to services that ensure the enjoyment of sexual and reproductive rights remain a major challenge.”362 While substantively this reference indicates that the situation regarding SRHR is unsatisfactory and can thereby be taken negatively, it is positive that the Secretary-General has included information in the context of a specific country situation and also recognized that access to sexual and reproductive health services is not just a need but a ‘right.’ The acknowledgment of SRHR as a right per IHRL is exceedingly rare in the discussion within the Security Council.

References to sexual and reproductive health (SRH), concerned with the provision of and access to services rather than the protection or realization of rights, were made in the context of Colombia, DRC, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Libya, Mali, and Syria.363 Only one resolution on DRC included a reference; the majority of references were concentrated in reports on Syria and were in the context of activities and assistance provided by UN entities as part of humanitarian efforts. Services aimed at meeting maternal health needs were specifically referenced in the context of the DRC, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Libya, South Sudan, Western Sahara, and Syria. Finally, in 2018, there were 54 references to non-specific services for victims/survivors of SGBV in reports of the Secretary-General.

Overall, the lack of reference by the Security Council in both its outcome documents and its discussions, as well as in the reports of the Secretary-General to SRHR, is disappointing. At a global level, forcibly displaced women and girls are particularly impacted by inadequate administration of and access to SRH services and as such experience increased maternal morbidity and mortality, heightened risk of SGBV, increased risk of sexually transmitted infections (STIs), increased chance of unintended pregnancy and increased likelihood of unsafe abortion. Thus, any response to women in conflict or other broader humanitarian situations must include access to contraceptives, abortion, post-abortion care (PAC), and menstrual regulation services.364 Further, social stigma can affect the willingness of women and girls to access services, even where they do exist. References to the stigma associated with SGBV appeared 21 times in 2018, in two resolutions and 19 reports - 8 of which were thematic reports on CAAAC. In situations such as Myanmar, it has been found that adolescent girls are particularly affected by stigmatization, which results in a reluctance to access services as they perceive service providers to hold biases.

SRHR is an essential component not only of humanitarian response, but also necessary to ensure the equal participation of women and girls, both economically and politically. Denial of SRHR, therefore, undermines all four pillars of the WPS agenda.

For example, according to research undertaken by NGOWG member the Women’s Refugee Commission, in the context of the humanitarian response to the displacement in Myanmar, the critical needs of survivors of sexual violence, such as sexual and reproductive health services, are not being met. The lack of access to such services undermines the rights, health, and autonomy of survivors of rape, who must bear the burden of unwanted pregnancies, unsafe abortions, and other health risks related to such violence, all of which are further compounded by social stigma and severe trauma.365 Insecurity and insufficient socio-economic opportunities in camps like Cox’s Bazar have led to an increase in human trafficking with women and girls accounting for the majority of victims of labor and sexual exploitation.366 Another study by the Women’s Refugee Commission found high levels of PAC for women and girls who have not previously utilized health facilities; they suggest this indicates that stigma related to rape and resulting pregnancies are causing women and girls to seek unsafe abortions, rather than seek qualified medical care in facilities where family or community members might recognize them.367
**Recommendations**

Women’s meaningful participation - direct, substantive inclusion of women so that they can influence the outcome of the process in question - must be prioritized, from the start, in all peace and security, institution-building, peacebuilding, and development processes at the international, national, and local levels.

In this context, the Security Council should:

- Concretely support a comprehensive and multifaceted approach to women’s and girls’ full, equal and meaningful participation in all peace and security processes (including peacebuilding, constitution-building, peace agreement negotiations, reconciliation efforts, transitional justice processes, and electoral processes) at all stages (development, planning, implementation, and monitoring) in all countries and regions on the agenda of the Security Council. This requires inclusion of: explicit language calling for women’s meaningful participation in outcome documents; specific provisions in the mandates of peace operations; specific analysis of barriers to women’s participation in each process, and follow-up on any briefings regarding lack of information and analysis on the extent to which women’s participation translates into their ability to influence decision-making.

- Consistently reinforce the importance of inclusive peace processes in every outcome document adopted on country-specific or regional situations. Further, the Council should call for the utilization of multiple, diverse approaches for increasing women’s meaningful participation and influence in peace and political processes, including quotas, women’s caucuses, and mentoring programs with the understanding that participation in informal processes or advisory roles is not a substitute for structured participation in formal processes.

- Explicitly call on the Secretary-General to: ensure there is training and gender parity for any mediation teams in UN-led peace processes on women’s rights, gender-sensitive conflict analysis; ensure and publicize strategies for inclusion in peace processes and reviews of processes that have excluded women in order to understand and remedy the barriers to their participation; and hold senior UN leadership accountable when they fail to ensure inclusive and representative processes. Consistently recognize the connection between high-level peace processes (Track 1) and parallel and grassroots processes (Tracks 2 and 3), including by calling for the inclusion of women leaders from Track 2 and Track 3 processes in Track 1 efforts and supporting linkages between all tracks at all levels.

- Call for the inclusion of women in negotiating teams as influential, equal participants, and explicitly and publicly call out processes in which women are excluded, or in which their participation is limited, or their ability to influence the outcome is not on a par with their male counterparts. Refrain from supporting processes that exclude women.

- Call for the removal of all barriers to women’s meaningful participation, including: logistical, technical, and financial obstacles; proactively address threats and violence against women in the public sphere (including women political candidates, women voters and women activists and HRDs); and speak out against any attempts to undermine gender equality and the full scope of women’s human rights, in order to ensure women’s meaningful participation.

Civil society, including women’s rights organizations, women leaders, women human rights defenders, and women peacebuilders, must be recognized as crucial contributors to international peace and security and to sustaining peace. Threats to civil society, including HRDs, undermine global efforts to prevent conflict and sustain peace. Ensuring the meaningful participation of civil society, therefore, requires promoting an enabling environment for their work, condemning attacks against women HRDs, and actively consulting with civil society on all aspects of peace and security.

In this context, the Council should:

- Include specific provisions in the mandate of every peace operation calling on the mission to regularly and meaningfully consult with diverse women-led and women’s rights groups from rural and urban areas in all aspects of mandate implementation, including conflict prevention, protection of civilians, peacebuilding, and electoral support.

- Recognize the legitimacy of their work and important role in maintaining peace and security and condemn intimidation, attacks or reprisals of any kind against women HRDs, including in the context of counter-terrorism efforts or for cooperating with the UN or any other international bodies.

- Ensure an enabling environment for all HRDs, including women HRDs, to carry out their work by calling
on governments to strengthen legal frameworks for ensuring the rights and the protection of women HRDs, peace activists, and humanitarian personnel, where relevant; and urge them to adopt and implement gender-sensitive protection measures to both enable their participation and ensure their safety and well-being. Further, the Council should encourage the establishment of national accountability mechanisms to ensure the investigation and monitoring of human rights violations, including against peace activists and women HRDs, and to release arbitrarily-detained political activists.

- Ensure meaningful consultation with and support for civil society participation, including women HRDs, at all levels.
- With a view to coherence and inclusivity, consider more diverse sources of information from women-led and women’s rights groups, as part of their deliberative process, including civil society alternative reports submitted to other UN bodies, such as the CEDAW Committee, the Universal Periodic Review, as well as formal and informal civil society briefings.
- Provide adequate support for HRDs. Ensure the availability of adequate and predictable funding for peace and security to women’s civil society, especially at the local level, and call for such funding in emergency and crisis situations.

The structures supporting the implementation of the WPS agenda within the UN system and the Security Council must have adequate capacity, expertise, and funding, and UN leadership must be held accountable for all obligations on women, peace and security.

In this context, the Security Council should:

- Pressure the UN to consistently institutionalize, implement and uphold all WPS standards and obligations, and to hold senior UN leadership accountable for failure to implement them; this includes urging the UN to fulfill its responsibility to advocate for women’s meaningful participation in all peace processes and by refraining from supporting any peace processes that exclude women, as well as assessing the actual WPS impacts of activities, integrating and acting upon findings, tracking responses, and communicating how impacts are addressed.
- Implement recommendations of the IEG on WPS, as well as systematically integrate these into deliberations in the Council, including specific questions to UN headquarters and field leadership during consultations; and support the regular engagement of all Security Council members in the IEG meetings.
- Require the integration of WPS as a cross-cutting issue in all reports of the Secretary-General on country-specific and regional situations, as well as thematic issues, including by ensuring there is gender-sensitive conflict analysis, detail regarding the impact and output of WPS-related activities, and recommendations are developed through gender-sensitive approaches and in partnership with women-led civil society, since their expertise provides nuanced insight and analysis that can strengthen peacebuilding efforts through policy, diplomatic action, and programs at all levels.\(^{369}\)
- Urge the appointment of dedicated and senior women’s protection advisers and gender advisers, ensuring that they have the required seniority and responsibility to influence mission decision-making, and encourage the appointment of women in senior positions in all UN country missions.

All conflict analysis must be gendered and intersectional, taking into account masculinities, femininities, gender roles, age, diverse SOGIESC, (dis-)ability, and be informed by sex, age, and disability-disaggregated statistics.

In this context, the Security Council should:

- Consistently call for strengthened gender-, age-, disability- and diversity analysis that takes into account the differentiated needs, power relations, and vulnerability of different women and girls based, for example, on age, race, ethnicity, nationality, diverse SOGIESC, location, class or (dis-)abilities.
- Require that DPO and DPPA provide robust, gender-sensitive conflict analysis in all reports and strategic reviews, as per existing obligations, including analysis of barriers and obstacles to women’s meaningful participation and violations of the full scope of human rights of women, girls, and LGBTIQ+ people. DPO and DPPA must also be required to engage with women’s rights groups and CSOs in gathering information, given that their expertise can help strengthen peacebuilding efforts.\(^{370}\)
- Take into account this robust gender-sensitive conflict analysis when making decisions regarding the
activities of peace operations and include explicit provisions that call on the missions to take into account such analysis in their decision-making processes.

**Prevention should be at the heart of peace and security policymaking.** A preventive approach should address the root causes of conflict, ensure full implementation of international law, and better reflect the reality and complexity of peace and security, particularly the gendered dimensions of all stages of conflict.

In this context, the Security Council should:

- In consultation with civil society, including local women's organizations, adopt a more nuanced and evidence-based understanding of root causes of conflict, including recognizing gender inequality and violations of human rights as root causes of conflict, and call on Member States to address them as part of their conflict prevention strategies. Develop a comprehensive conflict prevention strategy in consultation with local women's organizations that includes, inter alia, early warning, preventive deployment, mediation, peacekeeping, disarmament, accountability measures as well as post-conflict peacebuilding, and recognize that these components are interdependent, complementary, and non-sequential.

- Recognize the gendered impact of arms and call for action by Member States at the national level to identify and regulate the influx of arms that exacerbate the risk to women's, girls', and LGBTIQ+ peoples' rights and safety, including sexual and gender gender-based violence, through, for example, implementation of the ATT and international humanitarian and human rights law. Further, there should be an emphasis and prioritization of disarmament and peace in order to shift away from militarized approaches to peace and security.

- Take all measures to press parties to the conflict, and those states that support them, to promote the end of indiscriminate and targeted violence against civilians, such as the use of explosive weapons in highly populated areas, as well as the use of civilians in suicide attacks.

- Recognize the gender dimensions of climate change, and further take action against illegal exploitation and trafficking of natural resources, commodities in areas where it contributes to the outbreak, escalation or continuation of armed conflict.

- Strengthen linkages and explicitly refer to the connection with sustainable development goal (SDG) 16 on peaceful and inclusive societies and Security Council resolution 2282 (2016) on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace.

**Securing accountability for all gender-based crimes and all human rights violations committed, and ending the impunity of all perpetrators – state and non-state actors – is a paramount obligation.** Protection of women from gender-based violence is inseparable from women's meaningful participation and rights, and ensuring accountability for violations of fundamental human rights is necessary to prevent relapse into conflict. A two-track approach that addresses immediate protection needs while also investing in long-term, upstream conflict prevention that has gender equality at its core is critical to moving beyond short-term crisis response to sustainable and inclusive peace.

In this context, the Security Council should:

- Urge a comprehensive and holistic approach to addressing SGBV in fragile, conflict-affected, and post-conflict settings, which includes gender-responsive prevention strategies, such as through efforts to identify, challenge and address gender-based discriminatory attitudes and norms at all levels that accept and enable violence, particularly violence against girls and women.

- Ensure protection from the full scope of gender-based violence and call for the expansion of current documentation and reporting requirements to cover all gender-based crimes and human rights violations, including crimes against women HRDs and gender non-conforming people. The widespread or systematic nature of the many crimes of SGBV, including those committed before the outbreak of war, constitutes crimes against humanity and should be addressed as a matter of priority.

- End impunity for all armed actors, both state and non-state, and ensure that crimes are investigated so that all perpetrators are brought to justice in line with international humanitarian and human rights laws.

- Use targeted sanctions more effectively as an accountability tool, including the use of SGBV as a stand-
Recommendations

alone designation criterion. Utilize targeted sanctions proactively to list perpetrators based on verified information as early as possible and monitor and enforce sanctions more effectively. Ensure all sanctions experts groups have training on conflict-related sexual violence and gender, and their gender expertise is not assigned to experts with multiple other portfolios (such as humanitarian or child rights).

• Ensure a holistic approach to accountability and access to justice, which recognizes the various levels at which impunity must be addressed, and accountability and redress must be provided. Ensure that survivors of sexual and gender-based crimes in conflict have meaningful access to justice and reparations and that all transitional justice mechanisms use a gender-sensitive approach.

• Ensure protection of all rights and comprehensive and non-discriminatory access to the full range of services for survivors of SGBV, including sexual and reproductive health services. Sexual and reproductive health services must be recognized for their obligatory and enforceable nature and as an essential component of a survivor-centered approach; without access to comprehensive sexual and reproductive health and rights, the lives of women and girls are at risk, and they cannot meaningfully participate in peace processes, conflict resolution, or peacebuilding efforts, thereby undermining realization of all four pillars of the WPS agenda.

• Ensure justice/judicial institutions are inclusive and available to all, including women, girls, LGBTIQ+ people, and other marginalized groups.

• Support survivors of SGBV by requiring peace operations and good offices to establish rigorous training programs and protocols for all medical and humanitarian staff working on behalf of or in partnership with the UN.

• Strengthen reporting and advocacy systems dedicated to protecting civilians in conflict and supporting survivors’ demands for justice, particularly through domestic courts, hybrid courts, and the ICC, and support the creation of accountable and robust reporting systems for CSOs and HRDs to ensure protection and justice.
The WPS agenda is articulated in ten resolutions\textsuperscript{th} adopted by the Security Council between 2000 and 2019 and grounded in international human rights and humanitarian law. The WPS agenda recognizes that conflict has gendered impacts, that it affects women, girls, men, and boys, differently, and that women have critical roles to play in peace and security processes and institutions. It calls for the participation of women at all levels of decision-making in conflict prevention and resolution, peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts; protection and promotion of women’s rights, including ensuring justice and accountability systems are gender-sensitive; the prevention of SGBV, and provision of services for survivors; and adoption of gender perspectives in conflict prevention and resolution, peacebuilding, humanitarian responses and other processes.

The NGOWG is the only organization that monitors and analyzes the daily work of the Security Council to assess the implementation of the WPS agenda using an intersectional feminist lens. At its core, our analytical approach recognizes that a gender-blind understanding of conflict significantly undermines efforts to achieve inclusive and sustainable peace. With the provisions of the WPS agenda as a baseline, our feminist-informed methodology enables us to uncover additional dimensions and patterns in the Council’s work.

Process and scope

The language utilized in resolutions, presidential statements, and reports of the Secretary-General provide insight into the priorities of the Council, dominant discourse, and conceptual understanding of the WPS agenda. Our analytical process provides a snapshot of both the information flowing into the Security Council, as well as the actions taken by the Security Council and its subsidiary bodies. The scope of our analysis encompasses any agenda item for which the Security Council has adopted an outcome document or considered a report of the Secretary-General. The “regular work” of the Security Council that we analyze is comprised of a reporting and decision-making cycle that enables us to extensively assess the extent to which both the information and the decision-making is inclusive of and responsive to WPS concerns.

We utilize both qualitative and quantitative methods to analyze publicly available documents — primarily resolutions and presidential statements adopted by the Security Council — as well as reports of the Secretary-General submitted according to the Security Council’s request. We also consider the work of the subsidiary bodies of the Council, including the sanctions committees and associated experts groups, the Informal Expert Group, the working group on Children and Armed Conflict, etc.

Our qualitative research utilizes a dataset that includes thousands of data points and utilizes a dataset that includes 40 variables across hundreds of documents. All types of documents are analyzed to draw out top-line statistics related to general WPS trends. Several qualitative data analysis tools are used to identify specific search strings, based on relevant keywords and search terms drawn from common WPS terminology, which are then coded for themes, quality, and other characteristics. We particularly focus on the following documents:

- Outcome documents consist of resolutions and presidential statements adopted by the Security Council during formal meetings.
- Periodic reports of peacekeeping or special political missions are defined as those reports requested by the Security Council in resolutions or presidential statements that are submitted by the Secretary-General under an official document code.
- Meetings of the Security Council are those for which there are publicly available meeting records, and include briefings, debates, and open debates.

We include all agenda items under which the Security Council holds a meeting, considers a report or adopts an outcome document focused on country-specific or regional situations, with a particular focus on situations in which there is a peace operation.


\textsuperscript{th} S/RES/1325 (2000), S/RES/1820 (2008), S/RES/1888 (2009), S/RES/1889 (2009), S/RES/1960 (2010), S/RES/2106 (2013), S/RES/2122 (2013), S/RES/2242 (2015), S/RES/2467 (2019). Most peacekeeping and special political missions are the subject of either a resolution, presidential statement or a report over the course of the year; the only exceptions are: Central Asia (UNRCCA), Middle East (UNTSO), and India / Pakistan (UNMOGIP).
The yardstick against which we strictly measure the inclusion and quality of WPS are the resolutions adopted by the Security Council itself over the past 19 years, starting with Resolution 1325 and including all subsequent women, peace and security resolutions. We consider substantive references to WPS to be those that go beyond just listing “women” or “girls” along with other groups. We consider references to be “analytical” when they consider additional information on context and detail, that for example, highlights barriers, challenges, and patterns of violence targeting women or exclusion of women.

The information flowing to the Council overall includes at least some substantive references to WPS in most cases; however, there are instances where we see only sex-disaggregated data or only information on sexual exploitation and abuse. We do not consider country-specific reports of the Secretary-General to contain WPS references if they, for example, only contain a breakdown of the sex-disaggregated data of mission staff or thanked the women serving in the mission for their service. These references to women, peace and security are superficial and not representative of the substantive core of the WPS agenda. For example, traditional peacekeeping missions (e.g., UNDOF in Golan Heights) or reporting on country situations in which there is not a peacekeeping mission (e.g., Syria), it is possible to have brief references to women in the context of civilian deaths or attacks. Documents that contain only those characteristics do not meet the threshold of having WPS content.

Similarly, documents that only contain references to sexual exploitation and abuse, in the context of conduct and disciplinary actions undertaken by a peacekeeping mission, are not considered to have WPS content. There are two reasons for this: first, because the policy on “zero tolerance for sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA)” is meant to be a standard of conduct for troop-contributing and police-contributing countries and is only one of many responses to various forms of SGBV. Second, it is an insufficient indicator of WPS inclusion as it focuses on one set of actors within such a narrow issue-area. The exception to this is when the reference, in addition to discussing SEA, discusses other WPS issues.

Assessing engagement with civil society

We broadly consider civil society to be the range of non-governmental actors, including organizations or individuals, affiliated or unaffiliated with formal organizations. In the context of the Council’s commitment to invite representatives of civil society to brief on country-specific situations, we have sought to ensure that “civil society” is interpreted to ensure inclusion of HRDs and peacebuilders. In the current political climate of increasing backlash against human rights and closing civil society space, many women exercise rights described in the UN Declaration on HRDs but without explicitly identifying as women HRDs. For their safety and security, some women deliberately avoid referring to their work as related to human rights. Many women are involved in the protection and promotion of human rights in a professional capacity and many are volunteers. In keeping with the understanding of HRDs laid out in the UN Declaration on HRDs, we understand HRDs to be those who act to promote and protect human rights.

Women human rights defenders, peacebuilders and other representatives of civil society often have multiple capacities, roles and affiliations: the affiliation they choose to represent at the UN Security Council, and its independence from government, UN or other vested interests, is the primary means of ascertaining whether their briefing is sanctioned by resolution 2242 (2015). In the context of Resolution 2242 (2015) (OP 5(c)), we interpret “civil society, including women’s organizations” to refer to a range of actors. There are a number of other groups that fall into the category of rule 39 invitations, but do not constitute civil society and women’s organizations as per resolution 2242 (OP 5(c)), such as: representatives of governmental, inter/intragovernmental or regional organizations or institutions (such as treaty-making bodies or other institutions with governments as primary stakeholders); religious figures explicitly speaking on behalf of a religious institution, such as the Catholic church; former UN Secretary-Generals or other leadership, individuals affiliated and appointed to UN-mandated institutions, such as the UN University; or individuals representing for-profit businesses or corporations. Given that an assessment of whether an individual falls under the category of civil society is subject to a number of factors, determinations are best made on a case by case basis and nuanced application of the criteria above.

1 (A/RES/53/144)
2 For example, Philip Spoerri, Head of the International Committee of the Red Cross Delegation to the United Nations (S/PV.8324); or, Elisa Maria Tavares Pinto, Spokesperson for the Economic Community of West African States Women, Peace and Security Network (S/PV.8337); or, Dr. Sima Samar, Chairperson, Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (S/PV.7896, S/PV.8555)
3 For example, The Most Reverend and Right Honourable Justin Webley, Archbishop of Canterbury (S/PV.8334)
4 For example, Ban Ki-moon, Former Secretary-General of the United Nations (S/PV.8185)
5 For example, James Cockayne, Director of the Centre for Policy Research at the United Nations University (S/PV.8539)
6 For example, Chid Liberty, Chief Executive Officer and Co-Founder, Liberty and Justice (S/PV.8239)
## Annex. UN peace operations: summary of WPS-related mandate provisions

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<tr>
<th>MISSION</th>
<th>SUMMARY OF PROVISIONS</th>
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| Afghanistan (UNAMA)         | **Support for women’s participation and inclusion in peace and security processes**  
• In electoral processes (2145 (2014), OP 12)  
• In the peace process (2274 (2016), OP 17; 2405 (2018), OP 39; 2489 (2019), OP 5(f))  
• At all levels of decision-making (2489 (2019), OP 5(f))  
• In peacebuilding strategies at the national and subnational level (2489 (2019), OP 5(f))  
**Protection and promotion of human rights, including women’s rights**  
• Assist in implementation of Afghan constitution and relevant international treaties, including CEDAW to ensure protection and promotion of women’s rights (1662 (2006), OP 12; 1806 (2008), OP 4(g); 2344 (2017), OP 5(e); 2489 (2019), OP 5(e))  
• Ensure women’s rights are protected and promoted in the context of the peace process (2274 (2016), OP 17)  
• Support the importance of women’s human rights (2489 (2019), OP 5(f))  
**Support for gender-sensitive peace and security processes**  
• Support a peace process which is inclusive of gender (2274 (2016), OP 17)  
• Call on full financing and implementation of 1325 National Action Plan (NAP) (2489 (2019), OP 5(f))  
**Protection of civilians, including specifically women, and prevention and response to SGBV**  
• Ensure protection of civilians, especially women, including from SGBV (2489 (2019), OP 5(f))  
**Engagement with civil society, including women’s groups, as part of mandate implementation**  
• Support the participation of women’s rights groups in the peace process (S/RES/2405 (2018))  
**Enhanced reporting on various dimensions of WPS**  
• Reporting on the process of integration of women into the political, economic and social life of Afghanistan (2405 (2018), OP 39)  |
| CAR (MINUSCA)               | **Gender mainstreamed across the mandate of the mission**  
• Take fully into account gender as a cross-cutting issue (2149 (2014), OP 35)  
**Support for women’s participation and inclusion in peace and security processes**  
• In the peace process (2387 (2017), OP 42(b)(ii); 2448 (2018), OP 39(b)(iii))  
• In mediation and reconciliation processes, national dialogues, transitional justice, conflict resolution, and stabilization activities (2149 (2014), OPs 30(b)(iv), 35; 2301 (2016), OP 34(a)(i); 2387 (2017), OP 42(b)(v))  
• In conflict prevention efforts to address marginalization and local grievances (2301 (2016), OP 34(a)(ii))  
• In electoral processes at all levels and at an early stage (2149 (2014), OP 30(b)(v); 2217 (2015), OP 32(b)(v))  
• In DDR and SSR processes (2149 (2014), OP 35)  
**Protection and promotion of human rights, including women’s rights**  
• Monitor, investigate and report on violations against women, including SGBV; help prosecutions; prevent abuse; work w/ the Rapid Response Unit (UMIRR) (2149 (2014), OP 30(e)(ii); 2387 (2017), OP 43(d)(ii))  
**Support for gender-sensitive peace and security processes**  
• Support the implementation of gender-sensitive DDRR programs (2387 (2017), OP 43(c)(i))  
• Support the implementation of gender-sensitive community violence reduction programs (2387 (2017), OP 43(c)(ii))  
**Protection of civilians, including specifically women, and prevention and response to SGBV**  |
### Engagement with civil society, including women's groups, as part of mandate implementation

- In context of POC activities, provide specific protection for women (2149 (2014), OP 30(a)(ii); 2217 (2015), OP 32(a)(iii))

### Enhanced reporting on various dimensions of WPS

- Enhanced reporting on implementation of mandate to mainstream gender (2149 (2014), OP 35)

### Central Africa (UNOCA)

**Gender mainstreamed across the mandate of the mission**

- Take fully into account gender as a cross-cutting issue (S/PRST/2018/17, para. 8)
- Women, peace and security is a priority of the mission (S/PRST/2018/17, para. 6)

**Support for women's participation and inclusion in peace and security processes**


**Support for gender-sensitive peace and security processes**

- Enhance early warning and analysis with a gender perspective (S/PRST/2019/10)
- Conduct gender-sensitive research and data on drivers of radicalization for women, impacts of CT on women's human rights and women's organizations (2349 (2017), OP 32)

### Colombia (Verification Mission)

The Verification Mission in Colombia has an explicit mandate to support the implementation of the Peace Agreement, which itself calls for gender to be mainstreamed across verification and reintegration work, in addition to protecting and promoting women's rights as part of its implementation. As a result, the mission has mainstreamed gender across all its work.

**Support for women's participation and inclusion in peace and security processes**

- In the peace process and inter-communal trust building (2453 (2019), OP 4(e); A/73/738)

**Engagement with civil society, including women's groups, as part of mandate implementation**

- In context of the peace process and inter-communal trust building (2453 (2019), OP 4(e); A/73/738)

### Cyprus (UNFICYP)

**Gender mainstreamed across the mandate of the mission**

- “In the light of the emphasis placed by the Security Council, in its resolution 2430 (2018), on the participation of women at all stages of the peace process, UNFICYP will strengthen its focus on gender mainstreaming to ensure that it achieves the goals set out in resolution 1325 (2000) and all subsequent Security Council resolutions on women and peace and security, the most recent of which was resolution 2242 (2015).” (A/73/738, para. 13)

**Support for women's participation and inclusion in peace and security processes**

- In the peace process and inter-communal trust building (2453 (2019), OP 4(e); A/73/738)

**Engagement with civil society, including women's groups, as part of mandate implementation**

- In context of the peace process and inter-communal trust building (2453 (2019), OP 4(e); A/73/738)

### DRC (MONUSCO)

**Gender mainstreamed across the mandate of the mission**

- Take fully into account gender as a cross-cutting issue (2147 (2014), OP 27; 2463 (2019), OP 32)
- Ensure gender concerns are integrated into all operations and strategic aspects of MONUSCO’s work (2147 (2014), OP 4(a)(iii))

**Support for women's participation and inclusion in peace and security processes**

- At all levels for the maintenance of peace and security (2463 (2019), OP 32)
- In the national political dialogue (2147 (2014), OP 27) and political processes more broadly, including through the implementation of an action plan to advance women's political involvement and representation (A/73/816)
- In DDR and SSR processes (2147 (2014), OP 27)
- In protection of civilians' activities (2348 (2017), OP 37; 2463 (2019), OP 32)
- In conflict prevention and resolution activities (2463 (2019), OP 32)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Gender mainstreamed across the mandate of the mission</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>Gender perspective taken into account in all of the mission’s work (1949 (2010), OP 19; 2458 (2019), PP, OP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti (BINUH)</td>
<td>Gender mainstreamed across the mandate of the mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti (MINUJUSTH)</td>
<td>Take fully into account gender as a cross-cutting issue (2350 (2017), OP 15; 2466 (2019), OP 12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq (UNAMI)</td>
<td>Gender mainstreamed across the mandate of the mission</td>
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</table>

**Protect, promote human rights**
- Monitor and report on human rights, including SGBV (A/73/816)

**Support for gender-sensitive peace and security processes**
- Support inclusive SSR processes which deliver security, enforcement, and justice to women (2409 (2018), OP 37(ii)(b); 2463 (2019), OP 30(ii)(b))
- Promote gender-sensitive and non-sexist communication in the media/improve coverage of women in politics, peace & security (A/73/816)

**Protection of civilians, including specifically women, and prevention and response to SGBV**
- Identify threats to civilians, including all forms of SGBV (1925 (2010), OP 12(c); 2098 (2013), OP 12(a)(iii); 2147 (2014), OP 4(a)(iii); 2409 (2018), OP 36(i)(b); 2463 (2019), OP 29(i)(b))
- Accelerate implementation of MARA and engage w/parties to conflict to seek commitments to prevent and respond to CRSV (2098 (2013), OP 12(a)(iii); 2147 (2014), OP 4(a)(iii); 2409 (2018), OP 36(i)(b); 2463 (2019), OP 29(i)(b))

**Engagement with civil society, including women’s groups, as part of mandate implementation**
- In context of conflict prevention and resolution efforts (2463 (2019), OP 32; A/73/816)
- In the context of ensuring peace, stability, and civic space (A/73/816)

**Enhanced reporting on various dimensions of WPS**
- Impact of the conflict on women using disaggregated data and any “gender considerations made” (2463 (2019), OP 46(ii))

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**Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS)**
- Gender mainstreamed across the mandate of the mission
- Women’s participation in peacebuilding and implementation of the NAP on Gender (1949 (2010), OP 19; 2203 (2015), OP 3(e); 2458 (2019), OP 5(d))
- Increase women’s social and political participation (2458 (2019), PP)
- Ensure a gender perspective in peacebuilding in line with 1325 (2000) (1876 (2009), OP 3(i); 2203 (2015), OP 3(e); 2458 (2019), OP 5(d))

**Haiti (BINUH)**
- Gender mainstreamed across the mandate of the mission
- Women’s participation in peacebuilding and implementation of the NAP on Gender (1949 (2010), OP 19; 2203 (2015), OP 3(e); 2458 (2019), OP 5(d))

**Haiti (MINUJUSTH)**
- Gender mainstreamed across the mandate of the mission
- Women’s participation in peacebuilding and implementation of the NAP on Gender (1949 (2010), OP 19; 2203 (2015), OP 3(e); 2458 (2019), OP 5(d))

**Iraq (UNAMI)**
- Gender mainstreamed across the mandate of the mission
- Women’s participation in peacebuilding and implementation of the NAP on Gender (1949 (2010), OP 19; 2203 (2015), OP 3(e); 2458 (2019), OP 5(d))
## Lebanon (UNIFIL)

**Gender mainstreamed across the mandate of the mission**

**Support for women’s participation and inclusion in peace and security processes**
- At all levels of decision-making (2433 (2018), OP 24; 2485 (2019), OP 25)
- Support the implementation of the National Action Plan on 1325 (2000) (2485 (2019), PP)

**Ensure processes are gender-sensitive**
- Support the implementation of the National Action Plan on 1325 (2000) (2485 (2019), PP)

**Consultation and engagement with civil society, including women’s rights groups and/or women’s civil society organizations**
- Support the implementation of the National Action Plan on 1325 (2000) (2485 (2019), PP)

**Enhanced reporting on various dimensions of WPS**
- Enhanced reporting on implementation of mandate to mainstream gender (2433 (2018), OP 24; 2485 (2019), OP 25)

## Libya (UNSMIL)

**Gender mainstreamed across the mandate of the mission**
- Take fully into account a gender perspective (2376 (2017), OP 4; 2434 (2018), OP 4; 2486 (2019), OP 5)

**Support for women’s participation and inclusion in peace and security processes**
- In the democratic transition (2376 (2017), OP 4; 2434 (2018), OP 4; 2486 (2019), OP 5)
- In reconciliation efforts (2376 (2017), OP 4; 2434 (2018), OP 4; 2486 (2019), OP 5)
- In the security sector (2376 (2017), OP 4; 2434 (2018), OP 4; 2486 (2019), OP 5)
- In national institutions (2376 (2017), OP 4; 2434 (2018), OP 4)
- In electoral processes (2144 (2014), OP 6(a); 2040 (2012), OP 6(a); 2095 (2013), OP 7(a))
- In constitution drafting (2095 (2013), OP 7(a))

**Protection and promotion of human rights, including women’s rights**
- Monitor and protect human rights, including women’s rights (2040 (2012), OP 6(b); 2095 (2013), OP 7(b); 2144 (2014), OP 6(b))

**Support for gender-sensitive peace and security processes**
- Support police and security institutions are accessible and responsive to women (2040 (2012), OP 6(c))

**Protection of civilians, including specifically women, and prevention and response to SGBV**
- Assist GNA in the protection of women and girls from SGBV (2434 (2018), OP 4; 2486 (2019), OP 5)

## Mali (MINUSMA)

**Gender mainstreamed across the mandate of the mission**
- Take into account the resolutions on WPS (2100 (2013), OP 24)

**Support for women’s participation and inclusion in peace and security processes**
- In the implementation of the Agreement (2100 (2013), OP 13(c)(vi); 2227 (2015), OP 23; 2295 (2016), OP 26; 2480 (2019), OPs 4, 5, 56)
- In efforts to facilitate dialogue and reconciliation at all levels (2100 (2013), OP 13(c)(vi); 2100 (2013), OP 25; 2227 (2015), OP 23; 2295 (2016), OP 26)

**Protection and promotion of human rights, including women’s rights**
- Monitor, investigate and report on violations against women, including SGBV (2039 (2012), OP 16(d)(iii); 2100 (2013), OP 13(c)(vi))
- Support implementation of the Joint Communiqué on SGBV, including development of draft law on prevention, prosecution and response to GBV (2480 (2019), OP 58)

**Support for gender-sensitive peace and security processes**
### Annex. UN peace operations: summary of WPS-related mandate provisions

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Gender mainstreamed across the mandate of the mission</th>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Support for women’s participation and inclusion in peace and security processes</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In the prevention and resolution of conflict (2461 (2019), OP 9)</td>
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<tr>
<td>In peacebuilding (2461 (2019), OP 9)</td>
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<td>In elections (2461 (2019), OP 9)</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Protection and promotion of human rights, including women’s rights</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Address sexual violence; monitor and investigate violations against women (2102 (2013), OP 2(e)(iii); 2158 (2014), OP 12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promote respect for human rights and women’s empowerment (2102 (2013), OP 2(d)(i))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthen justice institutions to ensure accountability for crimes against women (2102 (2013), OP 2(d)(iv))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support implementation of the Joint Communiqué and the NAP to Combat SViC (2372 (2017), OP 43; 2461 (2019), OP 20)</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Protection of civilians, including specifically women, and prevention and response to SGBV</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prevent CRSV (2102 (2013), OP 2(d)(iii))</td>
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<tr>
<td>Protect women and girls from sexual violence, including SEA (2372 (2017), OP 43)</td>
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<tr>
<th>Engagement with civil society, including women’s groups, as part of mandate implementation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In order to ensure perspectives of civil society are incorporated into various political processes (2232 (2015), OP 33)</td>
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<tr>
<th>Enhanced reporting on various dimensions of WPS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Information on violations or abuses against women, including SGBV (2102 (2013), OP 2(e)(iii))</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>South Sudan (UNMISS)</th>
<th>Gender mainstreamed across the mandate of the mission</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Take fully into account gender as a cross-cutting issue (2241 (2015), OP 12; 2459 (2019), OP 17)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Execute mandate in a ‘gender-responsive’ manner (2459 (2019), OP 12)</td>
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<tr>
<th>Support for women’s participation and inclusion in peace and security processes</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In the implementation of the Agreement (2241 (2015), OP 12)</td>
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<tr>
<td>In conflict prevention, mitigation and resolution of inter-communal conflict (2155 (2014), OP 4(a)(v); 2223 (2015), OP 4(a)(v); 2459 (2019), OP 7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In decision-making forums (1996 (2011), OP 3(a)(ii))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In ceasefire monitoring (2241 (2015), OP 12)</td>
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<tr>
<td>In SSR and DDR processes (2241 (2015), OP 12)</td>
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<td>In constitutional development (2241 (2015), OP 12)</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Support for gender-sensitive peace and security processes</td>
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<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Monitor, investigate and report on violations against women, including SGBV (2155 (2014), OP 4(b)(ii))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection of civilians, including specifically women, and prevention and response to SGBV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• In context of PoC activities, provide specific protection for women (2155 (2014), OP 4(a)(i); 2459 (2019), OP 7(a)(i))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Deter and prevent SGBV (S/RES/1996 (2011), OP 24; 2327 (2016), OP 7(a)(v); 2459 (2019), OP 7(a)(i))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Support sensitization of police and civil society actors on issues related to SGBV (2223 (2015), OP 4(a)(vi); 2406 (2018), OP 7(a)(vii))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Provide technical assistance or advice on investigation and prosecution of SGBV (2406 (2018), OP 7(a)(vii))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Strengthen prevention and response to SGBV, including by ensuring risks are part of data collection, threat analysis, and early warning systems and engaging with victims and women’s organizations (2459 (2019), OP 17)</td>
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<tr>
<th>Engagement with civil society, including women’s groups, as part of mandate implementation</th>
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<tr>
<td>• In context of preventing and responding to SGBV (2459 (2019), OP 17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• In context of support for gender-sensitive community violence reduction programs (2459 (2019), OP 7(a)(vi))</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Enhanced reporting on implementation of mandate to mainstream gender (2241 (2015), OP 12; 2459 (2019), OP 17)</td>
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</table>

Sudan (Abyei) (UNISFA) Gender mainstreamed across the mandate of the mission |
• Take fully into account gender as a cross-cutting issue (2469 (2019), OP 28) |
| Support for women’s participation and inclusion in peace and security processes |
• In “all aspects of operations” (2469 (2019), OP 28) |
| • In confidence-building measures and community dialogue (2469 (2019), OP 18) |

Sudan (Darfur) (UNAMID) Gender mainstreamed across the mandate of the mission |
| Support for women’s participation and inclusion in peace and security processes |
• In the peace process, conflict resolution, peacebuilding (2429 (2018), OP 35) |
| • Support capacity of women to participate in the peace process, including through political representation, economic empowerment and protection from GBV (2429 (2018), OP 27) |

Protection and promotion of human rights, including women’s rights |
• Support implementation of provisions in the DPA / DDPA related to women’s rights (2363 (2017), OP 15(a)(xi)) |
| • Monitor, verify and draw attention to violations of women’s rights (2429 (2018), OP 19(iii)) |
| • Ensure protection of women and girls’ rights in drawdown (2429 (2018), OP 27) |

Support for gender-sensitive peace and security processes |
• Ensure a gender perspective in transition planning (S/PRST/2018/4, para. 5) |

Protection of civilians, including specifically women, and prevention and response to SGBV |
• In context of PoC strategy, provide specific protection for women and address SGBV (2003 (2011), OP 22; 2495 (2019), OP 3(iii)) |
| • Conduct community-oriented policing initiatives which integrates SGBV (2429 (2018), OP 19(iii)) |
| • Monitor and support implementation of resolution 2106 (2013), develop structured framework to address CRSV, and strengthen MARA on SGBV (2429 (2018), OP 35) |

Engagement with civil society, including women’s groups, as part of mandate implementation |
• In context of support for women’s participation in peace processes and other processes (2429 (2018), OP 35) |
### Enhanced reporting on various dimensions of WPS
- Information on implementation of WPS resolutions (2003 (2011), OP 22)
- Information on support for women’s participation and all related WPS tasks (2429 (2018), OP 35)

#### West Africa & the Sahel (UNOWAS)

#### Gender mainstreamed across the mandate of the mission
- Gender mainstreaming (S/PRST/2016/11, para. 3)
- Paying particular attention to WPS agenda (S/2016/1129, Function 1.3)

#### Support for women’s participation and inclusion in peace and security processes
- In political, peace and security processes (S/PRST/2017/2, para. 6)
- In initiatives to counter terrorism and prevent violent extremism (S/PRST/2018/16, para. 12)
- Facilitate exchange of information on women’s participation and leadership in electoral processes (S/2016/1129, Function 4.1)

#### Protection and promotion of human rights, including women’s rights
- Facilitate exchange of information on best practices related to gender equality (S/2016/1129, Function 4.1)

#### Support for gender-sensitive peace and security processes
- Gender perspective in addressing root causes of conflict, conflict prevention & management strategies (S/PRST/2018/16, para. 12; S/2016/1129, 4.3; S/2016/1129, Obj. 4; S/2019/7)
- Conduct gender-sensitive research and data on drivers of radicalization for women, impacts of CT on women’s human rights and women's organizations (2349 (2017), OP 8; S/2019/7)

#### Enhanced reporting on various dimensions of WPS
- Efforts to ensure conflict prevention is gender-sensitive, increasing women’s participation in CT / CVE efforts (S/PRST/2018/16, para. 12)
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Sahel (S/2018/749)


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Colombia (S/2018/386, Netherlands)


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Côte d’Ivoire (S/2018/958, para. 42)


Afghanistan (S/2018/1092, para. 8); Guinea-Bissau (S/2018/771, para. 44); Mali (S/2018/273, para. 12)

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Kosovo (S/2018/767, para. 5)

Lebanon (S/2018/703, paras. 51, 53)


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CAR (S/2018/611, para. 14); Mali (S/2018/541, para. 16)

Afghanistan (S/2018/539, para. 60); Afghanistan (Field Mission) (S/2018/419, para. 3); Libya (S/2018/140, para. 95; S/2018/423, para. 89; S/2018/780, para. 83); Mali (S/2018/215, para. 84; S/2018/666, para. 88; S/2018/1175, para. 69); Syria (S/2017/24, para. 43)


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111 Burundi (S/2018/1028, para. 20); Libya (S/2018/780, para. 60)

112 Libya (S/PV.8488), Report of the Secretary-General on WPS (S/2019/800)

113 Libya (S/PV.8159, Peru, Sweden; S/PV.8263, Peru, Sweden; S/PV.8312, Salamanca; S/PV.8341, Poland; S/PV.8348, UK), Security Council IEG on WPS: Summary of the meeting on Libya, 28 November 2018. Security Council IEG on WPS background materials available here: https://www.unwomen.org/en/what-we-do-peace-and-security/un-security-council


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NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security members are: Amnesty International; CARE International; Center for Reproductive Rights; Consortium on Gender, Security and Human Rights; Cordaid; Global Justice Center; Global Network of Women Peacebuilders; Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict; Human Rights Watch; International Alert; MADRE; Nobel Women’s Initiative; OutRight Action International; Oxfam; Plan International; Refugees International; Saferworld; Women’s Refugee Commission; and Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom. The NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security is a project of Tides Center.

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Cover Photos: From left to right, women civil society activists briefing the council in 2018: Razia Sultana, Justine Masika Bihamba, Jeanine Bandu Bahati, Randa Siniora, Ghizaal Haress. All pictures: UN Photo / Multiple photographers. Editing: Gabrielle Belli.


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