Peacebuilder: Metra Mehran
President, Excellencies,
Thank you for the opportunity to brief you today. My name is Metra Mehran, Founder of the Afghanistan Justice Archive,[1] a digital repository that documents both the Taliban’s repression through decrees and directives, as well as the resistance of women in Afghanistan, in the hope that they will someday secure justice. Our documentation substantiates what women from Afghanistan mean when they call the situation in the country “gender apartheid” — a systematic, institutionalized and deliberate framework of gender-based oppression.
Since August 2021, the Taliban have enacted over 230 decrees,[2] including the 2024 regulation on the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice (PVPV),[3] directly targeting women, girls and LGBTQI+ individuals because of their gender, by denying them nearly every fundamental human right, including to education, employment, health, and the freedoms of speech, movement, and religion or belief.[4] The Taliban have even criminalized women’s voices and faces.[5]
Earlier this year, in January 2026, the Taliban enacted a Criminal Procedure Code that builds upon the PVPV law by formalizing discrimination, legalizing violence against women, and dividing society into the “free” and the “enslaved.”[6] It criminalizes same-sex sexual conduct, with punishment including death.[7] Men effectively own their wives, and are explicitly permitted to “discipline” women using physical punishment, as long as their bones are not broken and their skin is not bruised.[8] The Code treats men as the primary legal authority within the justice system.
Further, the Criminal Procedure Code imposes severe punishments, including lashings, imprisonment and even death, for criticizing Taliban leadership,[9] and criminalizes failure to report meetings of “opponents of the government.”[10] In a context where civil society, journalists and human rights defenders are already facing reprisals and retaliation for their work,[11] this provision further institutionalizes the Taliban’s repression.
In May, the Taliban ratified the “Code on Judicial Separation of Spouses,” which effectively permits child marriage[12] and further limits women’s ability to obtain a separation or divorce.[13]
Afghanistan’s ethnic and religious groups, especially women from Shia and Ismaili communities,[14] often face the most severe forms of violence and political exclusion at the hands of the Taliban.[15]
The Taliban punish any violations of their decrees with violence, imprisonment or even death.[16] Moreover, while the Muhtasibs enforce the Taliban’s Vice and Virtue policies in public spaces, the system also deliberately compels ordinary men to police the behavior of their female relatives.[17] For women, there is no freedom within or outside the home. Over the past four years, I have worked with women who resist; they have faced house raids, arbitrary arrests, imprisonment, sexual violence, including forced nudity, rape and gang rape,[18] torture and even death, in retaliation for their activism.
Gender apartheid has also pushed Afghanistan into an escalating humanitarian crisis. Today, 21.9 million people need humanitarian assistance, and over 10.7 million of them are women and girls.[19] Yet women aid workers in Afghanistan themselves face restrictions and exclusion,[20] including bans on entering UN premises rendering effective and principled humanitarian aid impossible.[21] How can women deliver or receive aid, when they are not allowed to be seen by or speak to men?
The Taliban’s oppression of women is not incidental, but central to their model of governance: they have created a system of total control.
Despite the Taliban’s growing repression and complete lack of accountability, some members of the international community are increasingly normalizing relations with the Taliban. Continued engagement with the Taliban has not made them more open to the international community, as some had hoped, but rather, emboldened them to further institutionalize their repression. There has been a lack of clarity from the international community about how it envisions ongoing political processes. This has created profound fear and distrust among people in Afghanistan. For instance, the Doha process, intended to reintegrate Afghanistan into the international community on the condition that it complies with its international obligations, has lost much of its legitimacy by excluding women and diverse stakeholders in Afghanistan in order to secure the Taliban’s participation.[22] The Mosaic approach has similarly thus far failed to provide a clear roadmap for principled engagement, that is, engagement rooted in measurable benchmarks, including safeguards to protect the human rights of all people in Afghanistan, and stipulating consequences, should engagement yield no results.
Since August 2021 the Security Council has adopted several resolutions and press statements condemning the Taliban’s restrictions.[23] Yet, what meaningful follow-up or accountability has actually taken place? When violations are repeatedly condemned without consequences, questions about international complicity inevitably arise.
The women and girls of Afghanistan cannot afford international inaction. Despite our disappointment, we still do not believe that the answer is to walk away from these systems. We are pursuing every pathway available to us, whether through the International Criminal Court (ICC), the International Court of Justice (ICJ) or the codification of gender apartheid in the Crimes Against Humanity Treaty. We know that we cannot afford to abandon them, because our lives depend on whether these institutions, including this Council, uphold the principles they were created to defend.
Excellencies,
Finally, I turn to your current negotiations on the future of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). Over the last few years, the challenge has not been the strength of UNAMA’s mandate, but rather, the need for its robust implementation, a concern repeatedly raised by civil society in Afghanistan. Given the deepening rights crisis in Afghanistan, I urge you to ensure that UNAMA’s mandate remains firmly grounded in human rights and that it is tasked with prioritizing implementation of this Council’s resolutions on the Women, Peace and Security agenda across its work. Political or diplomatic engagement with the Taliban must not come at the expense of the rights, dignity and meaningful participation of women and girls. UNAMA also needs impartial and principled leadership at its helm by appointing a Special Representative who will prioritize the concerns of the people of Afghanistan in discharging UNAMA’s mandate.
I conclude by urging the Security Council, UNAMA and the international community to do the following:
- Refrain from political and diplomatic engagement that normalizes the Taliban’s repressive policies, including hosting, accrediting or entering into any agreements with the Taliban. As Taliban repression deepens in Afghanistan, now, more than ever, we need the international community to prioritize principles over pragmatism.
- Ensure the full, equal, meaningful and safe participation of the women of Afghanistan, as well as civil society organizations, human rights defenders, victim and survivor groups, and political opposition groups, both in UNAMA’s work, as well as in all UN-led political processes, including the Doha process, and future discussions regarding inclusive governance.
- Create and expand emergency protection and resettlement pathways for at-risk women, and refrain from forcibly returning any refugees or asylum seekers to Afghanistan.[24]
- Provide independent local civil society organizations financial and political support to sustain their critical work in Afghanistan.
- Scale up humanitarian assistance to meet growing needs. However, to ensure principled humanitarian delivery, aid actors must not comply with any Taliban restrictions that exclude or discriminate against women.
- UNAMA’s advocacy for human rights, including the rights of women, girls and LGBTQI+ individuals is critical. It must also strengthen its human rights monitoring and reporting, especially on violations affecting women, girls and marginalized communities, and reprisals against women human rights defenders.
- Member States should support all monitoring and accountability efforts, including through the ICC and UN Special Procedures. Ensure financial support for the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Afghanistan (IIM-A) and support efforts to codify gender apartheid in the draft Crimes Against Humanity Treaty.
Excellencies,
The longer the Taliban’s repressive rule is allowed to continue, the more lasting its damage on the lives of Afghanistan’s women and girls will be.
States and international institutions have legal obligations under international law to act now. And we intend to hold the international community to account.
This is not only our fight. It is a test of our global system. A test of multilateralism. And a test of whether the principles recited in chambers like this truly mean anything in practice.
Thank you.
Photo: UN Photo/Loey Felipe
[1] Afghanistan Justice Archive, https://afghanistanjustice.org/.
[2] Documentation by Afghanistan Justice Archive.
[3] UNAMA, “Report on the Implementation, Enforcement and Impact of the Law on the Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice in Afghanistan,” April 2025, https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/unama_pvpv_report_10_april_2025_english.pdf.
[4] See Rawadari, “Afghanistan Human Rights Situation Report 2025,” pp. 59-73, 25 March 2026, https://rawadari.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/RW_Annual_Report_Human_Rights_AFG-ENG.pdf; Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, “Concluding observations on the fourth periodic report of Afghanistan,” 10 July 2025, CEDAW/C/AFG/CO/4, https://docs.un.org/en/CEDAW/C/AFG/CO/4.
[5] France24, “Taliban leader bans windows overlooking places ‘usually used by women’,” 29 December 2024, https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20241229-taliban-leader-bans-windows-overlooking-women-s-areas; CNN, “Taliban bans the sound of women’s voices singing or reading in public,” 22 August 2024, https://edition.cnn.com/2024/08/22/middleeast/taliban-law-women-voices-intl-latam.
[6] UN Special Procedures Communication to Afghanistan, OL OTH 33/2026, 10 April 2026, https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=30851; Belquis Ahmadi, “The Taliban’s New Criminal Regulation Legalizes Slavery, Violence, and Repression of Women,” Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security, 30 January 2026, https://giwps.georgetown.edu/2026/01/30/taliban-regulation-legalizes-slavery-violence-repression-women; Rawadari, “Press Release Regarding the Implications of the “The Criminal Procedure Code for Courts” Issued by the Taliban,” 22 January 2026, https://rawadari.org/press_releases/press-release-regarding-the-implications-of-the-the-criminal-procedure-code-for-courts-issued-by-the-taliban/.
[7] Afghanistan Analysts Network, “AAN’s Unofficial Translation of the Penal Code for Courts,” Article 60, p. 28, updated 27 April 2026, https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2026/02/20260427-penal-code-Revised-FINAL.pdf;
UN Special Procedures Communication to Afghanistan, OL OTH 33/2026, p. 12, 10 April 2026, https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=30851.
[8] Afghanistan Analysts Network, “AAN’s Unofficial Translation of the Penal Code for Courts,” Article 32, p. 21, updated 27 April 2026, https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2026/02/20260427-penal-code-Revised-FINAL.pdf.
[9] Afghanistan Analysts Network, “AAN’s Unofficial Translation of the Penal Code for Courts,” Articles 17-21, pp. 17-19, updated 27 April 2026, https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2026/02/20260427-penal-code-Revised-FINAL.pdf; UN Special Procedures Communication to Afghanistan, OL OTH 33/2026, pp. 12-13, 10 April 2026, https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=30851; Rawadari, “Press Release Regarding the Implications of the “The Criminal Procedure Code for Courts” Issued by the Taliban,” 22 January 2026, https://rawadari.org/press_releases/press-release-regarding-the-implications-of-the-the-criminal-procedure-code-for-courts-issued-by-the-taliban/.
[10] Punishable by two years’ imprisonment. UNAMA, “Update on the human rights situation in Afghanistan: January – March 2026 Update,” p. 6, 12 May 2026, https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-05/English%20-%20UNAMA%20HRS%20Update%20on%20human%20rights%20in%20Afghanistan%20Jan-Mar%202026.pdf; Afghanistan Analysts Network, “AAN’s Unofficial Translation of the Penal Code for Courts,” Article 24, pp. 19-20, updated 27 April 2026, https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2026/02/20260427-penal-code-Revised-FINAL.pdf.
[11] See UNAMA, “Update on the human rights situation in Afghanistan: January – March 2026 Update,” pp. 3-4, 12 May 2026, https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-05/English%20-%20UNAMA%20HRS%20Update%20on%20human%20rights%20in%20Afghanistan%20Jan-Mar%202026.pdf; Rawadari, “Afghanistan Human Rights Situation Report 2025,” pp. 37-39, 55-57, 25 March 2026, https://rawadari.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/RW_Annual_Report_Human_Rights_AFG-ENG.pdf; Rawadari, “Torture and Ill-Treatment: The State of Prisons in Taliban-Controlled Afghanistan,” pp. 16-17, June 2025, https://rawadari.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/RW_TortureReport_English-Final.pdf.
[12] OHCHR, “Afghanistan: Silence is not consent to child marriage, UN committee condemns,” 1 June 2026, https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2026/06/afghanistan-silence-not-consent-child-marriage-un-committee-condemns.
[13] UN Women, “UN Women Afghanistan statement on Decree No. 18 issued by the de facto authorities, 26 May 2026, https://www.unwomen.org/en/news-stories/statement/2026/05/un-women-afghanistan-statement-on-decree-no-18-issued-by-the-de-facto-authorities; UNAMA, “UNAMA Statement on Afghanistan’s De Facto Authorities’ Decree No. 18 “Code on Judicial Separation of Spouses,” 21 May 2026, https://unama.unmissions.org/en/news/unama-statement-on-afghanistans-de-facto-authorities-decree-no-18-code-on-judicial.
[14] See Rawadari, “Afghanistan Human Rights Situation Report 2025,” pp. 75-79, 25 March 2026, https://rawadari.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/RW_Annual_Report_Human_Rights_AFG-ENG.pdf; Rawadari, ‘The Human Rights Situation of Ismaili Shias in Afghanistan,” 24 December 2025, https://rawadari.org/reports/the-human-rights-situation-of-ismaili-shias-in-afghanistan/; “Situation of human rights in Afghanistan – Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan, Richard Bennett,” ¶62-65, 8 October 2025, A/80/432, https://docs.un.org/en/A/80/432.
[15] Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, “Concluding observations on the fourth periodic report of Afghanistan,” ¶40-41, 10 July 2025, CEDAW/C/AFG/CO/4, https://docs.un.org/en/CEDAW/C/AFG/CO/4.
[16] See UNAMA, “Update on the human rights situation in Afghanistan: October-December 2025 Update,” pp. 3-4, 8 February 2026, https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-02/ENGLISH%20-%20UNAMA%20HRS%20Update%20on%20human%20rights%20in%20Afghanistan%20Oct-Dec%202025_0.pdf; “Situation of human rights in Afghanistan – Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan, Richard Bennett,” ¶26-33, 8 October 2025, A/80/432, https://docs.un.org/en/A/80/432.
[17] UNAMA, “Report on the Implementation, Enforcement and Impact of the Law on the Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice in Afghanistan,” p. 11, April 2025, https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/unama_pvpv_report_10_april_2025_english.pdf.
[18] Report of the Secretary-General on conflict-related sexual violence, ¶16-19, 21 April 2026, S/2026/321, https://docs.un.org/en/s/2026/321.
[19] OCHA, “Afghanistan: Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2026,” 30 December 2025, https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/afghanistan/afghanistan-humanitarian-needs-and-response-plan-2026-december-2025.
[20] See UN Security Council Briefing on Afghanistan by Negina Yari, 10 December 2025, https://www.womenpeacesecurity.org/resource/un-security-council-briefing-afghanistan-negina-yari/.
[21] OHCHR, “Afghanistan: UN experts demand immediate end to Taliban restrictions on women at UN premises,” 31 March 2026, https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2026/03/afghanistan-un-experts-demand-immediate-end-taliban-restrictions-women-un.
[22] Nobel Women’s Initiative, “Exclusion of Afghan Women from Negotiations Puts Women at Further Risk,” 12 July 2024, https://www.nobelwomensinitiative.org/exclusion_of_afghan_women_from_negotiations; NGO Working Group on WPS, “Letter to the UN, Security Council and Member States on Women’s Rights in Afghanistan,” 6 June 2024, https://www.womenpeacesecurity.org/resource/letter-womens-rights-afghanistan-06-2024/.
[23] Resolutions 2818 (2026), 2777 (2025), 2681 (2023) and 2626 (2022); Security Council Press Statements SC/15957 (27 December 2024), SC/15165 (27 December 2022), SC/14902 (24 May 2022), SC/14842 (27 March 2022) and SC/14604 (16 August 2021).
[24] OHCHR, “Türk: States must halt involuntary returns to Afghanistan,” 22 May 2026, https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2026/05/turk-states-must-halt-involuntary-returns-afghanistan; UNHCR, “UNHCR Guidance Note on Afghanistan – Update II,” September 2025, https://www.refworld.org/policy/countrypos/unhcr/2025/150460.